Download the printable 33-page PDF (includes two appendices, on scenario assumptions and transmission cost estimates) HERE.

For an Excel workbook that includes all calculations (and can be used for sensitivity analysis), click HERE.

By Peter Lang. Peter is a retired geologist and engineer with 40 years experience on a wide range of energy projects throughout the world, including managing energy R&D and providing policy advice for government and opposition. His experience includes: hydro, geothermal, nuclear, coal, oil, and gas plants and a wide range of energy end use management projects.

Summary

Here I review the paper “Simulations of Scenarios with 100% Renewable Electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market” by Elliston et al. (2011a) (henceforth EDM-2011).  That paper does not analyse costs, so I have also made a crude estimate of the cost of the scenario simulated and three variants of it.

For the EDM-2011 baseline simulation, and using costs derived for the Federal Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET, 2011b), the costs are estimated to be: $568 billion capital cost, $336/MWh cost of electricity and $290/tonne CO2 abatement cost.

That is, the wholesale cost of electricity for the simulated system would be seven times more than now, with an abatement cost that is 13 times the starting price of the Australian carbon tax and 30 times the European carbon price.  (This cost of electricity does not include costs for the existing electricity network).

Although it ignores costings, the EDM-2011 study is a useful contribution.  It demonstrates that, even with highly optimistic assumptions, renewable energy cannot realistically provide 100% ofAustralia’s electricity generation.  Their scenario does not have sufficient capacity to meet peak winter demand, has no capacity reserve and is dependent on a technology – ‘gas turbines running on biofuels’ – that exist only at small scale and at high cost.

Introduction

I have reviewed and critiqued the paper “Simulations of Scenarios with 100% Renewable Electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market” by Elliston et al. (2011a) (henceforth EDM-2011).

This paper comments on the key assumptions in the EDM-2011 study.  It then goes beyond that work to estimate the cost for the baseline scenario and three variants of it and compares these four scenarios on the basis of CO2 emissions intensity, capital cost, cost of electricity and CO2 abatement cost.

Comments on the EDM-2011 study

The objective of the desktop study by EDM-2011 was to investigate whether renewable energy generation alone could meet the year 2010 electricity demand of the National Electricity Market (NEM).  Costs were not considered.  The study used computer simulation to match estimated energy generation by various renewable sources to the known hourly average demand in 2010.  This simulation, referred to here as the “baseline simulation” proposed a system comprising:

• 15.6 GW (nameplate generation capacity) of parabolic trough concentrating solar thermal (CST) plants with 15 hours thermal storage, located at six remote sites far from the major demand centres;

• 23.2 GW of wind farms at the existingNEMwind farm locations – scaled up in capacity from 1.5 GW existing in 2010;

• 14.6 GW of roof-top solar photovoltaic (PV) inBrisbane,Sydney,Canberra,MelbourneandAdelaide;

• 7.1 GW of existing hydro and pumped hydro;

• 24 GW of gas turbines running on biofuels;

• A transmission system where “power can flow unconstrained from any generation site to any demand site” – this theoretical construct is termed a “copperplate” transmission system.

The accompanying slide presentation by Elliston et al. (2011b), particularly slides 5 to 12, provides a succinct summary of the objective, scope for their simulation study, the exclusions from the scope, the assumptions and the results.

The results of the baseline simulation show that there are six hours during the year 2010 when demand is not met, with a maximum power supply shortfall of 1.33 GW.  It should be noted that the supply shortfall would be significantly greater with higher time resolutions, e.g. 5 minute data rather than the 1 hour increments used, but this limitation is not addressed by EDM-2011.

The EDM-2011 approach is more realistic than Beyond Zero Emissions (2010) “Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan” (critiqued by Nicholson and Lang (2010), Diesendorf (2010), Trainer (2010) and others), especially because EDM-2011’s approach, as they say, “is limited to the electricity sector in a recent year, providing a more straight forward basis for exploring this question of matching variable renewable energy sources to demand.”  As the authors say, “this approach minimises the number of working assumptions”.

Despite the lack of costings, the EDM-2011 study is a useful contribution.  It demonstrates that, even with highly optimistic assumptions, renewable energy cannot realistically provide 100% of our electricity generation.  The baseline simulation does not have sufficient capacity to meet peak winter demand, has no capacity reserve, and is dependent on a technology – gas turbines running on biofuels – that currently exist only at small scale and at high cost.

The study is based on a number of assumptions that I argue are unacceptable:

1. a system with insufficient capacity to meet the winter peak demand and no capacity reserve margin would violate Australian Energy Regulator (AER) requirements;

2. the assumed capacity factors for the renewable energy generators are too high to be credible for the average plant life in a 100% renewable energy system;

3. the assumptions about the way the existing hydro and pumped hydro facilities can be used are not practical;

4. the assumptions about pumping and generating capacity of the pumped hydro plants are unjustified;

5. the practicable capacity of gas generators running on biofuels (and the capability of the biofuel system to provide the fuel and store it until needed) has not been demonstrated and critical details are glossed over;

6. the assumptions about a ‘copper-plate’ transmission system is unrealistic;

7. the assumptions about reducing winter peak demand is highly optimistic and not borne out by recent experience.

These assumptions, and the cost of the system simulated are discussed in the following sections.

Comments on the technologies and assumptions

Gas turbines running on biofuels

Gas turbines running on biofuels are not a proven, commercially viable electricity generation technology at the scale required (IEA, 2007).

Although some countries, e.g. those quoted by EDM-2011, do have some electricity generated by biomass, there are a wide variety of technologies used, and very little of it is gas turbines running on biofuels.  Much of it is in small plants, such as combined heat and power (CHP) fuelled by wood waste, chicken litter and other waste products.  Most of it is in thermal plants, not gas turbines.  IEA/OECD (2010), Table 3.7 lists four countries with some biogas capacity but this is mostly as reciprocating engine generators on waste dumps, sewage plants and the like.  According to Energy in Australia 2011 (DRET, 2011a),Australia has 231 MW of biogas generating capacity.

The land area that would be required for the required biofuel production would be unacceptable (1.6 million hectares of prime agricultural land in good years (Electropaedia); far more in droughts; this represents 74% of Australia’s irrigated agricultural land and 4% of all arable land (ARNA, 2009)).  The water requirements would also be unacceptable.  As would the truck movements required to collect the biomass.  A large commercial plant would need 100 to 200 truck movements per day and night collecting biomass from an area of 100 km radius (Simms et al., 2009)

The existing biomass electricity generation plants tend to be baseload or intermediate load plants.  Some of the European biogas systems, which use a biomass feed, take around 30 days to make the biogas from the biomass feed.  Such plants cannot be used for just the few days a year in winter when the CST, PV and Wind plants are unable to supply enough power to meet the demand.  The biogas plants listed in IEA (2010) Projected cost of electricity generation, Table 3.7 have assumed capacity factors of 80%, 85% and 90%.  These types of plants are not suited to the peaking plant role envisaged by EDM-2011.

Grattan Institute (2012) gives cost estimates for biofuel electricity generation inAustralia; however, the costs are based on a capacity factor of 70%. The report makes no mention of “gas turbines running on biofuels”.  The technologies mentioned are steam plants and reciprocating engines.  Following are three quotes from the report (Section 8):

For Bioenergy to provide 10% or more of Australia’s electricity needs it will have to use the large amounts of energy embodied within cereal crop residues

Even at 20 to 30 megawatts such plants require large amounts of biomass fuel to realise good capacity factors that are essential to offsetting the high upfront capital costs.

For a 30MW power plant at a 70% capacity factor the land area would be around 240,000 hectares and involve nearly 500 average sized wheat farms.

Note, these plants have to be run with capacity factors of around 70% to be economically viable.  They are certainly not the sort of ‘peaker’ plants envisaged by EDM-2011.

For the gas turbines running on biofuels to work as envisaged by EDM-2011, I envisage biogas would have to be produced throughout the year and stored for use during the few days in winter at the times when the remainder of the renewable energy generators cannot provide sufficient power.  The amount of biogas required per year is estimated to be 290 PJ (equivalent to 116% of natural gas consumed in electricity generation and 37% of total gas consumption in the eastern states in 2009-10).  But most of this is required over just a few short periods in winter.

The cost of electricity from the biogas plants is crudely estimated to be $563/MWh based on the 13% capacity factor assumed in the simulations.  Unlike natural-gas-fired gas turbines, which utilise low capital cost generators with readily available fuel, the biofuel proposal also requires capital intensive biofuel plants, year-round feedstock harvesting, and large-scale biogas storage and distribution infrastructure.

Given that the biogas option is so expensive, a cost estimate below was done for an alternative using natural gas instead of biogas.  All other assumptions are unchanged.

However, even this alternative would be much more expensive than a system that uses gas throughout the year.  In the baseline simulation, most of the gas generation would occur over a few short time spans each year.  That requires either the gas supply lines be sized to deliver the gas volumes needed over the short periods, or the gas must be stored at site for use when needed.  Either option will have a significant impact on the price of the delivered fuel and, therefore, on the cost of electricity.  The baseline simulation has 24 GW of gas generation capacity supplying 28.1 TWh of electricity per year.  However, EDM-2011’s Figure 3 shows that 26 GW is needed to provide a supply with no unserved energy and no unmet hours.  This capacity in the EDM-2011 baseline simulation is about 4 times the capacity of the existingNEMgas generators.

We should expect the generators’ fuel costs would increase by more than a factor of four.  One reason is that there is a small total consumption of gas over the year, but high usage rate for just a few short periods.  The gas supply system would have to provide the infrastructure to deliver the peak capacity demanded, but it would be paid for by a small quantity of gas sold per year.  So the gas price during the winter peak demand would have to be increased significantly.  A second reason the gas price would increase is that there would be a much higher demand for gas in winter at the same time as the gas demand peaks for winter heating.

Hydro

EDM-2011 assumes the water could be saved through most of the year and used on the few short periods in winter when the renewable energy generators cannot meet the demand.  This is not how our hydro schemes are designed to operate, nor capable of operating.  Here are some reasons why they cannot be operated in this way:

1. The generators would not be able to generate throughout the year to sell electricity at the time of peak demand.  Therefore, their revenue would be much less over the year.  So they would not be economically viable without a significant increase in the price they could charge for their electricity.

2. The hydro generation is needed throughout the year to balance the power surges in the system.  That is one of the most valuable functions of the hydro system and it will almost certainly be required to continue to serve that role.

3. Hydro cannot be stored all year and released in a massive river flush over a few days in winter.  To generate a great deal of energy over just a few days would mean large water releases which would compromise the management of storage and releases for irrigation and can cause flooding and unacceptable erosion to the river banks downstream.

4. If the management of storage and irrigation releases is compromised the water would be released in winter and not available for irrigation in summer.

Hydro generation is constrained by the average water inflows and the water storage capacity to level out the fluctuation in water inflows over the long term.  Snowy Hydro’s capacity factor is about 14%.  Total generation by hydro in theNEMin 2009-10 was 12,522 GWh, and less in 2008-09 and 2007-08.  This places an upper limit on the amount of hydro generation the simulation should generate.

It should be assumed the hydro generators will operate much as they do now.

Pumped hydro

The simulation assumes there will be no increase in the existing hydro and pumped hydro energy storage (PHES) capacity in the NEM.  The existing pumped hydro plants have a maximum energy storage capacity of 20 GWh (Lang, 2010).  There are also limits on the amount of energy that can be stored per hour and the time of day when pumping can occur.

The EDM-2011 simulation does not appear to limit the amount of energy that can be stored per day by the pumped hydro plants.  I estimate the upper limit on the rate of storing recoverable energy with the pumped hydro plants is (MWh stored per hour):

Furthermore, there is a minimum duration for which the pumps must be able to operate continuously once started (e.g. 4 hours).  So days when the pumps will not be able to run continuously for the minimum duration will not be able to store energy.

There is also a limitation on the hours of the day when pumping and generating can occur.  They cannot occur at the same time.  Since most of the excess power that would otherwise be spilled occurs during daylight hours when the CST plants are able to generate excess energy, it would seem that, in the simulation, pumping must be reserved for daylight hours when there is excess solar generating capacity.

It is not clear from the EDM-2011 paper how the model handles the distinction between the energy generated by hydro versus pumped-hydro in the two Australian facilities that are both hydro and pumped-hydro (i.e. Tumut 3 and Kangaroo Creek & Bendeela).  EDM-2011’s Figure 2 shows pumped hydro generating at 2.2 GW for 40 hours on 9 and 10 January – a total of 88 GWh.  This is not possible.  There is only 20 GWh of storage and the pumps can store energy at about 4.5 GWh per day.  The existing system would need to pump for about 7 hours with all pumps operating to be able to generate for 5 hours at 0.9 GW.  So, the maximum daily generation, on consecutive days, would be about 4.5 GWh (excluding draw down from storage).

It would seem, with EDM-2011’s assumption of pumped-hydro being dispatched first, the 20 GWh of available storage would not be recharged each day since only about 4.5 GWh could be recharged each day.  In the simulation, pumped hydro contributes little during the critical winter days shown in Slide 12 (Elliston et al, 2011b) and generates nothing on some days, e.g. July 1, 2, 5 and 6.

Only Wivenhoe is a ‘pure’ pumped hydro facility.  The other two facilities are mostly hydro, with a small pumped hydro capacity.  Therefore, it is more realistic for the EDM-2011 simulation to assume the hydro capacity is 6.6 GW and the pumped hydro can generate about 4.5 GWh per day at up to 0.9 GW on consecutive days (more for a short time if drawing down from 20 GWh of stored energy).

Concentrating Solar Thermal (Parabolic Trough)

EDM-2011 assumes a 60% capacity factor for CST. The details underpinning this are sparse, thus a number of questions arise.  Is the assumed capacity factor a realistic average for the life of the plant?  What is the basis for the assumed capacity factor for CST?  Does it take into account:

1. The system performance and reliability that is likely to be achieved over the full book life of the facilities?

2. Spilled energy?

3. Scheduled and unscheduled outages?

4. Outages in the long transmission lines (which are mostly in remote areas far from the major service centres, so repairs will take longer than for the existing system)?  Inevitably, these transmission lines will have lower reliability than theNEMaverage.  Therefore, the capacity factor of the wind and CST plants would be reduced because of transmission line outages.

PV

What would be the average capacity factor for a fleet of 14.6 GW of roof-top, fixed plate PV over a 30 year life?

• How much would have to be spilled because the distribution system cannot handle the peak power output and power surges?

• How much would the assumed 16% capacity factor be reduced over the 30 year assumed life of each installation as a result of, for example:

• Performance deterioration of the solar panels

• Performance deterioration due to collecting dirt and lack of cleaning

• Some PV installations stop working or are disconnected, for whatever reason, and are never fixed or reconnected

• Buildings are sold, new owners are not interested in maintaining the system; some don’t keep it connected

• Buildings are knocked down and rebuilt without reinstalling the original PV system (the cost analysis assumes an average 30 year life for the original installations).

Is 14.6 GW of roof top solar PV realistic?  That would be the equivalent of 1 kW for every man woman and child, or average of over 2 kW per dwelling.  The PV is assumed to be on residential dwellings many of which could be on apartment blocks with limited roof space.  Many of the houses may have tree shading and many will not have sufficient north facing roof space for a 2 kW system.

While the inclusion of 14.6 GW of rooftop solar may be theoretically possible, theNEMcould not accommodate such a concentrated non-dispatchable and variable energy supply without large-scale distributed storage and advanced ‘smart-grid’ management.  All of which is expensive, but no attempt has been made to cost this

Wind

The assumed capacity factor of 30% for wind seems too high for a 100% renewable system.  Although this is a valid figure for individual wind farms, much of the wind energy from a large-scale network of farms would have to be spilled.  So the system wide average capacity factor for wind would be less than 30% in an all renewable energy system comprising primarily solar and wind generation.

Transmission

The EDM-2011 simulation assumes a ‘copper-plate’ transmission and distribution system (“power can flow unconstrained from any generation site to any demand site”).  To achieve this assumption would require extensive additions to the existing transmission and distribution systems.  The additions would need to have the capacity to carry the full peak power output from each generator plant.

The distribution systems would have to be upgraded to carry the peak power output of the PV systems in each area, or have smart grids to curtail the power output of the PV systems when they exceed the capacity of the distribution and transmission systems.

The additions to the transmission system would incur additional energy losses.  Therefore, the 204.4 TWh of electricity generated in 2010 must be increased to account for the extra transmission and distribution losses.  Appendix 2 contains more about the ‘copperplate’ transmission system assumptions, options and the basis for the cost estimates.

Winter peak demand reductions

EDM-2011 suggest methods to reduce the peak demand in winter so the renewable energy system can meet the demand.  However, this approach is inconsistent with the stated objective which is to find a 100% renewable energy solution that can meet the 2010NEMdemand.

The relationship between energy efficiency and peak load is complex. As such, caution needs to be exercised in assuming that energy efficiency measures will invariably lead to commensurate reductions in peak demand.  Indeed, electric vehicles and other unforeseeable new sources of demand may increase the peak.

Scenarios costed and compared

I have made a crude estimate of the capital cost, the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) and the CO2 Abatement Cost for the EDM-2011 baseline simulation.  I have included an estimated cost for needed additions to the transmission and distribution systems to allow them to approach the ‘copper-plate’ assumption.

I have also analysed three additional scenarios with changes to some of the baseline assumptions. The changed assumptions include: sufficient generating capacity to meet all demand and maintain about 20% capacity reserve (which is less than a typical level for modern electricity networks, and much less than in theNEM); natural gas instead of biogas; reduced system-wide capacity factors for CST, PV and Wind, and less capacity for additions to the transmission system. The reduced capacity factors of CST, PV and Wind are compensated for by increasing the amount of generation by natural gas.  Also included is additional generation to compensate for the increased energy loss in the additions to the transmission system.

The scenarios (detailed in Appendix 1) compared are:

1. Baseline EDM-2011 simulation (i.e. gas turbines running on biofuels)

2. Baseline with gas turbines running on natural gas

3. Less renewable energy + more gas to improve reliability – Scenario 2 with most pumped hydro capacity reassigned to hydro, reduced pumped hydro capacity factor, reduced capacity factor of CST, Wind and PV, increased natural gas capacity and capacity factor.

4. Reduced transmission capacity + more gas – Scenario 3 with half transmission capacity from wind farms, half transmission capacity of interstate interconnectors and reduced capacity factor of CST, PV, Wind and pumped hydro generation because of transmission constraints.

Capacity, capacity factor and generation assumptions

This section summarises the capacity, capacity factor, amount of generation contributed by each technology and each technology’s share of the total generation.  These data are presented for the baseline (Scenario 1) and the three varied scenarios identified above as Scenarios 2, 3 and 4.

1. Baseline (i.e. gas turbines running on biofuels)

Table 1 lists the capacity, capacity factor, annual generation and share of total generation for each technology in the baseline scenario.

The capacity factors for hydro and pumped hydro energy storage (PHES) are not explicitly stated in the EDM-2011 paper.  I have estimated the capacity factors for the baseline case by subtracting the energy generated by the other technologies from the total 2010NEMdemand (stated by EDM-2011 to be 204.4 TWh).

2. Baseline with gas turbines running on natural gas

Scenario 2 is the same as Scenario 1 but with the gas turbines running on natural gas instead of on biofuels.  Table 2 would be the same as Table 1 except the ‘biogas’ column would be renamed ‘natural gas’.

3. Less renewable energy + more gas to improve reliability

The capacity, capacity factor, annual generation, and share for Scenario 3 are:

The total capacity is not the sum of the individual capacities because all but 0.5 GW of the PHES capacity is included in ‘Hydro’. The total generation is increased from 204.400 GWh to 214,600 GWh for an assumed 5% energy losses in the additions to the transmission system.  The capacity of OCGT is increased from 24 to 33 GW to ensure 20% capacity reserve above peak winter demand.  From Slide 12 (Elliston et al, 2011b), on July 1 peak demand is about 32.5 GW. At the time of peak demand there is little wind, no solar and no pumped hydro generation (because the pumped hydro was not recharged during the day).  So, all the generation must be provided by hydro and gas.  To maintain 20% reserve capacity (in case of unavailable generators) we need about 39.6 GW of gas and hydro capacity.  We have 6.6 GW of hydro capacity, (excluding the 0.5 GW of ‘pure’ pumped hydro capacity because it may not have been recharged as was the case on July 1, 2, 5 and 6).  So we need about 33 GW of gas capacity to give a 20% capacity reserve on1 July 2010.

4. Reduced transmission capacity + more gas

The capacity, capacity factor, generation and share for Option 4 are:

In this option the capacity of the transmission line from the wind farms is arbitrarily halved. The capacity factor and generation for wind is reduced because the transmissions line capacity is reduced.  The capacity factor and generation for CST is reduced because the capacity of the intestate interconnector lines is halved, so less power can be transmitted from the solar plants, at times.  The capacity factor and generation of PHES is reduced because the reduced capacity of the interstate interconnectors will reduce the amount of excess power that can be transmitted to and stored in the PHES facilities.  The capacity factor and generation of OCGT is increased to compensate for the reduction in contribution from Wind and CST.

To clarify the differences between these assumptions for the four scenarios, the capacity of the technologies is compared in Figure 1, the capacity factor in Figure 2 and the annual generation in Figure 3.

Transmission and Distribution assumptions

For estimating the cost of the transmission system additions needed to achieve the ‘copper-plate’ assumption (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3), I assumed the transmission lines from each CST plant and wind farm will be sized to carry the rated power output of each facility.  The transmission lines are assumed to run from the plant to the closest capital city or to the nearest entry point to the interstate interconnector lines.

The capital cities would have to be linked with interconnector transmission lines. For this crude cost estimating exercise I assumed their capacity must be sufficient to transmit the lesser of the peak demand at the receiver end or generation capacity minus demand at the sender end.

Figure 4 provides a graphic summary of the estimated capacities for the interstate transmission lines, as well as the renewable energy generating capacity (excluding biofuelled gas turbines) and the winter peak demand for each state.

For Scenario 4, the capacity of the transmission lines from the wind farms is half the rated capacity of the wind farms.  The capacity of the interstate interconnectors is half the capacity assumed for the ‘Copper-plate’ scenario (shown in Figure 4).  The capacity factor of the PV, CST and wind farms is reduced because of the transmission capacity constraint.  Increased generation from gas compensates for the reduced generation from the CST and Wind generators.

The distribution system must allow the 14.6 GW of roof top solar PV, which is located in the residential areas, to supply their peak output without curtailment.  It is assumed the transmission network would need to be ungraded to achieve this.

CO2 emissions intensity

Figure 5 compares the CO2 emissions intensity of the four scenarios with the 2010 NEMemissions intensity (DCCEE, 2010).  The emissions intensities for the scenarios are for fossil fuel combustion only.  Importantly, they are for gas turbines running on natural gas and operating at optimum efficiency.  They do not take into account the higher emissions produced when the gas turbines are operating at less than optimum efficiency, for example during start up, shut down, spinning reserve, part load and when their power is cycling up and down to respond to changes in demand and changes in the output of the PV panels and wind farms.  If these were included the emissions intensity for the three scenarios that use natural gas would be higher. They would also be higher if fugitive emissions were included.  The emissions intensity figure for the NEMincludes fugitive emissions.  None of the emissions intensities are life-cycle emissions so they do not include the emissions embodied in the plants.  The emissions intensity used for the calculations is 0.622 t CO2/MWh ‘sent out’ (EPRI, 2010).  See Appendix 1 for basis of estimates of CO2 emissions intensity.

Cost estimating methodology and assumptions

This section explains how the capital cost, Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) and CO2 abatement cost for each scenario was estimated.

Except where otherwise stated, unit costs are derived from the Department of Resources Energy and Tourism (DRET, 2011b).

All costs are in 2009-10 Australian dollars.

Capital costs are ‘Total Plant Cost’ and do not include ‘Owner’s Costs’ and ‘Interest During Construction’ (IDC).

The inputs and intermediate calculation steps for each scenario are presented in Appendix 1.

Capital cost

Generation

The capital cost for each generator technology is the capacity times the unit cost ($/kW) for that technology.  The capacity of each generator technology for each scenario is in Tables 1, 3 and 4.  The unit cost for each technology, except gas turbines running on biofuels, CST and hydro, is the average of the high and low ‘Total Plant Cost’ in the DRET (2011c, 2011d) spreadsheets, converted to “sent out”. The central estimates are also presented in ACIL-Tasman (2010).  The costs in the DRET spreadsheet are ‘$/kW installed’, so they must be converted to ‘$/kW sent out’:

$/kW ‘sent out’ = $/kW ‘gross’ / (100% – ‘Auxiliary Load %’)

DRET unit costs for CST are for 6 hours thermal storage.  The EDM-2011 simulations assume 15 hours storage.  The capital cost for CST is factored up by 1.53 to account for the increase of solar field and thermal storage size to increase energy storage from 6 hours to 15 hours.  The factor of 1.53 was derived from the DRET (2011c) costs for CST without storage and CST with 6 hours storage, assuming a linear upscaling.

The DRET costs for PV are for 5 MW commercial installations.  However, the simulations assume residential, roof-top, solar PV panels.  These would normally be around 1 to 6 kW (say average 2 kW), not the 5 MW to which the DRET cost figures apply.  The capital cost for PV should possibly be factored up by about 1.5 or 2.  I have not done this in these analyses.

The DRET spreadsheets do not include ‘gas turbines running on biofuels’.  There is very little commercial experience or cost information available for this technology.  The capital cost and LCOE for gas turbines running on biofuels are based on $5,051/kW.  This was derived from (IEA, 2007), IEA (2010), Grattan Institute (2012) and considerations of what would be needed to provide a secure supply of biofuels inAustralia.   The cost estimate for gas generators running on biofuels has high uncertainty.

There is no capital cost for the hydro and pumped hydro plants because they already exist and there are no plans in the EDM-2011 baseline or the additional scenarios to build additional hydro plants.

Transmission additions and distribution enhancements

The capital cost estimate for the transmission system additions is the product of the transmission line length, the transmission line capacity and the unit cost ($/MW.km).  The unit cost for additional transmission lines is estimated at $1,500/MW.km.  This is derived from the AEMO (2011) cost estimates for the South Australian Interconnector feasibility study assuming a mix of AC andHVDC transmissions lines.  The cost estimate assumptions and intermediate computation results are presented in Appendix 2.  The largest uncertainty is in the transmission line capacity for the interstate connectors.

The capital cost for the distribution system enhancements to carry the PV generation is estimated at 20% of the asset value of theNEMdistribution system.

Cost of electricity

The Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for the generator technologies was calculated using the NREL LCOE calculator.  The capital cost and capacity factor for each technology and each scenario are in Tables 1, 3 and 4.  The other input values are as per DRET (2011c, 2011d) spreadsheets for all except the gas turbines running on biofuels, hydro and pumped hydro.  Table 5 lists the other inputs.

The estimates of LCOE for generation using gas turbines running on biofuel assumes capital costs of $5051/kW (‘sent out’) and fuel price of $10/GJ to account for the costs involved with production, storage and transport.  All other inputs for calculating LCOE are the same as for natural gas fuelled OCGT.

The assumed LCOE for hydro is $50/MWh and for PHES is $300/MWh[1].

The LCOE for the additions to the transmission network were calculated using the NREL calculator.  The inputs are the capital cost (estimated as described above and shown in Figure 7) and the O&M costs.  The O&M costs were estimated from the 2010 NEMO&M cost for transmission factored in proportion of the line length of the new additions compared with the total length of existing NEMtransmission lines (AER, 2011). Book life was assumed to be 40 years and discount rate as per Table 5.

The LCOE for the enhancements to the distribution system assumed the capital cost to be the equivalent to 20% of the 2010 value of the NEM’s distribution system assets.   The O&M costs are assumed to be 20% of the NEM’s 2010 O&M costs (AER, 2011).

Costs not included in the cost estimates are:owner’s costs and interest during construction

1. biofuel generating costs may be understated

2. higher costs for natural gas to include the cost of building larger capacity gas pipes to supply 24 to 33 GW of peak gas generation (depending on the scenario), but with only 13% capacity factor to pay for the pipes (this means higher gas prices would have to be charged to pay for the high volume gas pipe system but with gas sales much less than the pipes could deliver).

3. Increased O&M costs for CST with 15 h storage instead of the 6 h for which the DRET O&M costs apply.

4. Costs for solar PV are probably too low (for kW sized, roof top, solar PV).

5. Cost of electricity for the existing NEM transmission and distribution network.  (Only the cost of the transmission additions and distribution enhancements are included.  If the LCOE for the existingNEM network was included it would increase the cost of electricity for all options and make no change to the capital cost or CO2 abatement cost.)

CO2 abatement cost

The CO2 abatement cost is the cost to reduce emissions intensity from the CO2 emissions intensity in theNEMin 2010 to the emissions intensity that would exist with the new scenario implemented; it is expressed as ‘cost per tonne CO2 abated’ ($/t CO2).

CO2 abatement cost = (LCOE₂ – LCOE₁) / (EI₁ – EI₂)

Where:

LCOE₁ = LCOE for theNEM in 2010

LCOE₂ = LCOE for the scenario

EI₁ = Emissions intensity for theNEM in 2010

EI₂ = Emissions intensity for the scenario

The LCOE and CO2 emissions intensity for theNEMin 2010 are taken as:

LCOE₁ = $45.40/MWh (AER, 2011; Chapter 1, Table 1.4)

EI₁ = 1.0 tonne/MWh (DCCEE, 2010, Table 5, weighted average forNEM)

The LCOE and CO2 emissions intensity for each scenario are in Appendix 1 (and charted in Figure 5 and Figure 6).

The inputs and intermediate calculation results for the CO2 abatement cost estimates are in Appendix 1.

Uncertainties in cost estimates

The greatest uncertainties in the cost estimates are in:

1. the fuel costs, capital costs and O&M costs for the gas turbines running on biofuels,

2. the cost of the solar thermal plants with 15 hours of thermal storage and their lifetime average capacity factor, and

3. the amount of additional transmission and distribution capacity needed.

Results

Capital cost, LCOE and CO2 abatement cost of the scenarios

Figure 6 compares the four scenarios on the basis of capital cost, cost of electricity and CO2 abatement cost.

Figure 7 compares the capital cost and cost of electricity for the ‘copper-plate’ additions to the transmission system (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3) and the scenario with reduced additions to the transmission system (Scenario 4).

Discussion

General

The EDM-2011 study reveals a great deal about the difficulty and cost of a largely renewable energy electricity system forAustralia’sNEM.

The study is more realistic than Beyond Zero Emissions’ “Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan” (critiqued by Nicholson and Lang, 2010; Diesendorf, 2010; Trainer, 2010; and others), especially because their approach, as they say, “is limited to the electricity sector in a recent year, providing a more straight forward basis for exploring this question of matching variable renewable energy sources to demand.”  As the authors say, “this approach minimises the number of working assumptions”.

Despite the lack of cost estimates – a deficiency rectified in this paper – the EDM-2011 study is a useful contribution.  It demonstrates clearly that, even with highly optimistic assumptions, renewable energy cannot realistically provide 100% of our electricity generation with currently available technology.  The baseline scenario does not have sufficient capacity to meet peak winter demand, has no capacity reserve and is dependent on a technology – gas turbines running on biofuels – that exist only at small scale and at high cost. Furthermore,Australia’s hydro and pumped hydro facilities cannot be used in the way assumed in the simulations.

Reliability of supply

The system simulated by EDM-2011 would not provide a reliable electricity supply.  The gas turbines running on biofuels and hydro-electricity provide nearly all the power, outside sun hours, on some winter days, e.g. July 1 to 6 for 2010 (Elliston et al., 2011b, Slide 12). However, the gas turbines running on biofuels system does not currently exist at commercial scale. Furthermore,Australia’s total hydro capacity cannot be run at full power for days and weeks at a time as is assumed in the simulation.  As such, without the assumed generation from these two technologies, the system simulated has near zero generating capacity for many hours in winter.  This would mean load shedding or rolling blackouts across theNEM, with no electricity for most consumers during those times.

If we substitute natural gas for biofuel for the gas turbines, we’d need capacity about equal to the winter peak demand (33 GW) to provide a reliable electricity supply with about 20% capacity reserve.  That means, nearly all the generation would be by natural gas on some days in winter.  The plants would be ‘peaker’ plants, not ‘baseload’, so they would be open cycle gas turbines (OCGT), which are the inefficient, high cost of electricity, high CO2 emissions type of gas technology.

Cost

For the baseline scenario (Scenario 1) the electricity supply would be unreliable and the costs for a system built in the current decade are estimated to be around $568 billion capital cost, $336/MWh cost of electricity and $290/tonne CO2 abatement cost (Figure 6).

That is, the wholesale cost of electricity for the simulated system would be seven times more than with the existing system, with an abatement cost that is 13 times the starting price of the Australian carbon tax (Energetix. 2011) and 30 times the European carbon price (European Energy Exchange, 2012).  (The cost of electricity does not include the costs for the existing electricity grid).

For Scenario 2 (natural gas substituted for biofuel in the baseline scenario) the cost of electricity is estimated at $280/MWh (Figure 6), which is about six times the 2009-10 average cost of electricity generation in theNEM.  The power supply would still be unreliable, but less so than with gas turbines running on biofuels.

For Scenario 3, where the assumptions are changed to provide a more reliable, mostly renewable electricity supply (although still not as reliable as we have now), more gas would be used and the cost of electricity is estimated at $286/MWh.  CO2 abatement cost is estimated at $306/MWh (Figure 6).

Scenario 4 – If the transmission capacity is reduced the capital cost and cost of electricity are further reduced (Figure 6) but more gas is used and more CO2 emitted (Figure 5).  This scenario has the lowest capital cost and lowest cost of electricity.

The assumed ‘copper-plate’ transmission system (Scenarios 1 to 3) adds $107 billion to the capital cost and $58/MWh to the LCOE (Figure 7).  The reduced additions to the transmission system (Scenario 4) adds $67 billion to the capital cost and $37/MWh to the cost of electricity (see Figure 7).  These costs are included in the capital costs, cost of electricity and CO2 abatements costs.

The transmission system additions are a high cost, especially when we consider there is no increase in demand driving these extra costs.  These costly transmission upgrades are only required if the policy objective is to implement renewable energy, rather than to provide low emissions electricity at least cost..

Baseload

EDM-2011 conclude “Achieving 100% renewable electricity also entails a radical 21st century re-conception of an electricity supply-demand system.”  They make their point succinctly in the last slide in their slide presentation where they state “Baseload plant is an outmoded concept” (Elliston et al. (2011b).

However, since the cost of electricity from the renewable energy option is some seven times the current cost of electricity, their study does not refute the fact that the “baseload plant” is still by far the least cost way to supply most of our electricity needs, and is far from being an “outmoded concept”.

The least cost way to meet the demand and reliability requirements is with a mix of generators that are located close to the demand centres, connected by relatively short transmission lines to the main demand centres and capable of supplying the power to meet baseload at all times, intermediate load during day time on week days and peak demand whenever it occurs.

The least cost option to match generation to the demand profile in most countries where large hydro capacity is not available such as inAustralia, is usually with coal, gas or nuclear for baseload, gas and hydro for intermediate load, and gas and hydro for peak load.

Bayless (2010) in “The case for baseload” provides “an engineer’s perspective on why not just any generation source will do when it comes to the system’s capacity, stability and control”.   He says:

The electric system is more than just the delivery of energy—it is the provision of reliability. First, the system must have capacity, that is, the capability to furnish energy instantaneously when needed. The system also must have frequency control, retain stability, remain running under varied conditions, and have access to voltage control. Each of those essential services for reliability must come from a component on the system. Those components are not free, and they don’t just happen. They are the result of careful planning, engineering, good operating procedures, and infrastructure investment specifically targeting these items.

The simple cost analysis presented here demonstrates that the renewable electricity system simulated by EDM-2011 cannot meet these requirements at anywhere near the cost of a conventional system.

Conclusions

I have reviewed and critiqued “Simulations of Scenarios with 100% Renewable Electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market” by Elliston et al. (2011a).  That paper does not analyse costs, so I have also made a crude estimate of the cost of the scenario simulated and three variants of it.  I conclude:

The costs for the simulated 100% renewable electricity system are estimated to be $568 billion capital cost, $336/MWh cost of electricity and $290/tonne CO2 abatement cost.  That is, electricity would cost seven times more than now, and CO2 abatement cost would exceed current carbon prices by 13 times the starting price for the Australian carbon tax and 30 times the European carbon price (at time of writing).

The electricity supply would be unreliable.

Any largely renewable electricity system for theNEMwould be high cost, as demonstrated here.  The changes made to the assumptions make little difference to the estimated capital cost, cost of electricity and CO2 abatement cost.

Recommendations

I recommended the simulation be rerun with the following changes:

1. Use natural gas instead of biofuel

2. Increase the gas generation capacity so there is sufficient capacity in the system to meet all peak demand and ensure 20% capacity reserve.

3. Check that the system can meet demand at the 5 minute time scale, not just the average demand over 1 hour.

4. Introduce constraints on hydro generation, pumped hydro energy storage rate, times of day for pumping and for generating and minimum number of continuous hours of pumping that match the actual constraints on the actual plants in theNEM.

5. Reduce the capacity of transmission lines from the wind farms to a percentage of their rated power output and reduce the maximum output of the wind farms accordingly; optimise (roughly) the transmission line capacity and generating capacity to achieve the least overall cost of electricity from the system.

6. Limit the peak output of the PV generators at a percentage of their peak power output to fit within the constraints of the distribution system; optimise (roughly) to achieve the least overall cost of electricity from the system.

7. Limit the capacity of the interstate transmission interconnectors (this would reduce the output of the renewable energy generators at some times and reduce the pumped hydro storage rate).

8. Do a loss of load probability (LOLP) analysis to check that the system being simulated meets the Australian Energy Regulator’s reliability requirements.

9. Do a simulation with a nuclear power scenario to provide an objective comparison of the cost for an alternative way to provide a low-emission electricity supply.

Estimate the costs of all scenarios and compare them on the basis of:

1. CO2 emissions intensity

2. capital cost

3. cost of electricity

4. CO2 abatement cost

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Barry Brook, Dr. Jani-Petri Martikainen DrJohn Morgan, DrIan Nalder, Martin Nicholson, Graham Palmer, Dr. Gene Preston, Dr. Ted Trainer and two others in the electricity industry whom I cannot name, for their input and assistance with this analysis and reviewing this document.

References

ACIL-Tasman (2010), Preparation of energy market modelling data for the Energy White Paper

http://www.aemo.com.au/planning/0400-0019.pdf

AEMO (2011), South Australian Interconnector Feasibility Study

http://www.electranet.com.au/assets/Uploads/interconnectorfeasibilitystudyfinalnetworkmodellingreport.pdf

AER(2011), State of the Energy Market 2011

http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1021485

Australian Natural Resources Atlas, Land Use – Australia

http://www.anra.gov.au/topics/land/landuse/index.html#lands

Bayless, B. (2010) The case for baseload

http://www.eei.org/magazine/EEI%20Electric%20Perspectives%20Article%20Listing/2010-09-01-BASELOAD.pdf

Beyond Zero Emissions (2010), Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan

http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/ZCA2020_Stationary_Energy_Report_v1.pdf

DCCEE (2010), National greenhouse accounts (NGA) factors, Table 5

http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/greenhouse-acctg/national-greenhouse-factors-july-2010-pdf.pdf

Diesendorf, M. (2010), Ambitious target does not measure up.

http://www.ecosmagazine.com/paper/EC10024.htm

DRET (2011a), Energy in Australia – 2011

http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/facts-stats-pubs/Energy-in-Australia-2011.pdf

DRET (2011b), Fact Sheet – Australian Electricity Generation Technology Costs – Reference Case

http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/facts/Pages/EnergyFacts.aspx

DRET (2011c), Data – Renewable Performance and Cost Summary 2011

http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/facts-stats-pubs/2011/Renewable-Performance-and-Cost-Summary.xls

DRET (2011d), Data – Fossil Fuel Plant Performance and Cost Summary 2011

http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/facts-stats-pubs/2011/Renewable-Performance-and-Cost-Summary.xls 

Electropaedia, Electricity Generation with Biofuels

http://www.mpoweruk.com/biofuels.htm

Elliston, B., Diesendorf, M. and MacGill, I.(2011a), Simulations of Scenarios with 100% Renewable Electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market

http://www.ies.unsw.edu.au/docs/Solar2011-100percent.pdf

Elliston, B., Diesendorf, M. and MacGill, I.(2011b), Simulations of Scenarios with 100% Renewable Electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market. (Slide presentation)

http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au/content/userDocs/Solar2011-slides.pdf

Energetics (2011), Carbon price impact on energy prices

http://www.energetics.com.au/newsroom/energy_newsletter/carbon-price-announcement

EPRI (2010), Australian electricity generation technology costs – Reference case 2010

http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/AEGTC%202010.pdf

European Energy Exchange (EEX) (2012), European Emission Allowances

http://www.eex.com/en/

Grattan Institute (2012), No easy choices: which way to Australia’s energy future? Technology Analysis

http://www.grattan.edu.au/publications/125_energy__no_easy_choices_detail.pdf

IEA (2007), IEA Energy Technology Essentials – Biomass for Power Generation and CHP

http://www.iea.org/techno/essentials3.pdf

IEA/OECD (2010), Projected costs of generating electricity

http://www.mit.edu/~jparsons/current%20downloads/Projected%20Costs%20of%20Electricity.pdf

Lang, P. (2010), Australia‘s pumped hydro energy storage capacity, Oz Energy Analysis

http://www.oz-energy-analysis.org/feed/show_me.php?comm=OzEA_DG0002

Nicholson, M. and Lang, P. (2010), Zero Carbon Emissions – Stationary Energy Plan – Critique

http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/08/12/zca2020-critique/

NREL (2011), Levelised Cost of Energy Calculator

http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html

Simms, R. et al (2009) “IEA’s report on 1^st to 2^nd Generation Biofuel Technologies”

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/03/ieas-report-on-1st-to-2nd-generation-biofuel-technologies

Trainer, F. (2010) Another ZCA 2020 Critique

http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/09/trainer-zca-2020-critique/

The first was a report on Arctic sea ice volume. Here is the graph that shocked me:

It shows the minimum northern hemisphere sea ice volume yearly from 1979 to 2011, and a simple time-series forecast based on a fit of the exponential-decline model. You can read about the details here: PIOMAS September 2011 (volume record lower still), where various related charts are also shown. One can argue about the precision of the projection line, but the general fit is remarkably robust and, on this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that unless some remarkable turn around occurs, the Arctic summer ice volume will be near-zero by 2020.

One explanation for this greater-than-expected decline is given in this new paper in Journal of Geophysical Research. Rampal et al. show that as the ice thins, it drifts more — increasing ‘export’ of ice to lower latitudes and accelerating melting. This may also explain the deviations seen between sea-ice extent (see left chart) and volume (both are bad, but volume is looking worse). Perhaps the gaps between small aggregations of ice are not showing up in the satellite data, with the mushy residual ice spreading out evenly to close gaps, thus appearing to maintain or even increase its extent, especially as the thinning summer ice becomes more ever more vulnerable to wind dispersion. As we approach zero volume, we will obviously get a clearer picture on positive feedbacks, but all that we can be sure of for now is that we are entering unknown territory.

The second depressing trend that disturbed me was the latest global carbon dioxide emissions data. The core problem is summarised here:

The world pumped about 512 million tonnes more of carbon into the air last year than it did in 2009, an increase of 6 per cent. That amount of extra pollution eclipses the individual emissions of all but three countries – China, the US and India, the world’s top producers of greenhouse gases.

A decent graphic that tells the ‘onward and upwards’ story is this:

Another more detailed chart, emphasising the magnitude of the recent spike in emissions, can be seen here. Most countries reported rises in their emissions, including many European nations (so much for the Euro carbon price), and of course the rising industrial powers of the developing world. The march to embrace new coal and the relentless push to access all of the world’s liquid hydrocarbon reserves, continues unabated. As this recent paper in Nature Climate Change reports, this path takes us towards a very different world:

Folks, we are failing badly, and our failure continues to compound each year. I tweeted this news (restricted to 140 characters) as: “Global CO2e emissions rises >500 million tonnes over 2010 – 2011 period, an increase of 6 % on 2009 – going backwards, need nuclear + renew!“, and pretty soon afterwards, solicited a typical tweet-based reply from someone saying: “//100% Renewables possible. Nuclear unnecessary!“.

Wake up. Smell the roses. This is extremely serious, and people who can look at these sea-ice and emissions data and still say: “We don’t need nuclear!” are, frankly, dangerous and delusional. Only hard-nosed rationality will fix this problem — and that will be built on policies that focus on reducing the cost of non-fossil energy (of any kind), such that it becomes an economically sensible decision to built these preferentially.

Folks as philosophically diverse as The Breakthrough Institute experts and Peter Lang get this. Indeed, it is almost certain that you — each and every one of you — can find someone you respect who gets it. The concept is really not that hard to understand, but we desperately need widespread education and a healthy dose critical, pragmatic and realistic thinking from the general populace. Will you help make this happen?

————–

Finally, some articles on the Fukushima nuclear accident that are worth reading. First there is The Nuclear Power Safety Record by Ted Rockwell, which looks at the global nuclear safety record, its comparison with other industrial activities, and a review of background radiation.

Second, there is a the IEEE Spectrum article 24 Hours at Fukushima, which provides a detailed blow-by-blow account of events, and draws six lessons learned:

1. Emergency generators should be installed at high elevations or in watertight chambers.

2. If a cooling system is intended to operate without power, make sure all of its parts can be manipulated without power.

3. Keep power trucks on or very close to the power plant site.

4. Install independent and secure battery systems to power crucial instruments during emergencies.

5. Ensure that catalytic hydrogen recombiners (power-free devices that turn dangerous hydrogen gas back into steam) are positioned at the tops of reactor buildings where gas would most likely collect.

6. Install power-free filters on vent lines to remove radio-active materials and allow for venting that won’t harm nearby residents.

Guest Post

A 10-page printable PDF version of this post can be downloaded here.

An Excel worksheet showing the calculations (allowing you to change inputs/assumptions) is also available.

Introduction

What is the cost of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions abatement with the various electricity generation technologies being considered for Australia?

The abatement cost of a technology depends on many factors such as the engineering characteristics of the electricity grid to which the new technology will be connected, the geographic location and many others.  One important factor often not mentioned is the reference case against which the abatement cost is calculated.  The abatement cost for a new technology is only meaningful when compared with another new technology or with an existing generator it would ‘displace’; e.g. nuclear compared with a new coal power station or nuclear compared with an existing power station.

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2010) report http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/AEGTC%202010.pdf for the Australian Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism provides data that allows CO2 abatement costs to be estimated for a range of new technologies. Unfortunately, the report is complex and opaque in parts.

The purpose of this paper is twofold:

1. to summarise in tabular form the relevant information from the EPRI report so others can access it easily and produce levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) figures under differing assumptions, particularly using the NREL LCOE calculator http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html .

2. to calculate and compare the CO2 abatement costs for a range of new technologies for each of three ‘displaced’ technologies.

This paper does not attempt to calculate the effects of carbon price on the LCOE or CO2 abatement costs, because:

1)     the EPRI report does not include the effects of carbon price — nor feed in tariffs, renewable energy certificates and other subsidies — so incorporating the effect of CO2 pricing, and other incentives and disincentives in the analysis would require many additional assumptions, and

2)     the purpose of this paper is to show the abatement costs for the various technologies so options can be compared and so the cost of incentives and disincentives (including carbon pricing), which would be needed to make each technology viable, can be made visible.

Methodology

The CO2 abatement cost is calculated for seven new electricity generation technologies, selected from the EPRI report.  The seven new technologies are:

1. Coal (black, without CCS).

2. Coal (black, with CCS)

3. Nuclear

4. CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine)

5. OCGT (Open Cycle Gas Turbine)

6. Wind (wind class 5, 100 x 2 MW)

7. Solar thermal (Central Receiver, 6h storage, DNI = 6)

The abatement cost for each is calculated by comparison with each of three ‘displaced’ technologies:

1. Hazelwood, brown coal power station, Victoria (1,600 MW, commissioned 1964 to 1971)

2. Liddell (see photo above), black coal power station, NSW (2,000 MW, commissioned 1971 to 1973)

3. A new black coal plant, withoutCCS; (this is same as #1 in the list of new technologies).

Most input data are taken from EPRI (2010) http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/AEGTC%202010.pdf ; these are summarised in Appendix 1.  To bring the figures up to date and to aid in international comparisons, costs presented in Table 1 have been converted from 2009 A$ to 2011 US$; these are in Appendix 2.  Details of the costings, including the exchange rates and inflation rates used, are included. The calculation steps and results are presented.

CO2 Abatement Cost is the difference in LCOE divided by the difference in CO2 emission intensity (EI):

CO2 abatement Cost = (LCOE_new – LCOE_displaced) / (EI_displaced – EI_new)

The data needed for calculating LCOE for each technology, using the NREL simplified LCOE calculator http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html, are provided in the Appendices.

The capital cost is one of the inputs needed for the LCOE calculation.  The capital cost figure needed is the Total Capital Required (TCR). But theTCRfigure is not given in the EPRI report.  As such, the method of estimating it, including the inputs and intermediate calculation results, are presented in Appendix 1.

The CO2 emissions intensity (EI) presented in the EPRI report includes only the emissions from burning the fuel in the generator. Fugitive emissions are not included.  Nor do the emissions intensities include the higher emissions intensities produced when load-following; e.g. when cycling power up and down to back-up for intermittent renewable energy generators.

The emissions intensities (EI) for Liddell and Hazelwood power stations are 1.08 t/MWh and 1.53 t/MWh (sent out) respectively (ACIL-Tasman (2009), Table 18 http://www.aemo.com.au/planning/419-0035.pdf ).  These EIs include fugitive emissions (whereas the EPRI EIs do not). This causes an error in the calculated abatement costs. In the ACIL Tasman report, fugitive emissions comprise 10% to 27% of EI for gas, 2% to 9% for black coal and 0.3% for brown coal.

The LCOE for Liddell and Hazelwood are ‘Commercial in Confidence’, so I’ve used $30 and $28 respectively, which are figures I’ve seen stated for the ‘equivalent LCOE’ for the remaining plant life.

Results

The CO2 abatement costs are summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1: CO2 abatement cost for seven selected new technologies (named on the horizontal axis) compared with each of three ‘displaced’ technologies (named in the legend).   Abatement costs are in US$/tonne CO2 (constant, 2011US$).

The inputs and intermediate calculation results are in Appendix 1 (in 2009 A$) and Appendix 2 (in 2011 US$). The data in Figure 1 is from Table A2-5.

Table A1-2 and A2-2 show the proportion of “Capital” (i.e. TCR) that EPRI apparently assumed for ‘Owners Costs’, including ‘Allowance for Funds Used During Construction’ (AFUDC).

The ratio TCR/TPC is given in Tables A1-3 and A2-3.  This ratio shows how much higher the TCR is than TPC for each technology.  For example, for nuclear the TCR is 1.93, or 93% greater than TPC.

Discussion

This report uses the EPRI (2010) figures for LCOE and emissions intensity.  These are the figures being used in Australian government reports such as ABARE (2010) and for the Treasury modelling of the carbon tax and ETS.  Some discussion of the figures and assumptions is warranted.

The Total Plant Cost figure in the EPRI report is confusing because it is not the full capital cost used to calculate LCOE.  The capital cost figure needed for calculating LCOE is the Total Capital Required, which includes Owner’s Costs.  Back-calculating from the figures provided reveals the amount of Owner’s Costs EPRI used in their LCOE analyses. This cost is significant. It is 93% higher than the Total Plant Cost for nuclear, 88% higher for CCGT, 45% higher for coal, and 41% higher for solar thermal. The EPRI report does not make clear the basis of the Owner’s Costs or the assumptions. For example, the construction period is not stated?

EPRI uses 85% for the average lifetime capacity factor for mature technologies such as coal, gas and nuclear. However it also uses 85% for immature technologies such as carbon capture and storage, and assumes capacity factors for Wind (36.6%) and Solar Thermal (31.6% with 6 hours storage) that appear to be based on the best possible figures, rather than the average achievable over a plant’s life. It is difficult to understand how these capacity factors could be realized in practice over the plant life.

The emissions intensities do not include fugitive emissions and appear to be for the technology running at optimum efficiency, rather than average efficiency. The abatement costs for Wind and Solar are probably understated, because the capacity factors assumed seem to be unreasonably high.

The reason the OCGT abatement costs are high is because EPRI used a capacity factor of 10% for the calculation of LCOE.  This is because OCGT is economic at capacity factors up to about 14% due to its high fuel costs (IPART, 2004, Exhibits 1-2 and 1-3 http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/documents/Pubvers_Rev_Reg_Ret_IES010304.pdf )

If we assume wind or solar are backed up with OCGT, it is clear, without needing to do detailed calculations, that wind and solar with back-up are a high-cost way to avoid emissions.

Of the options considered, CCGT is clearly the least cost way to abate CO2 emissions.  For example, if we are making a decision about new baseload capacity we might compare between a new baseload coal plant withoutCCSand other options.  From Figure 1, the CO2 abatement cost, compared with new black coal, is $44/t CO2 for CCGT and $107/t CO2 for nuclear.

Based on the EPRI figures, nuclear cannot be justified inAustraliaat this time because it is too expensive.   For nuclear to be an economically viable option, the impediments that are causing the EPRI estimates for the cost of nuclear in Australia to be several times higher than in Korea need to be removed.

Conclusions

Of the options considered, CCGT is clearly the least cost way to abate CO2 emissions, given the EPRI assumptions.

The abatement cost with CCGT is about 40% of the abatement cost with nuclear.

Based on EPRI’s estimates, nuclear is not economically viable in Australia because it is too expensive.  This situation will remain while the impediments to low-cost nuclear remain in place.

Glossary

OCGT – Open Cycle Gas Turbine

CCGT – Combined Cycle Gas Turbine

CCS – Carbon Capture and Sequestration

CST – Concentrating Solar Thermal

EPRI – Electric Power Research Institute

NREL – National Renewable Energy Laboratory

LCOE – Levelised Cost of Electricity

TCR – Total Capital Required

TPC – Total Plant Cost

AFUDC – Accumulated [or Allowance for] Funds Used During Construction (Capitalised Interest)

References

ABARE (2010), Australian Energy Projections to 2029-30: http://adl.brs.gov.au/data/warehouse/pe_abarebrs99014434/energy_proj.pdf

ACIL-Tasman (2009), Fuel resource, new entry and generation costs in the NEM: http://www.aemo.com.au/planning/419-0035.pdf

EPRI (2010), Australian Electricity Generation Technology Costs – Reference Case 2010: http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/AEGTC%202010.pdf

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (2004) The long run marginal cost of electricity generation in NSW: http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/documents/Pubvers_Rev_Reg_Ret_IES010304.pdf

NREL (2011), Levelized Cost of Energy Calculator: http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html

South CarolinaElectric & Gas Company (2011), VC Summers Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 (June 30, 2011): http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/A830A131-9425-46F1-B948-C8424530EE49/0/2011Q2BLRAReport.pdf

Appendix 1 – Input data and intermediate calculation results with costs in ‘constant 2009 A$’

Appendix 1 summarises the significant data from the EPRI (2010) report for the seven technologies selected for this study.  Costs are in ‘constant, mid-2009 A$’.

Table A1-1 lists the values needed for input to the NREL LCOE Calculator, http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html .

The Capital Cost figure listed in Table A1-1, needed for calculating LCOE, is ‘Total Capital Required’ (TCR). But the TCR figure is not given in the EPRI report.  So it must be back-calculated from the other data available in the report. The EPRI report provides the breakdown of LCOE by Capital, O&M and Fuel (Tables A1-2 and A2-2). This data was used to calculate the value EPRI used for TCR. The results are in Tables A1-3 and A2-3.  These tables also give the ratio TCR/TPC. This shows how much higher the TCR is than TPC for each technology.  For example, for nuclear the TCR is 1.93, or 93% greater than TPC, whereas for coal it is 48%.

Appendix 2 – Input data and intermediate calculation results with costs in ‘constant 2011 US$’

The cost figures in Appendix 1 are in ‘constant, mid-2009 A$’.  In Appendix 2 they have been converted to ‘constant, mid-2011 U$’.  The conversion factors are in Table A2-6.

Table A2-1 lists the values needed for input to the NREL LCOE Calculator.

Clearly, there are large uncertainties on the Inhaber equation and they are not quantified. Discussion will almost certainly take place in the scientific literature about the Inhaber equation over the next few months to years. Inhaber, does point out that the chart is schematic, we do not have the emissions data needed and the many major uncertainties.

Peter and I look forward to your feedback. This is an important technical matter to resolve, with potentially strong implications for energy policy.

I note that there may be circumstances where some or most of these problems can be overcome, where the grid is ‘evolved’ or set up in a specially configured manner (unknown cost) — the below findings are most applicable to existing grids which are having wind added incrementally (i.e. all current [real-world] jurisdictions).

A 7-page printable PDF version of this paper can be downloaded here.

Addendum: Peter Lang’s Response to the American Wind Energy Association’s reply

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CO₂ avoidance cost with wind energy in Australia and carbon price implications

Guest Post by Peter Lang. Peter is a retired geologist and engineer with 40 years experience on a wide range of energy projects throughout the world, including managing energy R&D and providing policy advice for government and opposition. His experience includes: coal, oil, gas, hydro, geothermal, nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and a wide range of energy end use management projects.

Introduction

This paper presents a simple analysis to estimate the amount of CO₂ emissions avoided by wind generation and the cost per tonne avoided as wind penetration increases from 0% to 20%. The carbon price implications are discussed. The analysis is based on a paper by Herbert Inhaber (2011)¹. The analysis is for Australia’s National Electricity Market.

Emissions Avoided by wind generation

Herbert Inhaber (2011) reviewed eleven studies of CO₂ savings by wind generation and concludes wind generation becomes less effective at reducing CO₂ emissions as wind penetration increases. That is, wind generation avoids less CO₂ as wind energy’s share of total generation increases. Inhaber explains:

as wind penetration increases, the CO₂ reduction will gradually decrease due to cycling of the fossil fuel plants that make up the balance of the grid.

Below is an extract from the “Conclusions” and “Uncertainties” sections of Inhaber’s paper [in this extract, references to ‘Fig. 3’ are to the figure in Inhaber’s paper, which is reformatted and called ‘Figure 1’ here):

There are considerable uncertainties about how fast this decrease occurs, and the curve in Fig. 3 should be taken as only suggestive. However, the arc seems to be a mirror image of a sigmoid curve, with an equation:

where Q is the CO₂ reduction in percent, x is the wind or intermittent renewable penetration of the grid in percent, and c is a constant, of the order of 0.2 in Fig. 3.

Figure 1: [Inhaber’s Fig. 3 reformatted to make it easier to interpret. In Inhaber’s paper, Fig. 3 is presented with log-scale on the vertical axis.]

Figure 1. (Inhaber Fig. 3.) A schematic graph of CO2 reductions as a function of wind (or other intermittent renewables) penetration into an electrical grid. Penetration is defined as the average fraction of energy contributed by wind to overall energy consumption...

5. Uncertainties There are considerable uncertainties in developing a curve of this type. A few of the many, not necessarily in order of importance, are:(a) The mix of fossil fuels used in the grid and the type of gas turbines in particular;

(b) Some of the literature on wind is of a polemic nature, either advocating its widespread use or pointing out its deficiencies. Care has to be taken to concentrate on the facts and leave opinions aside;

(c) Whether renewable energy is exported to other countries, as in the case of Denmark. This could skew results;

(d) The number of cycles of the fossil fuel sources that take place over time;

(e) What fraction of fossil fuel plants in the grid are relatively inefficient open-cycle gas turbines (as opposed to more efficient closed cycle gas turbines);

(f) The carbon dioxide intensity emitted from the fossil fuels used in the grid;

(g) The degree of variability of wind resources over a period of time, and a host of others.

(h) Funding sources for some literature is sometimes from proponents or opponents of the energy source;

(i) Some of the literature is not peer reviewed, posing potential problems in quality control.

For simplicity, let’s assume the average CO₂ emissions intensity of Australia’s electricity generation is 1 tonne per MWh (The figure varies by state and by year ).²
From Inhaber’s chart, at 1% wind energy penetration, emissions are reduced by 90% per MWh of wind generation. This equates to a reduction of 0.9 tonne per MWh of wind energy. However, at 20% wind energy penetration the CO₂ reduction is just 3.6%, or 0.036 tonne per MWh of wind energy.

CO₂ Avoidance Cost

For wind power to be viable the price for electricity would need to be about $120/MWh. The current average wholesale price of electricity is about $30/MWh³. So wind energy must be subsidised by about $90/MWh. If we have a carbon price of $25/MWh then the Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) need to reach $65/MWh to make wind viable. (That means the consumer must subsidise wind by $90/MWh, or three times the current wholesale price of electricity.). The figures are summarised in Table 1.

Let’s calculate the cost of emissions avoided by wind generation at 1% and 20% wind energy penetration.

From Inhaber’s chart, at 1% wind energy penetration, CO₂ reduction is 90%. Using the emissions intensity for electricity of 1 t/MWh this equates to 0.9 tonnes per MWh. Wind energy costs $90/MWh more than the current average cost of electricity. This is the cost we must pay to avoid CO₂ emissions with wind energy.

At 1% wind energy penetration, the cost per tonne CO₂ avoided is:

$90/MWh / 0.9 t/MWh = $100/t CO₂ avoided.

At 20% wind energy penetration the cost per tonne CO₂ avoided is:

$90/MWh / 0.036 t/MWh = $2,500/t CO₂ avoided.

These figures are for the cost to avoid an additional tonne of CO₂ by increasing wind penetration.

Figure 2 shows the CO₂ avoided and the cost of avoidance versus wind energy penetration.

Figure 2

Sensitivity Analysis

The CO₂ avoidance cost is sensitive to the wholesale electricity price and to the minimum price needed for wind power to be a viable investment. Figure 3 shows the results for six scenarios. The inputs for the six scenarios are listed in Table 2:

Figure 3

The greatest uncertainty is the Inhaber equation. As Inhaber states “There are considerable uncertainties in developing a curve of this type.” However, to conduct meaningful sensitivity analyses on the range of possible values for the Inhaber equation is beyond the scope of this simple analysis. Inhaber’s paper does not include ranges for the constants in the equation.

Carbon Price Implications

A carbon price of $2,435 per tonne CO₂ would be required for wind power to be viable at 20% penetration. This is for Scenario 1. The carbon price required for the six scenarios is plotted in Figure 4.

A carbon price of $2,435 per tonne is one hundred times the expected initial carbon price of about $25 per tonne CO₂. This indicates how much the carbon price would need to increase to make wind power reach 20% penetration based on carbon price with an REC price about double what it is now. The Australian Renewable Energy Target is 20% renewables by 2020 and most of this is expected to be provided by wind power. The carbon price would have to increase by a factor of nearly one hundred above the likely initial carbon price to achieve the target.

For the carbon price to stay below $100/tonne CO₂, wind energy penetration would have to be less than about 5% and the Renewable Energy Certificates price above $65 (for Scenario 1).

Another issue is that the carbon price will be paid by the back-up generator owners not the wind farm owners. This is clearly unreasonable since wind is contributing to reduced efficiency of the back-up plant.

Figure 4

Conclusions

As wind energy penetration increases from 1% to 20% the CO₂ avoidance cost increases from $100 to $2,500 per tonne.

The quantities and costs calculated are sensitive to the input assumptions and input data but the broad conclusions are robust to the range of input values tested.

Considerable uncertainties apply to the inputs for the Inhaber equation upon which this analysis is based and therefore to the results. However, these uncertainties have not been quantified.

A carbon price of around $2,500 per tonne would be needed for wind power to reach 20% penetration. The Renewable Energy Target is 20% renewables by 2020 and most of this is expected to be provided by wind power. Therefore, the expected initial carbon price of about $25 per tonne would have to increase by a factor of one hundred to achieve the Renewable Energy Target.

For the carbon price to be below $100 per tonne wind energy penetration would have to be less than about 5% (and Renewable Energy Certificates price above $65 per tonne).

Wind energy is a high cost way to avoid CO₂ emissions.

Australia is paying a high price for policies that mandate renewable energy while at the same time prohibiting other low emissions electricity generation options.

References

1. Herbert Inhaber (2011). Why wind power does not deliver the expected emissions reductions. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15, 2557–2562

2. Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2010). National Greenhouse Account (NGA) Factors, Table 5.

3. Matt Chambers, “Force of the near future”, article in “The Renewable Energy Special Report”, The Australian, 16 May 2011; figures attributed to Tim Nielsen, head of economic policy at AGL.

4. ABARES (2011). Energy in Australia 2011. p22

5. EPRI (2010). Australian electricity generation technology costs, – Reference Case 2010. Table 10-9 to Table 10-11, p10-4

Guest Post

The United Nations report Livestock’s Long Shadow (LLS) came out in 2006 with an estimate that 18 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are attributable to livestock. If you exclude deforestation emissions, then the number drops to 14 percent. Some 95 percent of these emissions are direct emissions of methane or nitrous oxide with just 5 percent being from associated energy use as shown in the table which is a contraction of a table from LLS.

The reason the energy emissions are so small is that almost no processing is included. The energy associated with the refrigerated meat chain from abattoir to consumer, cooking costs, energy to build the trucks that carry the animals and later the meat etc. None of this was included.

A couple of years after the LLS report, BNC published a piece by myself, Barry Brook and Peter Singer which showed that Australia’s most powerful climate forcing was livestock and not coal fired power stations. The demonstration relied on the difference between radiative forcing, a concept roughly equivalent to warming and used by climate scientists, and the less accurate concept of carbon dioxide equivalent used in the Kyoto protocol.

Two years later and it’s time for an update. The NOAA chart shows that methane levels are rising again after a flat spot during the early 2000s, and the biggest single source of anthropogenic methane is livestock.

This update will look at implications of livestock growth predictions, the Goodland/Anhang photosynthesis imbalance theory, industry attempts to show beef is carbon friendly, and ruminant methane reduction research. I’d like to also cover black carbon and ozone issues, but that will have to wait. I have written a small section to explain why black carbon and ozone are really, really important, but the detail will have to wait.

Pelletier and Tyedmers PNAS paper

August 2010 saw the publication in the US Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) of a paper looking at the implications of various livestock population scenarios out to 2050. It looked at the impact of the scenarios on postulated safe operating limits for three things:

1. human production of greenhouse gases,
2. our use of planetary biomass
3. and our production of reactive nitrogen.

These are all topics which will be familiar to some degree from earlier BNC posts (here for biomass, and here for nitrogen).

Currently the greenhouse gas emissions (CO2eq) for every person on the planet average about 4.8 tonnes a year. Australians are among the worst with emissions more than 5 times this. Nuclear powered France comes in at a little less than double the average. Typically, developing countries are below average emitters. For example Bangladesh emits about 0.9 tonnes per person per year. Sub-Saharan Africa comes in closer to average at around 4.5 with half that coming from land-use change … burning the landscape.

By 2050, the global average needs to be about 1. That’s right, just 1 tonne of CO2eq for each of the 8.9 billion people that P&T expect on the planet. That’s no change for Bangladesh and a 25 fold reduction for us.

P&T consider several scenarios:

1. No change in livestock populations or emissions. Since 95 percent of livestock emissions are direct rather than from energy use, a rebuilding of our energy infrastructures can’t make a dent in livestock emissions. So livestock, assuming no growth at all, will occupy about half of that 8.9 billion tonnes of CO2eq, leaving half a tonne per annum for everything else. Because this scenario postulates no increase in livestock but a growing population, the average consumption of meat per person must fall.
2. Growth in livestock as per FAO predictions. In this case livestock emissions will be 71 percent of each person’s allocated tonne of CO2eq.
3. The vegan. This is one of two endpoint scenarios. I’ve called it a vegan scenario, P&T call it their soy scenario because they assumed that all protein comes from soy and none from animal products. Soy protein to go for 8.9 billion can be generated for a greenhouse gas cost of just 0.1 tonne of CO2eq per person. Of course, it’s not necessary to eat soy to get protein. Protein is actually tough to avoid and humans don’t need much compared with, for example, goats.
4. Extreme meat. In this scenario P&T look at what happens when animal products supply all of a person’s protein requirements. They view this as the opposite endpoint of the vegan case, but it’s already happening in many first world countries. Australians, for example, average 73 grams of protein a day from animal products, which means all the rest of the food they eat contributes superfluous protein. In such a scenario, 92 percent of your tonne of CO2eq will come from the animal products in your diet. There won’t be much room left in your allocated tonne for anything else. As a footnote, I should say that P&T are using very low emission factors for their beef, so I’d say many Australians are already well over their tonne just from their meat alone.
5. Chicken substitution. This interesting scenario postulates that all livestock increases above the year 2000 level required to meet the demands of the extra 2050 population will come from chicken which has the lowest greenhouse gas footprint of any meat. Under this scenario, livestock consumes 62 percent of a person’s 1 tonne allocation.

An LLS reply …

The P&T paper prompted a response from FAO’s LLS authors Steinfeld and Gerber who argued that changes are already in place to make meat more environmentally friendly … by making it more animal abusive with a shift to pigs and chickens. It was a qualitative reply to a set of quantitative predictions.

Steinfeld’s use of the word “shift” is vague and a little misleading. The global cattle population has increased in each of the past four decades. True, it hasn’t grown as fast as pigs and chickens, but this doesn’t mean that there has been any global substitution of pigs and chickens for cattle. Pigs have long been the dominant meat globally with pig and chicken meat production combined being triple the size of beef. Without a reduction in cattle, and there is no evidence of this globally, it’s difficult to envisage any significant decrease in overall livestock impacts in the 3 areas P&T consider. Steinfeld’s response is really no more than hand-waving.

Is “abusive” a defensible description of the pig and chicken industries? Absolutely and it has solid scientific support. A major study looking at chickens in the UK found that only a few percent can walk normally. The researchers looked at 51,000 birds in 206 flocks. Apart from the few percent walking normally, the rest suffered varying degrees of crippling because their muscle growth exceeds that of their skeletal system. Scientists have also shown that the birds are in pain. They will quickly learn to select drinking water laced with analgesic when given a choice. This is a heavily globalised industry so there are good reasons to believe this study is representative. The situation with pigs is little better … typically 60 percent of breeding sows are replaced each year with lameness being a common reason.

P&T on Biomass

P&T use an estimate of the maximum sustainable limit on human biomass use by 2050 of about 9.7 billion tonnes annually which is consistent with a a land use stabilisation scenario of the IPCC. Livestock already use about 7 billion tonnes of biomass. But far more critical is which 7 billion. Almost 3 billion of those 7 are crop residues. This increases erosion and damages soil structure, ultimately reducing the productive capacity of plants which provides the bulk (83 percent) of human food. In wealthy countries we compensate with more fertiliser, but in poorer countries low productivity and hunger are the result. It’s tough to decide which of the livestock industries’ devastating impacts on animals, people and the planet is worse … animal suffering, species extinction, bowel cancer or methane’s contribution to climate change. But exacerbation of hunger and poverty in poor countries by the apparently innocuous process of eating crop residues possibly trumps all four.

Worldwatch and mega fauna

In 2009 Worldwatch published a paper by Robert Goodland and Jeff Anhang which put livestock emissions at 51 percent of anthropogenic emissions. I’ve mentioned this before. A large part of the difference between the 18 percent and 51 percent figures comes down to the treatment of livestock respiration … the carbon dioxide breathed out by animals (and us). If livestock are gradually reducing planetary plant capital, then at least some of their respiratory CO2 should counted. Current IPCC accounting rules are predicated on an assumption that respired carbon is matched (or exceeded) by plant growth.

Measuring such matters is difficult at best, but an interesting study came out in 2010 which throws light on the issue from a different angle. Put simply, the study estimated that humans and their domesticated biomass black holes … livestock … are consuming about 6 times more plant matter than the long extinct mega-herbivores in their hey-day back in the Pleistocene. This makes it clear just how unprecedented our current impact on the planet is, regardless of how the detail pans out.

Carbon neutral cattle stations

The last few years have seen a number of studies trying to show that various grazing systems are carbon friendly. This one from Mark Liebig at the US Department of Agriculture is an example and contains references to quite a few more. Here’s an Australian one from the Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries.

I’ve dealt with these issues in some detail before. But here’s an executive summary.

The first fundamental problem is in how the system boundary is defined. Consider methane. We used to have a planet with a rough balance between the methane sources and sinks. The terrestrial sources were things like wetlands and there were also terrestrial methane sinks like forests and some grasslands some of the time. The terrestrial sinks were always significant but were about a third the size of the atmospheric sinks. Regardless of the relative size of the sinks, it seems pretty obvious that you just can’t run around finding methane sinks and sticking cattle on them to make the area “methane neutral”. Ditto carbon in general. This is as silly as drawing a system boundary around a rechargeable plug-in electric vehicle and calling it pollution free.

The other standout issue is that of alternatives. A long term study in South East Spain illustrates the kinds of gains in carbon sequestration that can be made in suitable areas when pastures are converted to woodland.

These are not subtle points and when groups of well trained and intelligent scientists do substantial studies involving plenty of time, money and equipment and forget to mention these issues in the subsequent paper, then you have to wonder if the work is politically rather than scientifically motivated. In the case of the Queensland study mentioned above, Principal Scientist Gerard Bisshop resigned from the Queensland Government in protest.

Is Queenland a developing country hunting CDM credits?

It’s interesting to compare the Queenland study with appropriate United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) rules. These are the rules which developing countries need to follow in order to get tradeable carbon offset credits for reforestation work on agricultural or pastoral land. The rules are clear and require that the land is degraded and degrading with crops or livestock numbers having declined by at least 30 percent or more during the five years preceding the project. i.e., an ongoing cattle (or wheat) property can’t get credits for woody regrowth because it happened to decide not to bulldoze one or more paddocks. But the above linked Queensland DPI paper claims credit for precisely this kind of non-activity. It wouldn’t qualify for actual tradeable credits for a developing country under CDM and it shouldn’t appear in dodgy pro-industry advocacy papers by Queensland Government scientists.

And the CFI? … Carbon Farming Initiative

The Australian Government has recently released its Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) with a consultation paper and draft legislation for public comment. Despite the draft legislation being 331 pages of very precise legal language, the real substance is still being developed in Methodology documents being developed “with industry”. I’ll try and describe its key features as the substance emerges in a future post.

Less methane per moo

I feel compelled to give an update on the scientific progress to feed or engineer ruminants to produce less methane. Stories about breakthroughs in this area appear about as regularly as brain dead suggestions that eating more kangaroos will save the planet. Here’s a research result that might prompt just such a breakthrough story:

Many members of a series of … [compounds] were potent inhibitors of methanogenesis by rumen contents in vitro. The most potent compound inhibited methane production by 70% or more at a concentration of 1 microgram/ml (approximately 2.5 mumol/l).

Sound good? A massive 70 percent reduction in methane …

Yes it’s in vitro, but that’s a minor issue, think of the 70 percent!

This quote comes from a piece of research almost 30 years ago. Livestock farmers have long considered methane production from an animal as wasted energy and scientists have been working on a solution to this “problem” for a very long time. I traced papers back to the 1980s before losing patience. Apart from a huge wad of basic science about rumen function, I found papers on all kinds of things people have added to sheep or cattle feed to reduce methane production. The list included: mustard oil, horseradish oil, glucosinolate, cashew nut oil, linseed oil, coconut oil, krabok oil, palm fronds, soy oil, whole soybeans, antibiotics (various), fumaric acid, canola oil, copra meal, monolaurin, bromochloromethane, monensin, Yucca schidigera, Quillaja saponaria … and these are just the things with common names rather than chemical formulas. Monensin deserves a little footnote … it’s from a group of chemicals called ionophores, some of which have antibiotic properties. Meat companies are using ionophores as growth promoters while still using “raised without antibiotics” labels. One news story about huge US chicken producer Tysons doing this is here, but, curiously, the original Associated Press source seems to have been pulled from the website.

Many of the compounds reduce methane emissions but none seems to have made it into active use for all kinds of practical reasons. Seriously, who would waste cashews on cattle? A further persistant problem is that the organism populations in rumens adapt and can make any impacts short lived. Antibiotics work to some degree but create an evolutionary arms race in the rumen which will eventually see resistant organisms emerge. We don’t need any more antibiotic resistant bugs on the planet.

Apart from adding things to ruminant feed, the other approach under research is artificial selection. Some animals eat less per kilogram of growth and thereby generate less methane. Breed from these animals and hopefully the offspring will be similar. It’s rather trickier than it sounds and the gains will be small. How small?

Genetic approaches

Back in 2006 an Australian study did modelling suggesting that breeding for low methane production might yield a cumulative reduction in methane emissions in the Australian herd by 3.1 percent by 2025. This is hardly earth shattering, but seems to be enough to secure funding for this approach.

Since then various genes have been isolated that are associated with feed use efficiency (which is linked to methane production) with one study finding that these genes account for about 6.9 percent of the variability and a 2010 study found 150 gene factors (SNPs for those who know about such things) that account for 36 percent of the variability. How do you breed herds with these factors? That’s a good question.

As I was reading these papers it wasn’t always clear what was happening over time in the same animal. A group of Swiss researchers seemed to have the same interest. They examined animals from 3 popular dairy breeds over 41 weeks and found plenty of variability at different times but very consistent long term averages. They concluded:

The apparent lack of persistence of individual animal differences in methane yields suggests that genetic determination of this trait is of minor importance in dairy cows.

Measuring methane

A recent news article raised the issue of the accuracy of measurements of methane from cattle. The researcher involved was Canadian PhD student Jennifer Ellis. She has published a couple of papers, one of which I have, but she hasn’t (yet) responded to email requests, so I don’t have the other. The news article states:

Statistics have been giving us a bum steer when they state how much cattle methane emissions contribute to global warming, a new study shows. That’s because mathematical equations used to predict cows’ methane emissions are inaccurate and don’t take into account factors such as dietary changes, said Jennifer Ellis, lead author of the study and a PhD student at the University of Guelph.

The paper of Ellis’s that I do have investigates the accuracy of various equations used to predict methane from cattle. The first step is to look at the accuracy of the various methods of measuring methane from actual animals … there are three. Ellis and her 12 co-authors are happy that all three methods give the same results. So there isn’t a problem measuring methane emissions from cattle. But of course, you can’t measure emissions from every animal. You need to use the measurements on some animals to come up with equations which predict national herd emissions on the basis of livestock genetics and lifestyle. Is it true, as the article implies, that after 30 years of work, nobody has fitted any half reasonable models to the data?

In a 2008 paper, Ellis’s Ph.D supervisor, Associate Professor Ermias Kebreab calculated that current IPCC equations overestimate the emissions from US dairy cattle by about 12.5 percent and underestimate the emissions from US feedlot beef animals by about 9 percent. Since the ratio of beef to dairy cattle is probably about 10 to 1 then, the equations will give a net underestimate of total cattle emissions in any place with US feedlot conditions … and cattle emissions dominate livestock emissions. So the equations may be off by a few percent, but hardly enough to warrant the bum steer claim, especially since they look to be underestimating cattle methane.

But getting back to Ellis and her paper that I do have. She tested a swag of different equations proposed by many different researchers against a database of actual measurements from animals. Here’s a couple of her pictures to give you an indication of the findings. Each little diamond is a single animal. The graph below is from one equation and you can see from the predominance of diamonds below the observed=predicted line, that this equation underestimates emissions.

The equation used in the next figure on the right looks reasonably balanced.

It’s superficially clear that the range of emissions from various animals is large and not well captured by the available equations which are all pretty simple linear combinations of dietary components that researchers suspect are important. The equations were probably popped out of some linear regression software. But all you really need for large scale use is reasonable symmetry about the observed=predicted line. On the other hand for individual animals, the equations are frequently off by large amounts … factors of 2 or more. This indicates that it’s likely that nobody really has a clue about what causes the extreme variability between animals and that the dietary components featuring in the equations may not be among the causal factors driving that variability. The list of causal factors included in the equations includes starch, cellulose, forage, nonfiber carbohydrate, fat, dry matter intake and lignin. These are all common agricultural science suspects. There isn’t a single vitamin in the list or any of the other myriad suspects that feature in human nutritional work. My non-expert judgement is that this research, despite being decades old, is still in the very early stages. Make no mistake, I’m not maligning the scientists. This is very tough science, a ruminant is a wondrously complex creature and the research effort is tiny compared to, for example research into the diseases caused by red meat … like bowel cancer … or heart disease.

Industry responses

The livestock industry has countered LLS with all manner of rubbish. For example the NSW Farmer’s Association ran a line which confused US figures with global figures and left out nitrous oxide emissions altogether. Much of this confusion comes from one Frank Mitloehner who has been trumpetting a 3 percent figure at any journalist who will listen for some time now. While I’m sure Associate Professor Mitloehner knows what he’s talking about, journalists and NSW Farmer’s Association people tend to be easily confused.

Livestock methane emissions in the US are indeed about 3 percent of US emissions and are well below the 14 percent global average figure of LLS … about half of which was nitrous oxide as we saw in the first table.

It is common for US authors to confuse the US with the entire planet, but US livestock methane emissions are below average for a number of unsurprising reasons:

1. US cattle are predominantly grain fed (producing less methane) than cattle on pasture.
2. The US ratio of cattle to people is about 1 to 3 compared to 1 to 1 in Brazil and well above 1 to 1 in Australia.
3. US methane emissions from garbage are huge. In Australia, by comparison, and we are not noted for frugality, our garbage methane emissions are 1/6th of our livestock emissions. In the US, methane from garbage exceeds livestock methane.
4. The US imports about 10 percent (net) of its beef and almost all of its sheep meat … not that they eat much. So the emissions from that beef don’t appear in US figures.
5. Lastly, US advertisers and fast food chains may portray their home country as a hamburger culture, but Americans actually eat twice as much chicken as beef and almost no sheep meat at all. Australian ruminant meat intake is double that of the US.

It’s not so much that US livestock emissions are small, but that they are swamped by other profligate consumption emissions.

Tropospheric ozone and black carbon

Some readers will have seen the Supreme Master TV ads (on SBS in Australia) which proclaim that “If we cut methane emissions now, the worst climate change effects could go in a decade.”. The Supreme Master organisation has some of the look and feel of a religious sect to an athiest like me, but its backbone seems to be a large group of dedicated, caring and sharing volunteers who are refreshingly easy to deal with. I haven’t seen data to back their claim but here’s a claim from a paper co-authored by one of the world’s top climate scientists. Veerabhadran Ramanathan is Distinguished Professor of Climate and Atmospheric Sciences at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography at the University of California. Here’s the quote:

Fully applying existing emissions-control technologies could cut black carbon emissions by about 50 percent. And that would be enough to offset the warming effects of one to two decades worth of carbon dioxide emissions. Reducing the human-caused ozone in the lower atmosphere by about 50 percent, which could be possible through existing technologies, would offset about another decade’s worth. Within weeks, the heating effect of black carbon would lessen; within months, so, too, would the greenhouse effect of ozone. Within ten years, the earth’s overall warming trend would slow down, as would the retreat of sea ice and glaciers.

The detail will have to wait, but ending animal agriculture would be a big contribution to the reductions of both black carbon and ozone because the main cause of rising tropospheric ozone is rising methane and livestock is also a potent producer of black carbon via deforestation. The bottom line is that the Supreme Master claim is definitely plausible if Ramanathan’s modelling is accurate.

Concluding remarks

Livestock’s Long Shadow marks a watershed with livestock industry advocates giving solid numbers for many of livestock’s worst environmental impacts. The numbers were conservative as the subsequent Goodland/Anhang figures indicated. The report was also solid in its demonstration that more meat and dairy products requires more intensification if environmental impacts are to be minimised. Intensification is the industry’s euphemism for confinement, chemicals, crippling and suffering. The only way for meat and dairy to reduce its costs on the environment is to increase its cost on animals. For meat to become greener while continuing to be produced in vast quantities requires that it become crueller.

A population’s various impacts on the planet are largely dominated by what it eats. As people get richer, they can swamp this impact with other things. Private jets and a couple of Hummers will blow any environmental footprint budget. But for most of the planet’s 9 billion people in 2050, it will be food choices that dominate their impacts on the planet and it’s pretty clear that change is required. More of the same is both undesirable for most of the creatures involved and probably impossible. We need a substantive dietary transformation. The changes will be small in Bangladesh but large in Australia and other extreme-meat countries. As omnivores, unspecialised eaters, we have choices. We can trash the planet with our food choices, we can allow pigs, chickens and cattle to outbid the poor for food, or not.

Appendix … P&T figure with food supply characterists

P&T contained some fancy graphics which confused me a little … so I’ve tried to redraw, in the figure above, some of the data in what I think is a clearer form and added a heap detail about the global food supply … sticking to the law of conservation of confusion which allows the additon of extra data while keeping confusion constant :) I haven’t (yet) included nitrogen data. The data in the figure are generally the latest I could find, but the percentages of meat from different systems are ratios from LLS (circa 2000) and applied to the 268 million total meat production in 2007. The biomass data come from Kraussman. If you look at the red lines from “Meat” to “2796 Calories”, you will see it is about 8 percent of global calories. The other 8 percent, not highlighted with any lines, is dairy and eggs.

Hyperlinked Title DATE AUTHOR

2008

Welcome to A Brave New Climate 6/08/2008 Barry Brook
Geoengineering – damned if you do, damned if you don’t? 7/08/2008 Barry Brook
Climate Change Q&A Seminar 1: Is the Earth Warming (Discussion Thread) 8/08/2008 Barry Brook
How long will Old King Coal reign? Part I 9/08/2008 Barry Brook
Dr David Evans: born-again ‘alarmist’? 10/08/2008 Barry Brook
Tell us something we don’t know… 10/08/2008 Corey Bradshaw
Australia’s most powerful climate-forcing agent – it’s not coal 11/08/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA1 Presentations Available 12/08/2008 Barry Brook
1/3 CCQA1 Intro and Andrew Watson on climate records 12/08/2008 Barry Brook
Denial vs Good Science Part I 13/08/2008 Barry Brook
3/3 CCQA1 Barry Brook and Andrew Watson field questions on global warming 13/08/2008 Barry Brook
2/3 CCQA1 Barry Brook on how we know the earth is really warming 13/08/2008 Barry Brook
Will global warming cause a mass extinction event? 14/08/2008 Barry Brook
Spot the recycled denial I – Prof WJ Collins 15/08/2008 Barry Brook
Australia can be a clean energy superpower 15/08/2008 Stewart Taggart
Denial vs Good Science Part II 16/08/2008 Barry Brook
Two urgent climate statements – but no impact? 17/08/2008 Barry Brook
The Earth today stands in imminent peril 18/08/2008 Andrew Glikson
Irrationalism on climate change action 19/08/2008 Barry Brook
Spot the recycled denial II – 60 Minutes crunch time 20/08/2008 Barry Brook
Climate Change Q and A Seminar 2: Friday 22 Aug – natural vs human causes? 20/08/2008 Barry Brook
An iconic wetland at risk from sea level rise 20/08/2008 Barry Brook
The world’s largest fish is… shrinking 21/08/2008 Barry Brook
An unwelcome seachange 23/08/2008 Barry Brook
Dr Jennifer Marohasy ignores the climate science 24/08/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA2 Presentations Available 26/08/2008 Barry Brook
3/3 CCQA2 Questions from the audience regarding climate change causes 26/08/2008 Barry Brook
2/3 CCQA2 Barry Brook on human vs natural climate change 26/08/2008 Barry Brook
1/3 CCQA2 Intro and Bob Hill on natural climate changes 26/08/2008 Barry Brook
Make the switch to GreenPower and make (virtually) no difference to your carbon emissions 26/08/2008 Tim Kelly
A catastrophe in slow motion – sea ice updates 27/08/2008 Barry Brook
Carbon Targets I – Fermi Paradox solved? 28/08/2008 Barry Brook
Top 10 ways to reduce your CO2 emissions footprint 29/08/2008 Barry Brook
If you want a laugh… 30/08/2008 Barry Brook
Australia’s soaring carbon emissions put Kyoto out of reach 30/08/2008 Barry Brook
So just who does climate science? 31/08/2008 Barry Brook
Spot the recycled denial III – Prof Ian Plimer 1/09/2008 Barry Brook
A warning from the ghost of climate past 3/09/2008 Andrew Glikson
Twisted – the distorted mathematics of greenhouse denial 4/09/2008 Barry Brook
Climate Change Q and A Seminar 3: Friday 5 Sept – what future climate change scenarios are possible? 4/09/2008 Barry Brook
Carbon targets II – first thoughts on the Garnaut Review emissions trajectories 5/09/2008 Barry Brook
Don’t be swindled 6/09/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA3 Presentations Available 8/09/2008 Barry Brook
3/3 CCQA3 Questions from the audience regarding climate models and projections 8/09/2008 Barry Brook
2/3 CCQA3 Barry Brook on climate models and projections 8/09/2008 Barry Brook
1/3 CCQA3 Intro and Peter Hayman on climate variability and impacts 8/09/2008 Barry Brook
Cartoon guide to global warming denial 8/09/2008 Barry Brook
Spot the recycled denial IV – climate case built on thin foundation 9/09/2008 Barry Brook
Nitrogen, climate change and diet 10/09/2008 Geoff Russell
Spot the recycled denial V – Prof Bob Carter 12/09/2008 Barry Brook
What if the sun got stuck? 14/09/2008 James Hansen
Are voluntary actions meaningful where an emissions cap is introduced? 15/09/2008 Tim Kelly
Target atmospheric CO2 levels, not vague emissions reductions 16/09/2008 Barry Brook
Climate Change Q and A Seminar 4: Friday 19 Sept – Are the impacts of climate change being overstated? 17/09/2008 Barry Brook
Grim scenarios on a 2 to 6 degrees celsius hotter Earth 18/09/2008 Barry Brook
How long will Old King Coal reign? Part II 21/09/2008 Barry Brook
Ethics and climate change 22/09/2008 Barry Brook
Climate change and human health – inequities demand win-win solutions 23/09/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA4 Presentations Available 24/09/2008 Barry Brook
3/3 CCQA4 Questions from the audience regarding the impacts of climate change 24/09/2008 Barry Brook
2/3 CCQA4 Barry Brook on the impacts of climate change 24/09/2008 Barry Brook
1/3 CCQA4 Intro and Corey Bradshaw on marine impacts 24/09/2008 Barry Brook
Paying the climate change piper 24/09/2008 Tony Kevin
Ongoing rise in global carbon emissions and the lazy audience 26/09/2008 Barry Brook
Garnaut Climate Change Review Final Report – open thread 30/09/2008 Barry Brook
Climate ripe for transformative change 2/10/2008 Barry Brook
How much warming in the pipeline? Part 1 – CO2-e 6/10/2008 Barry Brook
Climate Change Q and A Seminar 5: Friday 10 Oct – Will it cost the earth to avoid climate change? 8/10/2008 Barry Brook
The global food system and climate change – Part I 9/10/2008 Geoff Russell
Thinking big and fast on renewable energy 13/10/2008 Barry Brook
Two denialist talking points quashed 14/10/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA5 Presentation Available 14/10/2008 Barry Brook
3/4 CCQA5 Barry Brook on the economic costs of climate change 14/10/2008 Barry Brook
2/4 CCQA5 Davide Ross on carbon abatement 14/10/2008 Barry Brook
Devouring the pale blue dot 20/10/2008 Andrew Glikson
Nine policies to drag ourselves out of the climate change mire 22/10/2008 Barrie Pittock
Climate Change Q and A Seminar 6: Friday 24 Oct – The popular media debate on climate change and peak oil 23/10/2008 Barry Brook
Off to China 24/10/2008 Barry Brook
Olduvai theory – crackpot idea or dawning reality? 28/10/2008 Barry Brook
CCQA6 Presentations Available 28/10/2008 Barry Brook
3/3 CCQA6 Questions from the audience regarding peak oil and greenhouse denial vs good science 28/10/2008 Barry Brook
2/3 CCQA6 Barry Brook on greenhouse denial versus good science 28/10/2008 Barry Brook
1/3 CCQA6 Intro and Michael Lardelli on peak oil 28/10/2008 Barry Brook
If attitudes can change on water conservation, then why not renewable energy! 30/10/2008 Barry Brook
The global food system and climate change – Part II 31/10/2008 Geoff Russell
Earth as a magic pudding 2/11/2008 Michael Lardelli
Do most scientists really believe in global warming? 6/11/2008 George Marshall
Response to a wine industry climate change skeptic 11/11/2008 Barry Brook
Interview with Prof Stephen Schneider 14/11/2008 Corey Bradshaw
What Bob Carter and Andrew Bolt fail to grasp 23/11/2008 Barry Brook
Hansen to Obama Pt 1 – the Now or Never plan 24/11/2008 James Hansen
Hansen to Obama Pt II – Carbon tax with 100% dividend 27/11/2008 James Hansen
Hansen to Obama Pt III – Fast nuclear reactors are integral 28/11/2008 James Hansen
Hansen to Obama Pt IV – Where to from here? 2/12/2008 James Hansen
The smokescreen of outdated emissions reduction targets 4/12/2008 Barry Brook
Managing catastrophic climate risk – the six step plan 7/12/2008 Ian Dunlop
Squeezing the marine nutcracker 10/12/2008 Barry Brook
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) nuclear power – Q and A 13/12/2008 Barry Brook
Time to stop pretending on emissions reduction 16/12/2008 Barry Brook
Beyond peak oil – will black gold turn green? 18/12/2008 Barry Brook
Renewable energy cannot sustain an energy intensive society 21/12/2008 Ted Trainer
Calls of urgency from climate scientists 24/12/2008 Barry Brook
Save a bit here, ship a whole lot there 26/12/2008 Barry Brook
Blame perversity for the worst kind of climate change denial 31/12/2008 Barry Brook

2009
Spot the recycled denial VI – Chris Kenny 1/01/2009 Barry Brook
Cartoon guide to global warming denial II 4/01/2009 Barry Brook
Prescription for the Planet – Part I 6/01/2009 Barry Brook
What we’ve learned about climate change in 2008 8/01/2009 Barry Brook
How to make voluntary carbon offsets a reality 12/01/2009 Tim Kelly
Prescription for the Planet – Part II – Newclear energy and boron-powered vehicles 13/01/2009 Barry Brook
Put all energy cards on the table to fix climate change fully 16/01/2009 Barry Brook
Ranking geo-engineering options for mitigating climate change impacts 19/01/2009 Barry Brook
What will Australia’s renewable energy amendment bill actually deliver? 23/01/2009 Tim Kelly
Prescription for the Planet – Part III – Renewable atoms and plasma-charged waste 25/01/2009 Barry Brook
A sketch plan for a zero-carbon Australia 29/01/2009 Barry Brook
Is there a link between Adelaide’s heatwave and global warming? 3/02/2009 Barry Brook
How hot should it have really been over the last 5 years? 8/02/2009 Barry Brook
Heatwave update and open letter to the PM 10/02/2009 Barry Brook
Integral Fast Reactors for the masses 12/02/2009 Barry Brook
Carbon tax or cap-and-trade? The debate we never had 14/02/2009 Tim Kelly
Global warming strains at species interactions 17/02/2009 Barry Brook
Response to an Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) critique 21/02/2009 Barry Brook
Climate futures 25/02/2009 Barry Brook
Prescription for the Planet – Part IV – Show me the money! 28/02/2009 Barry Brook
Could UHVDC be a “killer app” for solving climate change? 3/03/2009 Stewart Taggart
How much warming in the pipeline? Part II – it’s as tricky as ABC 6/03/2009 Barry Brook
Total energy independence in 12 years 10/03/2009 Barry Brook
Did climate change kill off woolly mammoths and giant wombats? 14/03/2009 Barry Brook
The Solar Fraud 18/03/2009 Barry Brook
Fast Reactor Radio 22/03/2009 Barry Brook
Six degrees of separation 26/03/2009 Barry Brook
Some new climate and energy blogs and resources 28/03/2009 Barry Brook
CPRS vs carbon tax: Senate Inquiry 30/03/2009 Tim Kelly
Mosquito outbreaks rising with the tide 2/04/2009 Barry Brook
Carbon footprint of the Olympic Dam uranium mine expansion 5/04/2009 Barry Brook
Climbing mount improbable 11/04/2009 Barry Brook
The war against science while Rome is burning 16/04/2009 Andrew Glikson
Towards climate geoengineering? 19/04/2009 Andrew Glikson
Ian Plimer – Heaven and Earth 23/04/2009 Barry Brook
More ice, flat temperatures – what does it all mean? 27/04/2009 Barry Brook
Rethinking nuclear power 30/04/2009 Geoff Russell
Admiral visions of a future now past 3/05/2009 Barry Brook
Has Kevin Rudd taken “a significant step forward on climate change”? 6/05/2009 David Spratt
Discussion Thread: Should Gen III nuclear power precede Gen IV in Australia? 7/05/2009 Barry Brook
Australia will break the world’s carbon budget 11/05/2009 Barry Brook
Climate change items in the 2009 Federal Budget 13/05/2009 Barry Brook
Voluntary Actions and the Rudd Government’s changes to its proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction System 15/05/2009 Tim Kelly
Climate Denial Crock 18/05/2009 Barry Brook
Al Gore’s blind spot on nuclear power 22/05/2009 Barry Brook
P4TP chapter 4 – everyone can now read Blees on IFR 25/05/2009 Barry Brook
Another hockey stick fabrication! 30/05/2009 Barry Brook
SA sets a 33% renewables by 2020 target 3/06/2009 Barry Brook
“Spooked” by IFR on TV 4/06/2009 Barry Brook
Memo to Stephen Fielding: It’s not the sun 8/06/2009 Barry Brook
An inconvenient solution 11/06/2009 Barry Brook
Solar Credits – just bad policy! 14/06/2009 Tim Kelly
Steel yourself – a clear role for hydrogen 16/06/2009 Barry Brook
Why is the US ignoring the Integral Fast Reactor? 20/06/2009 Steve Kirsch
Lovelock’s dire vision 23/06/2009 Tim Flannery
Discussion Thread: Is the EIA forecast of 2016 energy prices realistic? 27/06/2009 Barry Brook
Brave new power for the world 1/07/2009 Steve Kirsch
El Niño and sunspots return, sea ice doesn’t 5/07/2009 Barry Brook
Climate update – ongoing decline in South-East Australian rainfall 10/07/2009 Barry Brook
Counterpoint – nuclear power and the low carbon economy 14/07/2009 Barry Brook
We need a real global plan for carbon mitigation 19/07/2009 Barry Brook
Science Show – Nuclear power plants – now safer and cheaper 22/07/2009 Barry Brook
The great climate debate 2009 – Brook vs Plimer 27/07/2009 Barry Brook
Twitter Plimer on ice 31/07/2009 Barry Brook
Power to the People – Nuclear energy in South Australia 4/08/2009 Barry Brook
Does wind power reduce carbon emissions? 8/08/2009 Peter Lang
GreenPower claims and merits – clearing confusion 12/08/2009 Tim Kelly
Wind and carbon emissions – Peter Lang responds 13/08/2009 Peter Lang
Solar power realities – supply-demand, storage and costs 16/08/2009 Peter Lang
Classifying ‘belief systems’ in sustainable energy and climate change 20/08/2009 Gene Preston
Recent nuclear power cost estimates – separating fact from myth 23/08/2009 Barry Brook
Climate crisis update and cash for coal clunkers 27/08/2009 Katherine Wells
Solar thermal questions 31/08/2009 Ted Trainer
Australia’s weird winter 3/09/2009 Blair Trewin
Is Our Future Nuclear? 7/09/2009 Barry Brook
Solar realities and transmission costs – addendum 10/09/2009 Peter Lang
Science Council for Global Initiatives 15/09/2009 Barry Brook
Radiation – facts, fallacies and phobias 19/09/2009 Barry Brook
A necessary interlude 24/09/2009 Barry Brook
Thinking critically about sustainable energy (TCASE) 1: Prologue 27/09/2009 Barry Brook
TCASE 2: Energy primer 29/09/2009 Barry Brook
Q and A responses to climate skeptics’ arguments 2/10/2009 Brett Parris
Remote solar PV vs small nuclear reactor – electricity cost comparison 4/10/2009 Gene Preston
Backstory – Barry Brook on 4th Generation Nuclear Power 7/10/2009 Barry Brook
Germany – crunched by the numbers 9/10/2009 Tom Blees
TCASE 3: The energy demand equation to 2050 11/10/2009 Barry Brook
Life and death on Earth – the Cronus hypothesis 14/10/2009 Corey Bradshaw
The Integral Fast Reactor – Summary for Policy Makers 16/10/2009 Steve Kirsch
TCASE 4: Energy system build rates and material inputs 18/10/2009 Barry Brook
Danish fairy tales – what can we learn? 22/10/2009 Tom Blees
TCASE 5: Ocean power I – Pelamis 25/10/2009 Barry Brook
Crunch Time: Using and abusing Keynes to fight the twin crises of our era 27/10/2009 Tony Kevin
Energy dialogue, Green debate, Blog updates 29/10/2009 Barry Brook
Red Necked Aussie Greenies 31/10/2009 Geoff Russell
Critique of ‘A path to sustainable energy by 2030′ 3/11/2009 Barry Brook
Carbon emissions and nuclear capable countries 6/11/2009 Barry Brook
Fee-and-dividend is superior to cap-and-trade for effective carbon emissions reductions 9/11/2009 Steve Kirsch
Follow Britain’s nuclear lead 10/11/2009 Barry Brook
Two years, three record heat waves in southeastern Australia 14/11/2009 Barry Brook
Forget the quality, it’s the 700 million tonnes which counts 17/11/2009 Geoff Russell
TCASE 6: Cooling water and thermal power plants 20/11/2009 Barry Brook
Key concepts for reliable, small-scale low-carbon energy grids 22/11/2009 Gene Preston
Open Thread 1 27/11/2009 Barry Brook
The Nuclear Economy 27/11/2009 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 1 – Context 29/11/2009 Barry Brook
Copenhagen reality check – what’s really coming 1/12/2009 Barry Brook
Clean future in nuclear power 4/12/2009 Barry Brook
TCASE 7: Scaling up Andasol 1 to baseload 6/12/2009 Barry Brook
Mind the gap – distant climates and immediate budgets 10/12/2009 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 2 – fuel use 13/12/2009 Barry Brook
A LFTR deployment plan for Australia 17/12/2009 Alex Goodwin
Temperature of science – never give up 21/12/2009 James Hansen
Unnatural gas 24/12/2009 Tom Blees
Open Thread 2 28/12/2009 Barry Brook
Energy and climate books I read in 2009 31/12/2009 Barry Brook

2010
The most important investment that we aren’t making to mitigate the climate crisis 2/01/2010 Steve Kirsch
Burning the biosphere, boverty blues (Part I) 5/01/2010 Geoff Russell
Emission cuts realities for electricity generation – costs and CO2 emissions 9/01/2010 Peter Lang
From nuclear sceptic to convert 13/01/2010 Haydon Manning
Hypocrisies of the antis 17/01/2010 Marion Brook
Real holes in science 22/01/2010 Barry Brook
Nuclear safeguards and Australian uranium export policy 25/01/2010 Jim Green
Tom Blees in Australia 28/01/2010 Barry Brook
Alternative to Carbon Pricing 31/01/2010 Peter Lang
Burning the biosphere, boverty blues (Part II) 4/02/2010 Geoff Russell
Monckton vs Brook debate – the video 8/02/2010 Barry Brook
Human consequences of climate change – is private property the solution or part of the problem? 12/02/2010 Paul Babie
IFR FaD 3 – the LWR versus IFR fuel cycle 16/02/2010 Barry Brook
IFR FaD context – the need for U.S. implementation of the IFR 18/02/2010 Barry Brook
Do climate sceptics and anti-nukes matter? or: How I learned to stop worrying and love energy economics 21/02/2010 Barry Brook
After Copenhagen – James Hansen in Adelaide 22/02/2010 Barry Brook
Would 10,000 nuclear power stations cook the planet? 26/02/2010 Barry Brook
Cheap, green nuclear power? 1/03/2010 John Rolls
Climate debate missing the point 3/03/2010 Barry Brook
Open Thread 3 5/03/2010 Barry Brook
TCASE 8: Estimating EROEI from LCA 8/03/2010 Barry Brook
Hansen: Climate and Energy Leadership 11/03/2010 James Hansen
How to get rid of existing coal? 15/03/2010 Barry Brook
Britain’s energy future – political and technical considerations 19/03/2010 Douglas Wise
The problem with ‘Generating the Future: UK energy systems fit for 2050′ 22/03/2010 Barry Brook
The gentle art of interrogation 25/03/2010 Barry Brook
Globally warned – review of Hamilton and Hansen 28/03/2010 Tony Kevin
Nuclear century outlook – crystal ball gazing by the WNA 1/04/2010 Barry Brook
Pumped-hydro energy storage – cost estimates for a feasible system 5/04/2010 Peter Lang
TCASE 9: Ocean power II – CETO 11/04/2010 Barry Brook
Analysis of the 2010 Nuclear Summit and the obsession with highly enriched uranium 15/04/2010 DV82XL
Prospects for coordinated global action on climate change 18/04/2010 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 4 – a lifetime of energy in the palm of your hand 22/04/2010 Barry Brook
Santos chief’s gassy vision Part 1 – Australian natgas reserves 25/04/2010 Barry Brook
Santos chief’s gassy vision Part 2 – is gas almost as good as nuclear? 28/04/2010 Barry Brook
Why vs Why: Nuclear Power – new book by BNC author 1/05/2010 Barry Brook
An informed public is key to acceptance of nuclear energy 4/05/2010 DV82XL
Open Thread 4 6/05/2010 Barry Brook
Venus syndrome – the Claron’s despair 9/05/2010 Barry Brook
Pamphlets, talks and tweets on nuclear power and climate change 13/05/2010 Barry Brook
Learning the truth about energy 17/05/2010 Barry Brook
Counterpoint ABC radio debate – Does being green mean going nuclear? 19/05/2010 Barry Brook
TCASE 10: Not all capacity factors are made equal 22/05/2010 Barry Brook
Trawling for snake oil 25/05/2010 Geoff Russell
Replacing Hazelwood coal-fired power station – Critique of Environment Victoria report 29/05/2010 Peter Lang
OZ-ENERGY-ANALYSIS.ORG – open science for the new millennium 1/06/2010 Barry Brook
Public advocacy on nuclear power and climate change 5/06/2010 Rob Parker
Updated top 10 posts on BNC and some site stats 7/06/2010 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 5 – the Gen III and Gen IV nuclear power synergy – why we need both 10/06/2010 Barry Brook
Sea level rise – it’s still happening, isn’t it? Part 1 14/06/2010 Barry Brook
The 21st century nuclear renaissance is starting – good news for the climate 18/06/2010 Barry Brook
Take real action on climate change – Part 1 21/06/2010 Marion Brook
Take real action on climate change – Part 2 – the FAQ 25/06/2010 Marion Brook
Thinking Critically about Sustainable Energy (TCASE) – the seminar series 29/06/2010 Barry Brook
OzEA modelling – large-scale wind power using a bucket storage model and gas backup 30/06/2010 Barry Brook
What is risk? A simple explanation 4/07/2010 Peter Lang
Open Thread 5 7/07/2010 Barry Brook
TCASE 11: Safety, cost and regulation in nuclear electricity generation 8/07/2010 DV82XL
TCASE 12: A checklist for renewable energy plans 12/07/2010 John Morgan
BNC community analysis of the Zero Carbon Australia 2020 Report 14/07/2010 Barry Brook
Vote for Brave New Climate! 14/07/2010 Barry Brook
Climate change basics I – observations, causes and consequences 18/07/2010 Barry Brook
Climate change basics II – impacts on ice, rain and seas 21/07/2010 Barry Brook
Travels to US and China: ecological models and the Argonne National Laboratory 23/07/2010 Barry Brook
Walk Against Warming in a city near you on 15th August 2010 26/07/2010 Rob Parker
Nuclear Power – Yes Please! (why we need nuclear energy to beat climate change) 28/07/2010 Barry Brook
Balancing carbon with smoke and mirrors 31/07/2010 Geoff Russell
Energy in Australia in 2030 3/08/2010 Barry Brook
US Travel update, ‘Argonne West Diaries’ upcoming 7/08/2010 Barry Brook
Nuclear Power or Climate Change: Take Your Pick – a BNC business card and printable FAQ pamphlet 10/08/2010 Barry Brook
‘Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan’ – Critique 12/08/2010 Martin Nicholson & Peter Lang
Science Educator award, Sydney talk, BNC 2 years old 15/08/2010 Barry Brook
Climate change basics III – environmental impacts and tipping points 19/08/2010 Barry Brook
Accuracy of ABARE Energy Projections 22/08/2010 Peter Lang
Pebble Bed Advanced High Temperature Reactor at UC Berkeley – low cost nuclear? 25/08/2010 Barry Brook
Peak Oil Discussion 29/08/2010 Dave Lankshear
Does wind power reduce carbon emissions? Counter-Response 1/09/2010 Michael Goggin
Open Thread 6 4/09/2010 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 6 – fast reactors are easy to control 7/09/2010 Barry Brook
Another ZCA 2020 Critique – will they respond? 9/09/2010 Ted Trainer
Do the recent floods prove man-made climate change is real? 12/09/2010 Barry Brook
Fast reactor future – the vision of an atomic energy pioneer 14/09/2010 Len Koch
IFR FaD 7 – Q&A on Integral Fast Reactors – safe, abundant, non-polluting power 18/09/2010 Barry Brook
TerraPower’s Travelling Wave Reactor – why not use an IFR? 22/09/2010 George Stanford
Kakadu – a climate change impacts hotspot 25/09/2010 Barry Brook
Scenarios for nuclear electricity to 2060 – Context 28/09/2010 Barry Brook
SNE 2060 – thermal reactor build rates, uranium use and cost 29/09/2010 Barry Brook
Challicum Hills wind farm and the wettest September on record 3/10/2010 Barry Brook
IFR FaD 8 – Two TV documentaries and a new film on the Integral Fast Reactor 6/10/2010 Barry Brook
Discussion Thread – can nuclear be kick started at lower cost? 9/10/2010 Barry Brook
TCASE Video – Interactive discussions about the future of nuclear power 11/10/2010 Barry Brook
SNE 2060 – are uranium resources sufficient? 14/10/2010 Barry Brook
Who crippled the Murray Darling Basin? 18/10/2010 Geoff Russell
Book review: The Flooded Earth – Our Future in a World without Ice Caps 21/10/2010 Barry Brook
SNE 2060 – can we build nuclear power plants fast enough to meet the 2060 target? 25/10/2010 Barry Brook
Open Thread 7 29/10/2010 Barry Brook
Of brains, biceps and baloney 31/10/2010 Geoff Russell
Two nuclear-solar dialogues in Melbourne next week 2/11/2010 Barry Brook
Electricity costs exhibits 7/11/2010 Barry Brook
CO2 rising – the science of global warming 10/11/2010 Barry Brook
SNE 2060 – assessment of energy demand 14/11/2010 Barry Brook
Systems modelling for synergistic ecological-climate dynamics 18/11/2010 Barry Brook
SNE 2060 – a multi-source energy supply scenario 21/11/2010 Barry Brook
The effect of cutting CO2 emissions to zero by 2050 24/11/2010 Tom Wigley
Nuclear is the least-cost, low-carbon, baseload power source 28/11/2010 Barry Brook
The arithmetic adds up to nuclear 30/11/2010 Barry Brook
Media reactions to the Energy paper – part 1 4/12/2010 Barry Brook
Monthly Argument debate: climate change – is nuclear power the answer? 6/12/2010 Barry Brook
Idea: financing large capital cost electricity projects without raising rates 9/12/2010 Gene Preston
Media reactions to the Energy paper – part 2 13/12/2010 Barry Brook
OzEA – The second story 17/12/2010 Barry Brook
Energy and climate books I read in 2010 21/12/2010 Barry Brook
Open Thread 8 – BNC Christmas and New Year 2011 24/12/2010 Barry Brook

2011
No (statistical) warming since 1995? Wrong 2/01/2011 Barry Brook
BNC as a resource – call for help 5/01/2011 Barry Brook
Government intervention on fossil fuel pollution 9/01/2011 DV82XL
QLD floods highlight the cost of climate extremes, and may be a spur to action 12/01/2011 Barry Brook
Livestock and Climate Change … Status update 17/01/2011 Geoff Russell
The cost of ending global warming – a calculation 21/01/2011 Chris Uhlik
New BNC podcast series and predict millionth page view 26/01/2011 Barry Brook
Two countries, two paths, one crucial lesson learned 28/01/2011 Barry Brook
IFR: An optimized approach to meeting global energy needs (Part I) 01/02/2011 Barry Brook
An environmentally sound, energy-rich future (Part II) 04/02/2011 Tom Blees & Barry Brook
Keeping solid information on nuclear energy on the ALP’s discussion agenda 07/02/2011 Luke Weston
ABC Counterpoint radio on nuclear costs, and new talks 10/02/2011 Barry Brook
Climate Change – it’s complicated, but it’s real 12/02/2011 Barry Brook
Gas aplenty, but UAE opts for nuclear – a lesson to be learned? 14/02/2011 Barry Brook
Safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle 18/02/2011 Bill Hannum
Open Thread 9 – technosolar catastrophe? 20/02/2011 Barry Brook
Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III) 24/02/2011 Barry Brook

Thanks to all the many BNC guest posters (Gene Preston, Geoff Russell, Peter Lang, John Morgan, DV82XL, Marion Brook, Tony Kevin, John Rolls, Paul Babie, Jim Green, Tom Wigley, George Stanford, Len Koch, Rob Parker, Michael Goggin), numerous regular (and irregular) commenters, and the thousands of readers (including RSS subscribers and general lurkers), for keeping this online community as a thriving and interesting place to visit.

Here’s a toast to another interesting and productive year in 2011!

I’ll be taking a blogger’s holiday for a few weeks over the period 25 December 2010 to 8 January 2011. It’s as good a time as any for a writing break, given that this is a traditionally quiet period in the World of WordPress. From past experience in 2008 and 2009, the blog’s hits and comments dwindle to a trickle over this holiday period, as people go offline and get a life — or else burn their candles at both ends in merriment, partying, relaxing and [in Australia] taking summer holidays. So it’s a good time for me to also recharge my intellectual batteries. Not that I’ll go away entirely — I’ll still be hanging around online and commenting here and there, as the mood takes me. The conversation never dies, it merely quietens!

Still, that certainly doesn’t mean that YOU can’t have your say, about anything to do with climate change or energy, really. That’s what this Christmas and New Year Open Thread is for…

First, I have a paper coming out shortly in the journal Energy, co-authored with Martin Nicholson and Tom Biegler. It is called “How carbon pricing changes the relative competitiveness of low-carbon baseload generating technologies” (DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2010.10.039), but is not yet available online — when it is, I’ll write up an overview of it on BNC. The core message of this paper, based on a standardised meta-review of the last 10 years of authoritative assessments of levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) and life cycle emissions (LCE), is that nuclear is the lowest-cost option for mitigating carbon emissions; moreover, is already competitive with pulverised fuel coal (under the right conditions). I’d like to say more now, but I’ll have to wait until it’s been formally published online. Press releases etc. will be forthcoming…

Still, there are other things I can point out for now.

Exhibit #1: IEA/OECD projected nuclear costs for 14 countries — 2010 update:

Exhibit #2: 2016 Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources from the Annual Energy Outlook 2010:

Exhibit #3: OECD electricity generating cost projections for year 2010 on – 10% discount rate, c/kWh:

Exhibit #4: Electricity prices by country (selection — have more than 5 million people), with % energy generated by nuclear and technosolar* renewables (only domestic generation is counted):

*Wind and solar. Hydro and conventional geothermal are not listed here as they are highly location-specific and not scalable to replace fossil fuels.

A super-crude multiple linear regression of these data yields the following equation:

Electricity price (c/kWh) = 20.5 – 0.1*N% + 0.5*T%

i.e. baseline cost is 20.5 c/kWh, with each percentage unit of nuclear reducing the price by 0.1 c/kWh and each % of technosolar adding 0.5 c/kWh to the price. (Don’t draw any serious conclusions out of this super-simplified analysis).

———————————

This is data from the real world. Yes, there are caveats — aren’t there always? Draw your own conclusions.

Now this “Brain Food” event comes to Melbourne. Next Monday, 8 November, I will be speaking, along with Professor Vassilios Agelidis (Director Centre for Energy Research & Policy Analysis, University of New South Wales) and Dr Peter Seligman (Melbourne Energy Institute, University of Melbourne). Peter is author of the report “Australian Sustainable Energy – By the Numbers“. Some details (PDF here):

Nuclear – Solar Energies: Facts and Fictions Demystified

6:00pm for 6:30pm start

Coles Theatre, The University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester Street Carlton, VIC 3053

VISIT www.alumni.unsw.edu.au to sign up (bookings essential), or contact UNSW Alumni Office 61 2 9385 3279

There are some enormous challenges ahead with energy and electricity generation. More than one-quarter of the world’s population has no access to electricity and our reliance on fossil fuels must be reduced rapidly. A carbon constrained sustainable development is inevitable. Electricity demand is likely to continue to soar and transportation loads are likely to change profile as more electric vehicles would soon rely on electricity grids. Multi-billion dollar smart grid investments worldwide present tremendous opportunities.

Solar energy technologies have made rapid progress and are being built in both small and large-scale systems. Together with other renewable energy sources, they now have the potential to replace fossil fuels. Nuclear energy is seen by many nations as a way to energy security and immediate reduction to electricity generated carbon emissions.

Join our experts as they:

• demystify fact from fiction for both solar and nuclear energy technologies

• highlight the merits and limitations of these energy sources

• debate their role to Australia’s energy mix of the future

• share your contributions and address your questions and concerns.

Then, on Thursday 11 November, there is another Melbourne debate, this time organised by The Monthly Argument:

Climate change – is nuclear power the answer?

The Function Room, The Dan O’Connell Hotel, 225 Canning Street (corner of Princes Street) Carlton Melway 2B J4

6.30pm for 7.00pm start. Free admission. No need to book. Meals available from 5.30pm.

Prof. Barry Brook (Adelaide University) See his blog – “YES”: Nuclear power is safe, there’s no doubt that it can produce the amount of energy we will require, it’s cheaper than renewables. The intermittency and variability that’s inherent in the process of producing energy from renewables would lead to the building of new fossil fuel plants as back-ups.

Jim Green (Nuclear Awareness Project) – “NO”: Nuclear energy is dangerous, leads to proliferation, and the industry has a history of ’radioactive racism’ both in Australia and around the world.

Cam Walker (Friends of the Earth) – “NO”:  Renewables can already supply us with the energy we need so we should make the switch as rapidly as possible.

Arthur Dent (previously know as Albert Langer) – “NEITHER”:  Nuclear is a better bet than renewable, but both are far too expensive. They will not be taken up by the developing world which requires cheap energy NOW.  Instead of panicking, we should be demanding a huge increase in the funding of fundamental science.

It’d be great to see the Melbourne-based BNC readers at either or both events! I’m looking forward to locking my pair of evidential and logical horns with these folks, especially Jim Green who has posted previously here on BNC. I’d hope that the two events make available the audio (and maybe video) recording, so that at some point I might also be able to post the content here at the end of this post.

The question I now ask is, are the BZE team planning to respond to these two substantive pieces? I would be happy to publish their rejoinder here on BNC. The gauntlet is thrown down. Will they respond?

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Comments on

Zero Carbon Australia, M. Wright and Hearps, Univ. of Melbourne, Energy Institute, August 2010.

by Ted (F.E.) Trainer, Social Work, University of NSW, Kensington.

The ZCA report argues that Australia could run entirely on renewable energy by 2020.

I think this lengthy and detailed report is a valuable contribution to the energy discussion, containing much up to date information and many ideas and proposals that are promising.  I believe it heads in the general direction Australia should take.  However I think the report is quite mistaken in its optimism, that is in its conclusion that Australia can convert to renewables.  This conclusion is based on a number of assumptions, some of which seem to me to be highly challengeable.

My current understanding of the global (not Australian) situation is summarised in “Can renewables etc solve the greenhouse problem — The negative case.”  Energy Policy, Aug. 2010,  (which I will refer to below as CAN).  ZCA has helped me to see some mistakes in my analysis, which will enable improvement of my current attempt to apply the general approach to the Australian situation.

The issue is of course absolutely crucial and ZCA has made a significant contribution to the process whereby we try to sort out the situation.  ZCA concludes that there is a neat and simple way growth and affluence society can be made sustainable, quickly and affordably.  My view is that global problems cannot be solved within or by a society committed to affluence and growth.  The potential of renewables is a central issue in this gigantic debate, (although it is not crucial, that is, even if renewable energy turns out to be sufficient there are many other reasons for scrapping the core systems in this society, especially to do with global economic injustice.

The spectacular conclusions ZCA arrives at are largely due to the energy supply target set, which is very low.  Present Australian final or end-use energy consumption is 3900PJ/y, and ZCA says this can be reduced to 1660 and kept there.   (Fig 4.1 represents the task as supplying an average of 1317 PJ…35 GW, and the wind and solar thermal plant requirements seem to correspond to this lower figure.??)

In recent years Australian energy consumption has been growing at over 2% p.a.;, although ABARE expects this to fall to 1.9% p.a. by 2030.  ZCA notes electricity consumption is growing at 3.15% p.a., and transport energy use is growing at a similar rate.  A 2% p.a. growth rate indicates that demand will double   by 2045.  In my view the appropriate target for a discussion of the Australian energy problem is the likely 2050 demand.  In other words as I see it the discussion should begin by focusing on supplying around 8000 PJ/y in 2050 if business as usual continues, and then consider how conservation effort and new ways might reduce this.

It therefore seems to me quite inappropriate for ZCA analysis to take their target as meeting present demand of 3900 PJ.  Their argument is only that this 2008 demand can be dramatically reduced, and then met by renewables.  But what about the forces that are driving demand increase all the time and will continue to do so as there is continued pursuit of economic growth and higher “living standards”…  They do not discuss the 2050 task at all, beyond about two sentences, the main one being “Ongoing per capita efficiency gains of 1 – 1.3% p.a. after 2020 keep total demand steady at least to 2040, while allowing or population growth.” (p. 15.)  No support is given for this statement.  On p.130 they say their plan “…intends to decouple energy use from GDP growth”, with no further comment.  The implied assumptions are astronomical, i.e., apparently that the factors presently driving over 3% p.a growth in electricity and transport energy demand at will cease to operate from now on.

The report assumes that the general efficiency of energy use can be increased markedly.  However, I have not been able to find more than a few scraps of useful data on what is likely to be achieved.   (In CAN I assumed a 33% reduction.)  The 2050 task for ZCA therefore seems to me to be dealing with a 6400 PJ/y BAU supply task.

ZCA discusses many valuable ideas whereby this BAU demand might be reduced, such as moving from petrol to electricity for cars.  Their major strategy is to assume that the whole economy can be more or less totally shifted to electricity, and that this can come from wind and solar thermal systems.  However while they discuss at length many functions that can be shifted to electricity, they do not show what proportion of present energy demand can be shifted.   This requires good data on the forms and uses of energy in the Australian economy, which I have not been able to get, e.g., how much how goes into water heating, space heating, furnaces… (ABARE et al. don’t have such breakdowns, and Ayres, 2008, says they are not generally available.)

At present only 20+% of final energy used is in the form of electricity, so for the ZCA case a great deal depends on how much of the remaining 80% can be shifted, and this is not established.  In CAN it was noted that even if 60% of transport is shifted to electricity and electricity was assumed to be 25% of final demand, that left 55% of final energy to be supplied in non-electrical form.  CAN assumed 10% of final demand in the form of low temperature space and water heating would come from solar panels without difficulty (not true in Europe and northern US) and so this was left out of the analysis.  (ZCA deals with heating via heat-pumps, which seems sensible but this adds to their electricity task an amount CAN ignored … and they don’t show that heat pumps can do the job in Victoria which sets the main problems via its winter heating demand.  (Mackay says heat pumps can’t do it in UK, but Victoria sets a less difficult task.)

ZCA assumes light and heavy trucks and all cars can be run on electricity.  My  understanding is that big trucks and long distance trips are not going to  be conveniently battery powered, in view of energy density, the recharging task, etc.

ZCA assumes greatly reduced use of cars but nevertheless it seems to me from Mackay’s analysis (2008) that the rate of battery use and therefore lithium per capita would exceed that which all the world’s people could have.

ZCA assumes most travel and freight transport can be diverted to rail.  This is problematic; can rail get individuals and consignments to their unique desired destinations well enough given present expectations re convenience and time.  It would take an huge increase in existing infrastructures to make this a satisfactory way for most people to get to where they want to go.  ZCA also assumes long distance truck transport will be powered by overhead electricity lines, but the infrastructure cost of this is not discussed.

The ZCA travel solution goes beyond the realm of energy technology; it assumes a major change in social attitudes and preferences, i.e., whereby most people would be willing to accept small cars and the greater inconvenience of traveling mostly by rail and bus.  The feasibility of these changes can’t be assumed.  If for instance people were willing to go without a fridge (which I am) we could cut a lot off energy demand, but proposals like that are of a different kind to merely technical proposals like switching cars from petrol to electricity.  At least it seems that we should focus first on the technical energy possibilities given the preferences people have at present, then separately deal with how likely it is that we can change preferences how much.  (Nicholson and Lang recognize the socio-political problem here, 2010.)

The main problem the transport analysis seems to involve is to do with improved energy efficiency.   ZCA claims changing from petrol to electricity would enable a 5 fold improvement.  This is based on the performance of a light electric car and a Camry. But the figures given refer only to what can be achieved by electricity coming out of the battery, and do not include the losses in getting the energy from the windmill into the battery.  Bossel (2004) shows that when distribution losses, battery charging etc. are included there is a 50% loss between windmill and wheels.  It seems then that a more appropriate gain from electrifying cars would be closer to half that ZCA assumes.

Another problem for electric transport concerns Life Cycle Analysis of the new vehicles.  Mateja (2000)says that when the need for exotic materials is taken into account an electric car takes a surprising amount of energy over its lifetime, compared to large petrol-driven cars.

Another challengeable claim is that car batteries can be charged with wind and/or sun are at their best.  This seems mistaken because car batteries have to be fully charged by the time people want to drive to work or back, whether or not it’s a windy day.

Thus ZCA’s transport claims seem questionable.  We can surely go a long way in the direction they advocate, but how far?  It would seem to me from the above points that we might expect to achieve one-third of the gains they claim.

At present transport constitutes about 33% of final energy use.  If by 2050 this is still the case, and ZCA proposals can cut it in half, we’d still need 1,335 PJ/y for transport.  ZCA argues that the proposals mentioned above can cut transport demand to 320 PJ/y.

Issues on the supply side.

Again it is important to note that the ZCA strategy assumes almost all energy can be provided in the form of electricity.  Therefore they are in a position to say that wind and solar thermal can provide most of it.

Wind is assumed to provide 40% of energy needed.  Lenzen’s review (2009) concluded that in general problems of integration limit wind to a 20-25% contribution.  ZCA argue from the Danish situation, and this is not valid.  It is well known that Denmark’s situation is unusual, being a very small nation close to large nations and therefore able to export surpluses and import electricity when the winds are down, and to draw on the regions considerable hydro power when necessary.  Some good wind regions might be able to integrate much more than 25% of supply from wind, but 40% cannot be assumed as a valid figure for Australia.  Denmark produces wind energy equivalent to about 20% of its consumption, but only about 4% of its demand is met by its wind energy.

Similarly ZCA claims that 15% of wind supply can be regarded as ”firm” or a constant minimum which can be thought of as “base load”.  It is difficult to understand how this can be said when the graphs given (e.g., 4.1) show wind’s contribution falling to around zero from time to time, from an assumed national supply system.  Several studies have shown that over large areas wind’s contribution often falls to around zero. (Oswald, Raine and Ashraf-Bull, 2008, Coelingh, 1999,  Sharman, 2005, and Davey and Coppin, 2003.)

The basic electricity supply strategy ZCA offers is to use all the wind energy all the time, then top up with energy from the solar thermal system, drawing on the 17 hour storage built into each plant.  It is claimed that very little hydro and/or biomass would be needed to bring supply from these components up to demand.

It is puzzling why CSA proceeds as if 17 hour storage of heat in the solar thermal system is enough.  What if the next day is cloudy?  What if four days in a row or two weeks are pretty cloudy?  The main problem for the plan is to provide for Victoria, and the nearest solar thermal plant assumed is at Mildura.  Bureau of Meteorology data show that in winter Mildura has more than 11 days a month “cloudy” and only about 7 days a month “clear”.  Provision to store for 4 days would require about 5.6 times as much storage capacity as they assume.  Even in Central Australia ARDHB (2006) tables show there is a considerable probability of more than a 4 day run of cloud in winter, and longer runs occur.  A 4 day task means storage loss would be 4% of energy collected.  There are about ten other factors that tend o reduce output which are not apparently included in ZCA’s performance figures (e.g. absorbers being cooled by wind), and it would add to dollar costs. (For my 30 page attempt to determine the potential and limits of solar thermal, see Trainer 2010.)

Yes greater use could be made of  biomass to deal with extended periods of poor wind and sun, but the accounting has not been given.  If biomass had to meet the equivalent of demand on 40 days a year given my 2050 estimated target then we’d have to harvest about 14 million ha of woody biomass (which is probably possible.)

A more realistic assessment of the storage problem would play havoc with other aspects of the report, such as the claim that 55 GW has been explained as “firm and “reliable”, and the biomass said to be sufficient.

The second major issue in this supply strategy is the huge over-sizing of the solar thermal system that is assumed.  Fig 4.1 makes clear that because the variability of wind is so great, fluctuating between providing 40% of demand and around 0%, a great deal of solar thermal capacity has to be on hand to plug the gaps, i.e., to completely substitute for wind sometimes (because the plot shows that 15% is not ‘firm”.).  But that capacity goes on producing energy on the days when wind is contributing 40%, so the solar thermal energy is then dumped.  The discussion states that some 30+ of solar thermal energy is “curtailed”,  but in Fig   4.1 it looks close to 50%.

System over-sizing makes sense as a way of dealing with variability, but the important point these graphs make clear is the great magnitude required.  To cope with the variability of wind in a system where it supplies 40% of electricity demand, you seem to need to have built an equivalent amount of extra solar thermal generating capacity, and you will have to dump half of the electricity it generates (or heat energy it collects.) This has major implications for system plant redundancy and investment cost; below.

It is good that the report refers to the embodied energy cost of plant, or pay-back time, but I don’t think the brief treatment is satisfactory and I think the figures are far too low.  I have found the literature on this issue is scant and inconclusive and I feel we are not close to a good understand of the situation.  Fig.  2.27, p. 37  seems to say about 1% of a solar thermal plant’s life time energy output would be needed to produce the plant.  Lenzen reports 10.7% for central receivers.  ZCA ‘s plot seems to indicate  perhaps 1% for wind, but ISA states about 7%.  ISA’s figure for PV is more than 6 times the figure ZCA assumes.

The most important unsettled issue re embodied energy costs is whether a full accounting of all ”upstream” factors has been included.  For instance in addition to the energy it takes to produce steel it is important to include the appropriate fraction of the energy it took to produce the steel works, etc.  Lenzen and Treloar argue that for steel a full accounting more or less doubles the figure arrived at.  For PV panels Lenzen et al. (2006) conclude that a full accounting actually trebles the commonly stated pay-back time, making payback time equal to one-third of plant lifetime.  I am pretty sure no one has carried out such a “full accounting” for solar thermal plant, and this suggests that even the 10.7% figure is likely to be much too low.

I would want much more reason to be confident about the solar thermal output figure used.  Models and theoretical estimates abound, and one can work these out easily, but I cannot get actual performance figures from operating solar thermal plant.  The theoretical discussions almost always deal only with annual average DNI, and almost never throw light on performance in winter.  (I do have some data for troughs, and it shows that they are pretty useless in winter.)   I have been told that the companies will not make performance data available.  There are many reasons why the theoretical derivations can be too high because minor factors have not been included in them, (such as the effect of dust on reflectors, heat losses, breakdowns, cooling by winds; again see the list of 13 factors in Trainer 2010.)

The biggest problem with ZCA’s solar thermal discussion is to do with whether plant peak or average output has been used in deriving quantities and costs.  It seems to me that the wrong one has been used.

The need in Fig 4.1 is for enough solar thermal plant to generate a constant 35 GW.  ZCA seems to be saying that 156 central receivers each of 217 peak MW  and each of 2.65 million square metres collection area, will do this.  This would be true if 217 MW is the average output per central receiver,  but not if it is the peak output.

Sargent and Lundy say that the solar to electricity efficiency of central receivers is under 8% (2003), but they estimate it can be raised to 17.3% in future.  (ZCA’s Fig. 2.19 shows 10.4% for the Andersol plant.  If we take the 17.3% figure and 2.65 million square metres of reflectors and the average 7.9 kWh/m2/day ZCA assume, then output only averages 143 MW, not 217.

The Mildura plant, where ZCA states winter DNI at only 4.8 kWh/m2/d, would generate around 87 MW, as distinct from 217 MW.  So in that region in winter we would need about 3 times as many ST plants as ZCA concludes.  (NASA’s radiation data give 3.9 kWh/m2/day for Mildura, not 4.8 kWh/m2/day.)  Note that most electricity demand is in the south east of Australia, so most of the plant would have to be in that direction.  (ZCA opts not to locate in central Australia in view of the long transmission distances and losses, but most of the locations chosen still involve very long distances and there is no discussion of a loss factor, e.g., Carnarvon, Roma, Charleville, Longreach, Broken Hill and Moree.  Over 3000 km losses would be 15%; Mackay, 2008.)

Figures on solar radiation from different data sources vary surprisingly.  Again the NASA source indicates that for Mildura in winter DNI is only 3.9 kWh/m2, and in addition radiation is not the same every year and NASA says the Mildura figure can be 3.45 kWh/m2/d in winter, some 25% below the figure ZCA takes.  In other words the output of the Mildura plant in winter would sometimes be 62 MW, a  long way under 217 MW.

The forgoing discussion does not take into account the fact that the winter performance of central receivers compared with their summer performance seems to be even worse than for troughs.  What seems to be the only publicly accessible data, from the early SANDIA/NREL projects (e.g., Radosevich, 1988), shows that in winter output falls to around one-seventh to one-tenth of summer output.  (The  geometry of trough and central receivers determines that in winter the average angle between sun, reflector and absorber is much worse than in summer.)  Taking this factor into account would mean that output at Mildura in winter would  be even lower than he above estimates indicate.  ZCA does not discuss this issue.

Another major area of concern is to do with assumed future costs.  Nicholson and Lang make several important critical points here, firstly that the solar thermal technology assumes is anything but well established and cost reductions should not be assumed, let alone falls of 50% or more.  Indeed they provide impressive information on recent large cost rises in alternative technology costs.  For instance the cost of wind energy systems has increased markedly in recent years.  In the early 2000s around $1500/kW was assumed but ABARE (2010) estimates recent Australian installations are costing $2,900/kW, having undergone a 30% increase in one year.  ZCA assumes it will be about half this amount.

ZCA accept the expectation expressed by Sargent and Lundy (2003) that solar thermal costs will fall to around one-third of the present amount.  Such figures can only be educated guesses.  Although some supporting reasons are given for them by Sargent and Lundy they are not derived.  The only two commercial plants under construction are estimated by Niocholson and Lang to now be costing $(A)16,400 and $(A)25,000 per kW respectively.  They note a large cost increase or Solar Tres.  Lang reports the more recent NEEDS study of solar thermal systems as estimating $(A)17,000 /kW.  ABARE anticipates only a 34% fall in solar thermal costs to 2030.   ZCA proceeds on the assumption that the cost will fall to c. $4,130/kW overall (or, confusingly, to $3,360/kW if calculated per central receiver, i.e., $739 million/220MW.)

Nicholson and Lang rightly urge caution re adoption of the “learning curve” notion.  This applies usually to refinements and increases in scale which come with experience in building more units of an established technology, and neither the 7.5 MW wind or 220 MW solar thermal units ZCA assumes have even been built yet.  In the establishment phase huge cost over runs are common.

To summarise, my back of the envelope impression is that when the foregoing points are added the ZCA conclusion is out by the following factors:

i.     The efficiency gain assumed for electric vehicles should be perhaps halved.

ii.     The assumed proportion of travel that can be transferred to electric vehicles is too high, in view of how well people and freight can be got to intended destinations by light vehicles and public transport,  and in view of what people will accept.

iii.     The embodied energy costs of plant might be much more than 10 times as high as has been assumed.

iv.     Far more storage for solar thermal needs to be assumed, perhaps 96 hours, as distinct from 17.

v.     The amount of solar thermal capacity might need to be trebled I am right about the peak vs average issue.

vi.     Very optimistic assumptions and estimates have been made throughout, including regarding costs.

Note that all of the above points refer only to achieving the energy supply target ZCA assumes, which I began by arguing is mistaken.  If the 2050 supply problem we are heading towards is addressed the target would be 6400 PJ/y, (after taking off ZCA’s assumed general 20% efficiency gain) not 1660 PJ/y (let alone 1330 PJ/y.)  That is, the task would be 4 times as great.

Combining clear and confident estimates for all these factors would obviously yield a final multiple of ZCA plant requirements, costs and annual investments that would be many times greater than those ZCA arrives at.  The application of the CAN approach to Australia’s situation indicates that even with our good renewable resources we could not afford to depend solely on them.  (This is not an argument against transition to renewables, which is highly desirable.  It is an argument against the possibility of running an energy intensive society on renewables – and therefore an argument for the need to move to The Simpler Way (detailed in Trainer, 2006.)

Literature Cited

ABARE, (2010), http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_10/EG10_AprListing.xls

Australian Solar Radiation Data Handbook, (2006), ANZ Solar Energy Society, April.  Energy Partners, 6260 6173.

Bossel, U., (2004), ‘The hydrogen illusion; why electrons are a better energy carrier’, Cogeneration and On-Site Power Production, March – April, pp. 55 – 59.

Coelingh, J. P., (1999), Geographical dispersion of wind power output in Ireland,

Ecofys, P.O. Box 8408, NL – 3503 RK Utrecht, The Netherlands. www.ecofys.com.

Davy, R. and Coppin, P., (2003), South East Australian Wind Power Study, Wind Energy Research Unit, CSIRO, Canberra, Australia.

EPRI (2009): EPRI (2009b). Program on technology innovation: integrated generation technology options; Technical Update, November 2009.
http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Product_id=000000000001019539

ISA, (Integrated Sustainability Analysis), (2006) Life-cycle energy and greenhouse gas emissions of nuclear energy in Australia,  Dept. of Physics, University of Sydney.

Lenzen, M., (2009), Current state of development of electricity-generating technologies – A literature review. Integrated Life Cycle Analysis, Dept. of Physics, University of Sydney.

Lenzen, M., C. Dey, C. Hardy and M. Bilek, (2006), Life-Cycle Energy Balance and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nuclear Energy in Australia. Report to the Prime Minister’s Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review (UMPNER), Internet site http://www.isa.org.usyd.edu.au/publications/documents/ISA_Nuclear_Report.pdf, Sydney, Australia, ISA, University of Sydney.

Lenzen, M and G. Treloar, (2003), Differential convergence of life-cycle inventories toward upstream production layers, implications for life-cycle assessment”, Journal of Industrial Ecology,  6, 3-4.

Mackay, D., 2008, Energy – without the Hot Air. http://www.withouthotair.com/download.html

Mateja, D.: 2000, ‘Hybrids aren’t so green after all’,  www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060331/31hybrids.htm

NEEDS (2008). Final report on technical data, costs, and life cycle inventories of solar thermal power plants.
http://www.needs-project.org/docs/results/RS1a/RS1a%20D12.2%20Final%20report%20concentrating%20solar%20thermal%20power%20plants.pdf

Nicholson, M and P. Lang, (2010), Zero Carbon Australia – A Strategic Energy Plan: A Critique.

Oswald, J.K., M. Raine, H.J. Ashraf-Ball, (2008), “Will British weather provide reliable electricity?”, Energy Policy, 36,  3202 – 3215.

Radosevich, L. (1988), Final Report on the Power Production Pase of the 10 MWe Solar Thermal Concentrating Receiver Pilot Plant, SAND 87 – 8022, NREL, Sandia National Laboratories, Alberquerque.

Sharman, H., (2005), ‘Why UK power should not exceed 10 GW’ ,Civil Engineering, 158, Nov., pp. 161 – 169.

Trainer, T., (2006), The Simpler Way website, http://ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au

Trainer, T., (2010), The potential and the limits of solar thermal energy, http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/08/31/solar-thermal-questions/

I’d also like to flag, for those in Adelaide, that #3 in my series “Thinking Critically About Sustainable Energy” is on tonight at the RiAus. Tonight’s topic is “Future Renewables“, covering engineered geothermal, ocean energy and next-generation biofuels. Hope to see some BNC readers there! And for those who can’t make it, there are always the videos.

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The Facts about Wind Energy’s Emissions Savings

Guest Post by Michael Goggin. Michael represents the wind industry on transmission matters, coordinates member input on the development of policy positions, facilitates the exchange of information between members, handles press inquiries on transmission-related issues, and advocates policy positions that advance wind industry interests. Through these activities, he works to promote transmission investment and advance changes in transmission rules and operations to better accommodate wind energy in the power system while maintaining system reliability. Prior to joining AWEA, he worked for two environmental advocacy groups and a consulting firm supporting the U.S. Department of Energy’s renewable energy programs. Michael holds a B.A. with honors in Social Studies from Harvard College.

Recent data and analyses have made it clear that the emissions savings from adding wind energy to the grid are even larger than had been commonly thought. In addition to each kWh of wind energy directly offsetting a kWh that would have been produced by a fossil-fired power plant, new analyses show that wind plants further reduce emissions by forcing the most polluting and inflexible power plants offline and causing them to be replaced by more efficient and flexible types of generation.

At the same time, and in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the fossil fuel industry has launched an increasingly desperate misinformation campaign to convince the American public that wind energy does not actually reduce carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, we feel compelled to set the record straight on the matter, once and for all.

The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Desperate War Against Facts

Not to be deterred by indisputable data, numerous refutations, or the laws of physics, the fossil fuel lobby has doubled down on their desperate effort to muddy the waters about one of the universally recognized and uncontestable benefits of wind energy: that wind energy reduces the use of fossil fuels as well as the emissions and other environmental damage associated with producing and using these fuels.

For those who have not been following this misinformation campaign by the fossil fuel industry, here is a brief synopsis. Back in March 2010, AWEA heard public reports that the Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States (IPAMS), a lobby group representing the oil and natural gas industry, was working on a report that would attempt to claim that adding wind energy to the grid had somehow increased power plant emissions in Colorado.

Perplexed at how anyone would attempt to make that claim, AWEA decided to take a look at the relevant data, namely the U.S. Department of Energy’s data tracking emissions from Colorado’s power plants over time. The government’s data, reproduced in the table below, show that as wind energy jumped from providing 2.5% of Colorado’s electricity in 2007 to 6.1% of the state’s electricity in 2008, carbon dioxide emissions fell by 4.4%, nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions fell by 6%, coal use fell by 3% (571,000 tons), and electric sector natural gas use fell by 14% (Thorough DOE citations for each data point are listed in the hyperlink). Two conclusions were apparent from looking at this data: 1. the claim the fossil fuel industry was planning to make had no basis in fact, and 2. the fossil industry was understandably frustrated that they were losing market share to wind energy.

In early April 2010, AWEA publicly presented this government data, and when the fossil fuel lobbyists released their report later that month it was greeted with the skepticism it deserved and largely ignored. Case closed, right? We thought so too.

After the initial release of the report fell flat, the fossil fuel industry tried again a month later. John Andrews, founder of the Independence Institute, a group that has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding from the fossil fuel industry, penned an opinion article in the Denver Post parroting the claims of the original report. Fortunately, Frank Prager, a VP with Xcel Energy, the owner of the Colorado power plants in question, responded with an article entitled “Setting the record straight on wind energy” that pointed out the flaws in the fossil industry’s study and reconfirmed that wind in fact has significantly reduced fossil fuel use and emissions on their power system. Having been shot down twice, we thought that the fossil industry would surely put their report out to pasture.

Yet just a month later the report resurfaced, this time in Congressional testimony by the Institute for Energy Research, a DC-based group that receives a large amount of funding from many of the same fossil fuel companies that fund the Independence Institute. The group has continued trumpeting the report’s myths at public events around the country and on their website, and these myths are now beginning to spread through the pro-fossil fuel blogosphere. In recent days, these myths have re-appeared in columns by Robert Bryce, a senior fellow at the fossil-funded Manhattan Institute.

The fossil fuel industry’s desperate persistence and deep pockets make for a dangerous combination when it comes to distorting reality, so we’d like to once and for all clarify the facts about how wind energy reduces fossil fuel use and emissions.

The Truth about Wind and Emissions

The electricity produced by a wind plant must be matched by an equivalent decrease in electricity production at another power plant, as the laws of physics dictate that utility system operators must balance the total supply of electricity with the total demand for electricity at all times. Adding wind energy to the grid typically displaces output from the power plant with the highest marginal operating cost that is online at that time, which is almost always a fossil-fired plant because of their high fuel costs. Wind energy is also occasionally used to reduce the output of hydroelectric dams, which can store water to be used later to replace more expensive fossil fuel generation.

Let’s call this direct reduction in fossil fuel use and emissions Factor A. Factor A is by far the largest impact of adding wind energy to the power system, and the emissions reductions associated with Factor A are indisputable because they are dictated by the laws of physics.

In some instances, there may also be two other factors at play: a smaller one that can slightly increase emissions (let’s call it Factor B), and a counteracting much larger one that, when netted with B, will further add to the emissions reductions achieved under Factor A (let’s call this third one Factor C).

Factor B was discussed at length in an AWEA fact sheet published several years ago. This factor accounts for the fact that, in some instances, reducing the output of a fossil-powered plant to respond to the addition of wind energy to the grid can cause a very small reduction in the efficiency of that fossil-fueled power plant. It is important to note that this reduction in efficiency is on a per-unit-of-output basis, so because total output from the fossil plant has decreased the net effect is to decrease emissions.

As a conservative hypothetical example, adding 100 MW of wind energy output to the grid might cause a fossil plant to go from producing 500 MW at 1000 pounds of CO2/MWh (250 tons of CO2 per hour) to producing 400 MW at 1010 pounds of CO2/MWh (202 tons of CO2 per hour), so the net impact on emissions from adding 100 MW of wind would be CO2 emissions reductions of 48 tons per hour. Unfortunately, fossil-funded groups have focused nearly all of their attention on Factor B, which in this example accounts for 2 tons, while completely ignoring the 50 tons of initial emissions reductions associated with Factor A. A conservative estimate is that the impact of Factor B is at most a few percent of the emissions reductions achieved through factor A.

(Mr. Bryce’s recent Wall Street Journal article is the most creative in its effort to exaggerate Factor B and downplay factor A. In his article, Bryce exclaims about the “94,000 more pounds of carbon dioxide” that the IPAMS study claimed were emitted in Colorado due to Factor B. To be clear, 94,000 pounds is equivalent to the far less impressive-sounding 47 tons of carbon dioxide, or the amount emitted annually on average by two U.S. citizens. Yet just a few paragraphs later, Mr. Bryce speaks dismissively when noting a DOE report that found that, on net, wind energy would “only” reduce carbon dioxide by 306 million tons (enough to offset the emissions of about 15 million U.S. citizens.)

Factor C is rarely included in discussions of wind’s impact on the power system and emissions, but the impact of Factor C is far larger than that of Factor B, so that it completely negates any emissions increase associated with Factor B. Factor C is the decrease in emissions that occurs as utilities and grid operators respond to the addition of wind energy by decreasing their reliance on inflexible coal power plants and instead increase their use of more flexible – and less polluting – natural gas power plants. This occurs because coal plants are poorly suited for accommodating the incremental increase in overall power system variability associated with adding wind energy to the grid, while natural gas plants tend to be far more flexible.

(It is important to keep in mind that the supply of and demand for electricity on the power system have always been highly variable and uncertain, and that adding wind energy only marginally adds to that variability and uncertainty. Electric demand already varies greatly according to the weather and major fluctuations in power use at factories, while electricity supply can drop by 1000 MW or more in a fraction of a second when a large coal or nuclear plant experiences a “forced outage” and goes offline unexpectedly, as they all do from time to time. In contrast, wind output changes slowly and often predictably.)

To summarize, the net effect of Factors A, B, and C is to reduce emissions by even more than is directly offset from wind generation displacing fossil generation (Factor A).

Unsurprisingly, government studies and grid operator data show that this is exactly what has happened to the power system as wind energy has been added. A study by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) released in January 2010 found drastic reductions in both fossil fuel use and carbon dioxide emissions as wind energy is added to the grid. The Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) used in-depth power system modeling to examine the impacts of integrating 20% or 30% wind power into the Eastern U.S. power grid.

The EWITS study found that carbon dioxide emissions would decrease by more than 25% in the 20% wind energy scenario and 37% in the 30% wind energy scenario, compared to a scenario in which our current generation mix was used to meet increasing electricity demand. The study also found that wind energy will drastically reduce coal generation, which declined by around 23% from the business-as-usual case to the 20% wind cases, and by 35% in the 30% wind case. These results were corroborated by the DOE’s 2008 technical report, “20% Wind Energy by 2030,” which also found that obtaining 20% of the nation’s electricity from wind energy would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 25%.

The fact that this study found emissions savings to be even larger than the amount directly offset by adding wind energy is a powerful testament to the role of Factor C in producing bonus emissions savings. By running scenarios in which wind energy’s variability and uncertainty were removed, NREL’s EWITS study was able to determine that it was in fact these attributes of wind energy that were causing coal plants to be replaced by more flexible natural gas plants (see here page 174).

As further evidence, four of the seven major independent grid operators in the U.S. have studied the emissions impact of adding wind energy to their power grids, and all four have found that adding wind energy drastically reduces emissions of carbon dioxide and other harmful pollutants. While the emissions savings depend somewhat on the existing share of coal-fired versus gas-fired generation in the region, as one would expect, it is impossible to dispute the findings of these four independent grid operators that adding wind energy to their grids has significantly reduced emissions. The results of these studies are summarized below.

1 http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2009/Carbon_Study_Report.pdf

2 Transmission Expansion Plan, Vision Exploratory Study, Midwest ISO (2006), http://www.midwestiso.org/page/Expansion+Planning

3 http://www.state.nj.us/dep/cleanair/hearings/pdf/09_potential_effects.pdf

4 http://www.iso-ne.com/committees/comm_wkgrps/prtcpnts_comm/pac/reports/2010/economicstudyreportfinal_022610.pdf

It is even more difficult to argue with empirical Department of Energy data showing that emissions have decreased in lockstep as various states have added wind energy to their grids. In addition and in almost perfect parallel to the Colorado data presented earlier, DOE data for the state of Texas show the same lockstep decrease when wind was added to its grid. This directly contradicts the Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States report when it attempts to claim that wind has not in fact decreased emissions in Texas.

Specifically, DOE data show that wind and other renewables’ share of Texas’s electric mix increased from 1.3% in 2005 to 4.4% in 2008, an increase in share of 3.1 percentage points. During that period, electric sector carbon dioxide emissions declined by 3.3%, even though electricity use actually increased by 2% during that time (c.f. here). Because of wind energy, the state of Texas was able to turn what would have been a carbon emissions increase into a decrease of 8,690,000 metric tons per year, equal to the emissions savings of taking around 1.5 million cars off the road.

The fossil fuel industry’s latest misinformation campaign is reminiscent of scenes that played out in Washington in previous decades, as tobacco company lobbyists and their paid “experts” stubbornly stood before Congress and insisted that there was no causal link between tobacco use and cancer, despite reams of government data and peer-reviewed studies to the contrary. It’s time we enacted the strong policies we need to put our country’s tremendous wind energy resources to use, creating jobs, protecting our environment, savings consumers money, and improving our energy security, even if it means leaving a few fossil fuel lobbyists behind.

Download the printable 13-page PDF (includes appendix) here.

By Peter Lang. Peter is a retired geologist and engineer with 40 years experience on a wide range of energy projects throughout the world, including managing energy R&D and providing policy advice for government and opposition. His experience includes: coal, oil, gas, hydro, geothermal, nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and a wide range of energy end use management projects.

Introduction

The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) is an Australian government economic research agency that provides analysis and forecasting of, among other things, our energy production and usage. ABARE’s projections have been criticized by some hoping for large scale changes in our energy sector as unreliable, biased towards the fossil fuel industry, and as underestimating the contributions that will be achieved in the future by renewable energy, energy efficiency, smart grids and the like.

To test these criticisms I have compared ABARE’s projections [1] for the year 2004-05 with the actual figures for 2004-05 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6].  I have compared the following: primary energy production, electricity consumption, resource reserves, and CO₂ emissions.  I also comment on what was being advocated by green energy proponents in 1990, and point out how little has changed.  The same arguments are being repeated again now by the same sorts of groups with similar beliefs and agendas.

The reason I’ve used the year 2004-05 for the comparison is because ABARE’s 1991 projections were for the period 1990-91 to 2004-05.  I have my own hard copies of that and earlier reports but not of later reports so I used this readily available source.

I make two points:

1. ABARE’s projections are the best we have to work with.  We can’t do better than follow their projections.
2. The arguments about what can really be achieved with renewable energy, energy efficiency improvements, smart grids and the like, have all been had before.  Twenty years later, nothing has changed.

These ideas proved excessively optimistic in the past, as shown here, and people with sound engineering judgement and experience are warning against repeating the same mistakes.  The effective solution is not to try to apply draconian methods.  The priority should be on developing rational policies, largely aimed at facilitating rational fuel switching.

Primary energy production

Table 1 compares ABARE’s 1991 projection of Australia’s 2004-05 primary energy production with the actual production in 2004-05.

Table 1: Primary Energy Production 2004-5: ABARE 1991 Projection, and Actual Production

Points to note:

ABARE’s 1991 projections of Australia’s primary energy production in 2004-05:

• underestimated total energy production by 22%

• significantly underestimated the 2004-05 production of fossil fuels except oil.  It overestimated the production of oil by 8%, which most would consider good forecasting for a 15-year projection.

• underestimated uranium production by 11%

• overestimated the hydro-electricity production by 18%

Electricity generation

Table 2 compares ABARE’s 1991 projection of Australia’s 2004-05 electricity generation with the actual generation in 2004-05.

Table 2: Electricity Generation 2004-5: ABARE 1991 Projection, and Actual Generation

Points to note: ABARE’s 1991 projections of the electricity demand in 2004-05

• underestimated the electricity demand in 2004-05

• overestimated the amount by which energy efficiency improvements would reduce demand growth.

• underestimated the fossil fuel generated electricity by 12%

• overestimated hydro-electricity generation by 18%

Resource reserves

Table 3 compares our known economically recoverable energy resources in 1989 and 2009.  This is not a comparison of ABARE’s projections but is interesting to see how our estimated energy resources have changed over that 20 year period.

Table 3: Known, economically recoverable energy resources in 1989 and 2009 (PJ).

Points to note:

• ABARE’s figures for known mineral and energy reserves in 1989 were based on reports by the Bureau of Mineral Resources (BMR) and Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE).  Now they come from Geoscience Australia (formerly BMR).  ABARE does not undertake its own estimates of resource reserves, so are not accountable for errors.

• Over the intervening 20 years, our estimates of known economically recoverable resources have been revised.  Coal has been revised down and oil, natural gas and uranium have been revised up by 39%, 220% and 145% respectively.

• Known uranium resources have increased by a factor of nearly 2.5 in 20 years and we’ve hardly even looked.  There is little activity in uranium exploration being undertaken.  Most of Australia is locked up against uranium exploration.

CO₂ emissions

Table 4 compares ABARE’s 1991 projection with the actual CO₂ emissions from Australian energy consumption for the year 2004-05.  ABARE’s 1991 projection of 379 Mt is for the ‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) case.  ABARE also defined what we’d have to do to achieve the government’s target (20% below 1988 levels by 2005) and what would be needed to achieve a ‘half way’ target.

Table 4: ABARE’s 1991 forecast with the actual CO2 emissions in 2004-05 from Australia’s energy consumption.

Points to note:

• ABARE underestimated by 4% (based on BAU).  This is excellent given the state of knowledge 20 years ago.

• The government set an extremely low target but made it impossible to achieve by banning nuclear power from being an option.  Nuclear was not even to be considered in analyses by government departments.

• There was strong pressure by the green lobby groups at the time to set lower targets and for governments to mandate stringent regulations for energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy, but no nuclear.

• The same groups are still advocating the same failed policies now.

• Some people never learn!

See Attachment 1, an extract from the 1991 ABARE report.  It is fascinating to be reminded how much we knew, the policies, the CO2 emissions reduction targets, and the realities.  It demonstrates little has changed in 20 years.

Conclusions

ABARE’s projections are good.  I am not aware of any organisation that has made consistently better forecasts of Australia’s energy demand and supply.

I believe the consistently optimistic pressure from green advocacy groups, pushing for projections that align with their beliefs of what governments should do, influenced ABARE to underestimate energy demand, underestimate fossil fuel demand, overestimate renewable energy contribution and over-estimate how much energy efficiency improvement can be achieved over the projection period.

References

[1] ABARE (1991) Projections of Energy Demand and Supply; Australia 1990-91 to 2004-05, ISBN: 0 664 13716 9

[2] ABARE (2006) energy update

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_06/energyupdate_06.pdf

[3] ABARE (2006), Australian energy: national and state projections to 2029-30

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_06/nrg_projections06.pdf

[4] ABARE (2007), Table A Update 07, Table A1 Australian energy supply and disposal, 2004-05 – energy units,

http://www.abare.gov.au/interactive/energy_july07/excel/Table_A_update_07.xls

[5] ABARE (2009), Energy in Australia 2009

http://www.abareconomics.com/publications_html/energy/energy_09/auEnergy09.pdf

[6] ABARE (2010), Energy in Australia 2010

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_10/energyAUS2010.pdf

Attachment 1

(Download the 8-page PDF of the ABARE extract here)
Extract from: ABARE (1991)

Projections of Energy Demand and Supply: 1990-91 to 2004-05, pp 31-37.

“4. Greenhouse gas reduction: an illustrative scenario”

Here I attach a chapter “Greenhouse gas reductions: an illustrative scenario” extracted from the 1991 ABARE report.  It makes fascinating reading.  It shows:

1.  how much we knew back then;

2.  how little has changed;

3.  we knew the targets were impossible given the policies being advocated;

4.  we knew that renewable energy and energy efficiency could not make significant improvement over and above what was already included in the Business as Usual (BAU) projections;

5.  we knew then that if we wanted to really cut GHG emissions we had to go nuclear.

But politics dictated nuclear could not be on the agenda.  The reason was Labor needed the Green vote to hold onto power.

Many conclude the Greens have been the cause of the delay all along!!

—————————-

I got back from China at midday on Saturday and spent the next 24 hours in bed recovering from a stomach bug. It often happens after a long haul of travelling, and, after 3 weeks abroad, it’s great to finally be home. I’m now on the road to recovery — enough to enjoy reading the blog comments and to see what an impact the BNC readers made in Tassie, Vic and NSW in this year’s Walk Against Warming. Great work guys! I still have 300+ emails to wade through and reply to, however. Anyway…

A little over 2 years ago, on 7 August 2008, the Brave New Climate blog, later to be shorthanded to BNC, was born. Little did I foresee the evolution it would take over the next 290 posts and 20,000 comments (although John Morgan turned out to be quite prescient). It’s been a real learning experience for me, and has been thoroughly enjoyable (albeit exhausting and exasperating at times, in about equal measure). I’ve been helped greatly along the way by talented guest posters, including regulars Peter Lang, Geoff Russell, Tom Blees and many others. My sincere thanks — and here’s to another year of trials and tribulations, as we, together, think critically about sustainable energy and climate change.

In part recognition of the blog’s influence in educating the general community, I was very proud to be awarded the title of ‘Community Science Educator of the Year‘ for 2010, at the SA Science Excellence awards:

Community

Sponsored by The Royal Institution of Australia

The Community Science Educator of the Year Award is open to individuals, groups or organisations for an outstanding and innovative program of science awareness and engagement delivered within the past five years.

The Award recognises the enhancement of the community’s appreciation of the contribution of science and its impact on society and the environment.

My thanks to the judging panel for their wisdom (!), and all those at the University of Adelaide, RiAus and beyond, who have helped me to organise my public speaking events, write a popular book and many newspaper Op Eds, spar on radio, and just get out there and talk to people on issues about which I’m passionate. Public communication of science, and the teaching of critical, evidence-based thinking — especially on such important applied matters as sustainable energy and climate change — is one of the most enjoyable aspects of my job and life. It is heartening for my efforts to be recognised in this way. As I was in China on the night, Corey Bradshaw accepted the award on my behalf and apparently gave an excellent acceptance speech. Somewhat worryingly, he still has the trophy at his place…

And finally, 2 years of hard slog and a shiny award later, I’m not about to stop! So, on Wednesday 8 September (6 to 8 pm, CLB6, UNSW Kensington Campus), I’ll be in Sydney to engage in a discussion at the University of New South Wales in a ‘BrainFood’ session called ‘Nuclear — Solar Energies: Facts and Fiction Demystified‘. The other speaker will be Dr Mark Diesendorf, and the facilitator will be Prof Vassilios Agelidis. As the promo flyer says:

Join our experts as they:

• demystify fact from fiction for both solar and nuclear energy technologies

• highlight the merits and limitations of these energy sources

• debate their role to Australia’s energy mix of the future

• share your contributions and address your questions and concerns.

I’ve thought a fair bit about the type of presentation I’ll be giving, considering my previous ‘run in’ with MD at the Adelaide nuclear power ‘debate’. For those who are in Sydney and can make it, I hope you’ll enjoy my new take on the presentation of matters nuclear, solar, and ‘expertise’.

Okay, that’s me signing off for a while. I’ve got a lot of catching up to do, in all four quarters of life.

Download the printable PDF here

[An addendum on wind farm and solar construction rates, by Dave Burraston]

————————

Edit: Here are some media-suitable ‘sound bytes’ from the critique, prepared by Martin. Obviously, please read the whole critique below to understand the context:

• They assume we will be using less than half the energy by 2020 than we do today without any damage to the economy. This flies in the face of 200 years of history.

• They have seriously underestimated the cost and timescale required to implement the plan.

• For $8 a week extra on your electricity bill, you will give up all domestic plane travel, all your bus trips and you must all take half your journeys by electrified trains.

• They even suggest that all you two car families cut back to just one electric car.

• You better stock up on candles because you can certainly expect more blackouts and brownouts.

• Addressing these drawbacks could add over $50 a week to your power bill not the $8 promised by BZE. That’s over $2,600 per year for the average household.

By Martin Nicholson and Peter Lang, August 2010

1. Summary

This document provides a critique of the ‘Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan’ [1] (referred to as the Plan in this document) prepared by Beyond Zero Emissions (BZE). We looked at the total electricity demand required, the total electricity generating capacity needed to meet that demand and the total capital cost of installing that generating capacity. We did not review the suitability of the technologies proposed.  We briefly considered the timeline for installing the capacity by 2020 but have not critiqued this part of the Plan in detail.

In reviewing the total energy demand, we referred to the assumptions made in the Plan and compared them to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) report on Australian energy projections to 2029-30 [2]. The key Plan assumptions we questioned were the use of 2008 energy data as the benchmark for 2020, the transfer of close to half the current road transport to electrified rail and transfer of all domestic air travel and shipping to rail which could have a devastating impact on the economy. In the Plan, total energy demand was reduced by 63% below ABARE’s assessment. We recalculated the energy demand for 2020 without these particular assumptions. Our recalculation increased electricity demand by 38% above the demand proposed in the Plan.

We next turned our minds to the amount of generator capacity needed to meet our recalculated electricity demand. We assumed that the existing electricity network customers would require the same level of network reliability as now. At best the solar thermal plants would have the same reliability and availability of the existing coal fleet so the network operators would at least require a similar proportion of reserve margin capacity as in the existing networks. We kept the same proportion of wind energy as in the Plan (40%) and recalculated the total capacity needed to maintain the reserve margin. The total installed capacity needed increased by 65% above the proposed capacity in the Plan.

The Plan misleadingly states that it relies only on existing, proven, commercially available and costed technologies. The proposed products to be used in the Plan fail these tests. So to assess the total capital cost of installing the generating capacity needed, we reviewed some current costs for both wind farms and solar thermal plants. We also reviewed ABARE’s expectation on future cost reductions. We considered that current costs were the most likely to apply to early installed plants and  that ABARE’s future cost reductions were more likely to apply than the reductions used in the Plan. Applying these costs to the increased installed capacity increased the total capital cost almost 5 fold and increases the wholesale cost of electricity by at least five times and probably 10 times. This will have a significant impact on consumer electricity prices.

We consider the Plan’s Implementation Timeline as unrealistic.  We doubt any solar thermal plants, of the size and availability proposed in the plan, will be on line before 2020.  We expect only demonstration plants will be built until there is confidence that they can become economically viable. Also, it is common for such long term projections to have high failure rates.

2. 2020 Electricity Demand

BZE make a number of assumptions in assessing the electricity demand used to calculate the generating capacity needed by 2020. In summary these are:

1. 2008 is used as the benchmark year for the analysis. BZE defend this by saying “ZCA2020 intends to decouple energy use from GDP growth. Energy use per capita is used as a reference, taking into account medium-range population growth.”.
2. Various industrial energy demands in 2020 are reduced including gas used in the export of LNG, energy used in coal mining, parasitic electricity losses, off-grid electricity and coal for smelting.
3. Nearly all transport is electrified and a substantial proportion of the travel kms are moved from road to electrified rail including 50% of urban passenger and truck kms and all bus kms. All domestic air and shipping is also moved to electric rail.
4. All fossil fuels energy, both domestic and industrial, is replaced with electricity.
5. Demand is reduced through energy efficiency and the use of onsite solar energy.

The net effect of these assumptions is to reduce the 2020 total energy by 58% below the 2008 benchmark and 63% below the ABARE estimate for 2020. The total electricity required in 2020 to service demand and achieve these reductions is 325 TWh. This is the equivalent of an average generating capacity of 37 GW over the year.

All of these assumptions are challenging and some are probably unrealistic or politically unacceptable. To address these concerns, we have adjusted the assumptions and recalculated the energy estimates shown in Table A1.3 of the Plan.

The revised assumptions are as follows:

1. Comparing Australia’s energy use per capita with Northern Europe ignores the significant differences in population density and climate between the two regions. To address this, we have used ABARE’s forecast for 2020 as the benchmark year for our analysis. The ABARE forecast assumes energy efficiency improvement of 0.5 per cent a year in non energy-intensive end use sectors and 0.2 per cent a year in energy intensive industries.
2. The export of LNG will continue. Much of the world may not wish to, or be able to, emulate this plan and the demand for gas as an energy source will continue for several decades. The other demand reductions shown in BZE assumption 2 above are included.
3. A substantial modal shift in transport to rail is unlikely to be politically acceptable, particularly domestic aviation and bus travel. Domestic aviation and shipping will continue to use fossil fuels or bio-equivalents. In our analysis, nearly all road transport is electrified but without a reduction in distance travelled. Though this transport electrification is unlikely to be achieved by 2020, it is a realistic long term goal so has been included in the revised calculations. ABARE energy data are for final energy consumption so a tank/battery to wheel efficiency comparison should be made. This is considered to be a 3:1 energy reduction [3] not 5:1 as identified in the Plan.
4. All fossil fuels energy is replaced with electricity as per the Plan.
5. Demand is reduced through energy efficiency and the use of onsite solar energy as per the Plan but discounted by the energy efficiency already included in the ABARE data identified in 1 above.

These assumptions and recalculations are based on information provided in Appendix 1 of the Plan. Each SET column shown in Table 1 below are defined in Appendix 1. Recalculations are based on data provided in Appendix 1. ABARE provided data for 2008 and 2030 only so 2020 is our estimate based on the ABARE figures.

The net effect of these revised assumptions is shown in Table 1 which is a rework of Table A1.3 in Appendix 1 of the Plan. The total electricity required in 2020 to service the revised demand and achieve the energy reductions is 449 TWh or 38% more than the ZCA2020 Plan estimate of 325 TWh.

3. Total Capacity Needed

A number of assumptions have been made by BZE in assessing the generating capacity needed to supply the electricity demand in 2020. These can be summaries as follows:

1. The Plan relies on 50 GW of wind and 42.5 GW of concentrating solar thermal (CST) alone to meet 98% of the projected electricity demand of 325 TWh/yr. In addition, the combination of hydro and biomass generation as backup at the CST sites is expected to meet the remaining 2% of total demand, covering the few occasions where periods of low wind and extended low sun coincide.
2. In the Plan system design the extra generating capacity needed to meet peak demand is reduced relative to current requirements. The electrification of heating, along with an active load management system, is assumed to defer heating and cooling load to smooth out peaks in demand resulting in a significant reduction in the overall installed capacity required to meet peak demand.
3. In the Plan, negawatts are achieved through energy efficiency programs which lower both overall energy demand and peak electricity demand as well as by time-shifting loads using active load management. Negawatts can be conceptually understood as real decreases in necessary installed generating capacity, due to real reductions in overall peak electricity demand.
4. The current annual energy demand in the Plan is considered to be 213 TWh which can be converted to an average power figure of 24 GW. BZE assumes that the current installed capacity to meet maximum demand is 45 GW. The difference (21 GW) is then considered power for meeting the demand for intermediate and peak loads only. The peak load in 2020 is assumed to be equal to the average of 37 GW plus the 21 GW for intermediate and peak loads. This is then reduced by a 3 GW allowance for ‘Negawatt’ to give an overall maximum demand of 55 GW.
5. In the worst case scenario modelled in the Plan of low wind and low sun, there is a minimum of 55 GW of reliable capacity. This is based on a projected 15%, or 7.5 GW, of wind power always being available and the 42.5 GW of solar thermal turbine capacity also always being available with up to 15 GW of this turbine capacity backed up by biomass heaters. The 5 GW of existing hydro capacity is also always available.

The key issues in these assumptions are that the maximum (peak) demand is 55GW and that the proposed installed capacity can deliver a minimum of 55GW at any time. We will deal with each of these issues separately.

3.1. Recalculation of peak demand

The ZCA2020 Plan proposes a single National Grid comprising the existing NEM, SWIS and NWIS grids. The current installed capacity and loads in the three regions are shown in Table 2. An accurate assessment of peak demand – not average demand – is critical for assessing the total installed capacity needed.

Reliability in each network is maintained by additional available capacity over and above the expected peak demand. This is to cover for planned or unexpected loss of generating capacity either through planned maintenance or unplanned breakdown. This additional capacity is often referred to as the ‘reserve margin’.

The current reserve margin in each network is approximately 33% higher than the actual peak load. Note also that the actual total installed capacity is 53 GW and average power is 26 GW across the three networks. These are both higher than suggested by BZE in assumption 4 above.

The anticipated electricity demand in 2020 from Table 1 is 449 TWh. Assuming no change in current peak demand we can expect the pro rata peak in 2020 would be 78.7 GW (39.7 x 449/227). If we apply the 3 GW negawatt reduction discussed in assumption 4, peak demand will become 75.7 GW as shown in Table 3.

3.2. Recalculation of required capacity to reliably meet demand

The Plan insists that the combination of wind power and solar thermal with storage can deliver continuous supply (baseload). The only way to accurately assess this and the capacity required to meed the performance demands on the network is to do a full loss of load probability (LOLP) analysis. This does not appear to have been done in the ZCA2020 Plan, or at least it was not discussed as such in the report.

It is also beyond the scope of this critique to perform an LOLP analysis. A reasonable proxy is to apply the reserve margin requirements currently in the network. To maintain reliability, all three network regions have a reserve margin of 33% above the anticipated peak demand.

The size of the reserve margin is, among other things, related to the reliability of the generators in the network. In the current networks the predominant generators are conventional fossil fuel plants supplying over 90% of the energy.

In the Plan, the predominant plants are solar thermal with biomass backup supplying just under 60% of the energy. The Plan states that “The solar thermal power towers specified in the Plan will be able to operate at 70-75% annual capacity factor, similar to conventional fossil fuel plants.” The remainder of the energy mostly comes from wind powered generators. It would therefore seem likely that the network operators would continue, at a minimum, to require a 33% reserve margin to maintain the current levels of network reliability. The reserve margin may well be higher given the proportion of wind power and the use of relatively new solar thermal/biomass hybrid plants.

Table 3 shows the anticipated peak demand and total capacity needed to meet the 2020 demand calculated in section 2.

3.3. Estimate of the required wind and solar capacity

As close as possible we have kept the percentage of energy coming from wind and solar the same as in the Plan. This means that roughly 40% of the energy will come from wind and 60% will come from solar thermal plants with sufficient biomass capacity and sufficient fuel supply system to back-up for when there is insufficient energy in storage.

40% of the 449 TWh demand required by 2020 shown in section 2 will require 68 GW of wind. This is 36% higher than the 50 GW of wind used in the Plan.

The Plan assumed that 15% of wind power would always be available (assumption 5 above). This is the capacity credit allocated when assessing network reliability. Dispatchable generators like fossil fuel plants typically have a capacity credit of 99%. [4]

For the purpose of this estimate, we have assumed that the solar plants will have sufficient biomass capacity and reliability to be given a capacity credit of 99%. This may require a higher availability of biomass at the solar sites than has been included in the Plan. Without an LOLP we are not able to make that assessment.

Table 4 shows the amount of wind and solar needed to satisfy the network requirement for a total capacity of 101 GW calculated in 3.2 and shown in Table 3. The solar supply and biomass backup will need to be more than doubled from the present 42.5 GW to 87 GW.

4. Capital Costs

The Plan makes an estimate of the capital costs for the generators and the transmission lines. The Plan states that it “relies only on existing, proven, commercially available and costed technologies”. This is misleading. Although it is true that wind and solar thermal generators have been used commercially for a number of years, the particular products and product size suggested in the Plan are not yet available and caution is needed when estimating future costs for these products. Further, the Plan also assumes that baseload solar thermal is available today when the International Energy Agency does not expecting competitive baseload CSP before 2025. [5]

In this analysis we have compared the costs proposed in the Plan with known costs for solar and wind plants, together with ABARE’s suggested likely cost reductions over time.

4.1. Wind costs

According to ABARE [6, 7], current costs for wind farms in Australia are around $2.9 million/MW. In 2009 the costs were $2.3 million/MW – see Table 5.

The following assumptions have been made by BZE in estimating the cost of wind farms:

1. The Plan involves a large scale roll out of wind turbines, that will require a ramp up in production rate, which will help to reduce wind farm capital costs and bring Australian costs into line with the world (European) markets.
2. The 2010 forecast capital cost of onshore wind is approximately €1,200/kW (2006 prices) or $2,200/kW (current prices). By 2015 the European capital cost of onshore wind is estimated to be around €900/kW (2006 prices) (or $1,650 in current prices).
3. It is expected that Australian wind turbine costs in 2011 will reduce to the current European costs of $2.2 million/MW. For the first 5 years of the Plan, the capital costs of wind turbines are expected to transition from the current European costs to the forecast 2015 European amount — $1.65 million/MW.
4. In the final five years the capital costs are expected to drop to approximately $1.25 million/MW in Australia.

Wind turbines are not new technology and this would not normally suggest such significant falls in future costs. The 7.5 MW Enercon E126 turbine proposed is significantly larger than any currently installed on-shore commercial turbine and is still being developed. No firm costs for such a turbine are yet available. It seems very optimistic to suggest that the cost of these turbines will almost halve over the next decade. That projection is not supported by ABARE, which forecasts² a reduction in the cost of wind power of 21% from 2015 to 2030. This is a simple average reduction of 1.5% per year.

Given the current cost of turbines in Australia ($2.9 million/MW) and accepting some economy of scale both in turbine size and volume purchased it might seem more prudent to assume the cost will fall from the current cost of $2.9 million/MW to $2.5 million/MW over the decade in line with ABARE’s forecast.

4.2. Solar costs

The solar plant proposed by the ZCA2020 Plan is a solar thermal tower with 17 hours molten salt energy storage. The proposed 220 MW plant is 13 times larger than any existing solar tower system. As with the wind proposal, no firm costs for such a large sized plant are yet available.

We have prepared an analysis of two solar thermal tower projects of varying sizes and using molten salt with varying energy storage sizes. These are plants where the capital cost could be identified and shown in Table 6. All costs are converted to 2010 A$.

Part of the variation in cost per MW is related to the hours of storage. The size of the solar field has to be increased to support more hours of storage as does the size of the storage tanks. According to the Plan (p140), 80% of the cost of a solar tower system using molten salt storage comes from the solar field and the storage system.  Scaling up the storage will increase the cost per MW. These costs have been adjusted in Table 6 to 17 hours storage as proposed in the Plan.

The Plan (p61) has applied the following pricing which falls as more solar plants are installed:

1. The first 1,000 MW is priced at a similar price to SolarReserve’s Tonopah project at $10.5 million/MW.
2. The next 1,600 MW is priced slightly cheaper at $9.0 million/MW.
3. The next 2,400 MW is priced at Sargent & Lundy’ conservative mid-term estimate for the Solar 100 module which is $6.5 million/MW.
4. The next 3,700 MW is priced at Sargent & Lundy Solar 200 module price of $5.3 million/MW.
5. The remaining 33,800 MW is priced at $115 billion or $3.4 million/MW.

The Tonopah project is treated as a First-Of-A-Kind (FOAK) plant. Unfortunately the Tonopah plant has only 10 hours of storage [8] not 17 hours as required by the Plan. Grossing up the $10.5 million/MW from 10 hours to 17 hours based on the additional materials needed makes the cost $16.4 million/MW. For comparison, the Gemasolar plant shown in Table 6 has a scaled up cost of $25.7 million/MW.

ABARE² forecasts a reduction in the cost of solar thermal with storage of 34% from 2015 to 2030. This is a simple average reduction of 2% per year. It might seem more prudent to assume the price will fall in line with ABARE’s assessment which will lower the price from $16.4 million/MW to $13.7 million/MW over the decade.

4.3. Assessment of generator capital costs based on revised capacity

In 3.3 we estimated the needed capacity to meet reliability standards in the electricity networks. From Table 4 the wind capacity needed was 68 GW and solar thermal plant capacity was 87 GW.

In this section we take the construction timelines suggested in the Plan (p57, p67) and gross them up to meet the capacity figures above. We then apply the prices calculated in 4.1 and 4.2 to calculate the revised total capital cost.

Table 7 and Table 8 apply a construction schedule as close as possible to the schedules provided in Table 3.7 and Table 3.14 of the Plan. The price each year is assumed to fall uniformly over the 10 years. We recognise this is not what would happen in practice but the end result would not vary greatly.

The Plan’s projected capital cost of wind = $72 billion.

The Plan’s projected capital cost of CST = $175 billion.

Because the required capacity for wind is 36% higher in this analysis than in the Plan and the capacity for solar is 105% higher, there is significant increase in capital cost over the Plan. This is particularly so for the solar component as the average cost per MW over the 10 years has increased from the BZE assessment of $4.1 million to $14.6 million. This a 3.6 times increase in average capital cost.

4.4. Assessment of the revised total investment cost

As the total installed capacity has increased then both the transmission system and biomass supply will also need to be increased. For the purpose of this assessment, the biomass is assumed to increase pro rata with the increase in solar thermal capacity. The transmission is assumed to increase pro rata with the total installed capacity. The actual increases could only be properly assessed with a full LOLP analysis.

The Plan assumes that the biomass fuel will be transported from the biomass pelletising plants, which are located in the wheat growing areas, to the solar thermal power plants by electrified railway lines.  It seems the Plan does not include the cost of these.  We have made an allowance of $54 billion for the capital cost of the electrified rail system for the biomass fuel handling logistics.  This assumes 300km average rail line distance per solar power site, for 12 sites at $15 million/km of electrified rail line.  This is included in our revised total investment cost shown in Table 9.

4.5. Uncertainty in the capital cost estimates

Capital costs for this Plan are highly uncertain.  None of the proposed generator types has ever been built.  Previous estimates for wind power and solar power have often proved to be gross underestimates. Our estimates include projections of cost reductions due to learning rates as does the Plan.  However, there is evidence that real costs have been increasing for decades so the learning rate reductions have to be considered uncertain.

The Plan calls for electrified rail lines to run from the pelleting plants in the wheat growing areas to the solar power stations but the capital cost for lines was not included.  We have included an estimate for this as discussed in 4.4.

There is uncertainty on the downside due to potential technological break-throughs which might make the learning curve rates forecast by various sources: Sargent and Lundy, NEEDS, DOE, IEA and ABARE achievable.  BZE projects a cost reduction of some 50% for solar and wind over the decade.  We will consider this to be the downside uncertainty.

There are several uncertainties on the upside:

1. 1. A qualified estimator will state that the uncertainty on the upper end is as high as 100% for a conceptual estimate involving a particular design using mature technology for a particular site. The Plan and our estimates are for a concept that does not involve mature technology, without specific site surveys and without a system design for a totally redesigned electricity system.
2. Previous estimates for solar thermal plants over the past two decades have often underestimated the cost of the actual plants.  For example, the estimated cost of Solar Tres / Gemasolar increased by 260% between 2005 and 2009 (when construction began).
3. 3. A loss of load probability (LOLP) study would be essential to accurately estimate the generating capacity and transmission network requirements before this Plan was executed.
4. The wind power contribution to reliability is based on an assumed firm capacity of 15%.  Many consider this highly optimistic.  Should the LOLP study suggest a significantly lower firm wind capacity, then much more solar thermal and biomass capacity would be required, increasing the total capital cost.
5. Some consider that almost none of our hydro resource could be used in the way assumed in the Plan to back up for low sun and low wind periods.  If this proved to be the case then more solar and biomass capacity would be required.
6. 6. All existing CST pilot plants have been built in areas that are relatively close to the necessary infrastructure such as road, water, gas mains and a work force.  This will not be the case for most of the 12 sites proposed for Australia.

In Table 9 , we have used a downside uncertainty of 50% and an upside uncertainty of 260% for solar plants and 200% for the other components.

5. Electricity Costs

The wholesale electricity cost, the price paid to the generator, makes up between 30% to 50% of retail electricity prices so any significant increase in the wholesale cost will impact consumer electricity prices. The Plan claims that wholesale prices will rise from the present $55/MWh to $120/MWh after  2020 (p122).

Table 10 shows estimates for the cost of electricity from solar thermal plants and wind farms for different years. It is clear that the Plan estimate for solar is significantly less than the other estimates. This would suggest a significantly lower capital cost for solar in the Plan than anticipated by these other assessments. The Plan does not offer an electricity cost for wind farms.

Based on the ABARE electricity cost estimates shown in Table 10. for solar thermal and wind, if the ratio of energy generated is 60% solar and 40% wind then the wholesale electricity price would need to be, at a minimum, $270/MWh by 2020 to cover the cost of generation.

However this is not a total system cost.  The wholesale cost of electricity would be about $500/MWh based on the capital cost of $1,709 billion, the supply of 443 TWh/a, a lifetime of 30 years and real interest rate of 10% pa.

If the capital cost is at the low end of the range, $885 billion, the electricity cost would be about $270/MWh.  If the capital cost is at the high end of the range, the electricity cost would be about $1200/MWh.

The $500/MWh cost is over 4 times the cost proposed in the Plan and nearly 10 times the current cost of electricity.  The low end of the estimate, $270/MWh, is more than twice the estimate proposed by the Plan and 5 times the current cost of electricity.  The high end of the range is over 10 times the cost proposed in the Plan and over 20 times the current cost of electricity.

6. Implementation Timeline

The Plan is not economically viable; therefore it will not be built to the timeline envisaged in the plan. As an example of how unrealistic the timeline is, the Plan assumes 1000 MW of CST will be under construction in 2011.   This is clearly impossible.  The first plant with 100MW peak capacity and just 10 hours of storage won’t be on-line in the USA until 2013 at the earliest.  It could be years before Australia can begin building plants with 17 hours of storage.

Trying to schedule the proposed build is making a category error. It is unlikely that any project manager would touch it. The project is simply not scoped.

We expect only demonstration plants will be built until there is confidence that they can become economically viable.  We doubt any solar thermal plants, of the size and availability proposed in the plan, will be on line before 2020. .

7. Conclusions

We have reviewed the “Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan” by Beyond Zero Emissions.  We have evaluated and revised the assumptions and cost estimates. We conclude:

• The ZCA2020 Stationary Energy Plan has significantly underestimated the cost and timescale required to implement such a plan.

• Our revised cost estimate is nearly five times higher than the estimate in the Plan: $1,709 billion compared to $370 billion.  The cost estimates are highly uncertain with a range of $855 billion to $4,191 billion for our estimate.

• The wholesale electricity costs would increase nearly 10 times above current costs to $500/MWh, not the $120/MWh claimed in the Plan.

• The total electricity demand in 2020 is expected to be 44% higher than proposed: 449 TWh compared to the 325 TWh presented in the Plan.

• The Plan has inadequate reserve capacity margin to ensure network reliability remains at current levels. The total installed capacity needs to be increased by 65% above the proposed capacity in the Plan to 160 GW compared to the 97 GW used in the Plan.

• The Plan’s implementation timeline is unrealistic.  We doubt any solar thermal plants, of the size and availability proposed in the plan, will be on line before 2020.  We expect only demonstration plants will be built until there is confidence that they can be economically viable.

• The Plan relies on many unsupported assumptions, which we believe are invalid; two of the most important are:
  1. A quote in the Executive Summary “The Plan relies only on existing, proven, commercially available and costed technologies.”
  2. Solar thermal power stations with the performance characteristics and availability of baseload power stations exist now or will in the near future.

8. References

[1] Australian Sustainable Energy – Zero Carbon Australia – Stationary Energy Plan

http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/ZCA2020_Stationary_Energy_Report_v1.pdf

[2] ABARE Australian energy projections to 2029-30

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_10/energy_proj.pdf

[3] European Commission – Mobility and Transport

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/vehicles/road/electric_en.htm

[4] Doherty et al – Establishing the Role That Wind Generation May Have in Future Generation Portfolios IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 21, NO. 3, AUGUST 2006

[5] IEA – Technology Roadmap Concentrating Solar Power

http://www.iea.org/papers/2010/csp_roadmap.pdf

[6] ABARE’s list of major electricity generation projects – April 2009

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_09/EG09_AprListing.xls

[7] ABARE’s list of major electricity generation projects – April 2010

http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/energy/energy_10/EG10_AprListing.xls

[8] SOLARRESERVE GETS GREEN LIGHT ON NEVADA SOLAR THERMAL PROJECT July 2010

http://solarreserve.com/news/SolarReservePUCNApprovalAnnouncement072810.pdf

But fear not! The BNC blog will remain active over that time. Indeed, there are quite a number of new posts in the pipeline for this period, including guest pieces by Rob Parker (this Sunday), Geoff Russell (next week) and Peter Lang (soon — an executive summary and review of the ZCA critique), a couple of new energy policy and planning essays by yours truly, plus parts III and IV of the climate change basics series, part II of the sea level rise post, and some more TCASE entries.

What will I be doing on my travels, you may ask? Well, first I fly to Chicago, where I’ll be working for a week with Dr Robert Lacy, Prof Resit Akcakaya and collaborators, on integrating spatial-demographic ecological models with climate change forecasts, and implementing multi-species projections (with the aim of improving estimates of extinction risk and provide better ranking of management and adaptation options). This work builds on a major research theme at the global ecology lab, and consequently, a whole bunch of my team are going with me — Prof Corey Bradshaw (lab co-director), my postdocs Dr Damien Fordham, Dr Mike Watts and Dr Thomas Prowse and Corey’s and my ex-postdoc, Dr Clive McMahon. This builds on earlier work that Corey and I had been pursuing, which he described on ConservationBytes last year.

After that research workshop, I fly back across the states to Sacramento CA, where I’ll be staying with Tom Blees (author of Prescription for the Planet) for a few days. I’ll also be meeting up with Steve Kirsch and a few other SCGI folks then, which should be great. Then, Tom and I will drive up to Idaho Falls and stay for a few days with Dr Charles Till, who ran the superb R&D programme for the Integral Fast Reactor at the Argonne West National Laboratory. Chuck, along with other members of the 1984-1994 IFR research team, Dr Michael Linberry and Dr John Sackett, will give Tom and I a personalised tour of what is now the Idaho National Laboratory, including the site where the Experimental Breeder Reactor II was run, and a visit to the fuel conditioning facility. Needless to say, I can’t wait!

Then, Tom, Chuck and I will go on a sightseeing drive through Yellowstone National Park and the Grand Tetons, before I fly out of the US. This will be great, as I get to look over the sites occupied by the endangered Yellowstone grizzly bear, for which I wrote a population viability analysis (among other species) for my PhD studies back in the 1990s.

I then go straight to Shanghai for World Expo 2010, where I’m a plenary speaker at the ‘Australia — China Futures Dialogues: Achieving Sustainable Economic Development in the Asia Pacific’, thanks to an invitation from Prof Andrew O’Neil of the Griffith Asia Institute. I’ll be talking about climate change, sustainability, and of course, nuclear power and other alternative energy sources.

Right, I’d better go and pack, I’ve got a lot of last minute organisation to get done!

Guest post

A 10-page printable PDF version of this post can be downloaded here.

———————————–

Beyond Zero Emissions recently launched their Zero Carbon Australia 2020 Stationary Energy Plan (read the BNC community critique here).  It joins a growing list of renewable energy plans – Desertec, Greenpeace’s Energy [R]evolution, World Wildlife Fund Australia’s Clean Energy Future, Peter Seligman’s Australian Sustainable Energy, and others around the world.

The need to cut ourselves loose from our carbon based economy is urgent, and proponents of these plans are to be applauded.  But, can they work?  Many posts and comments at Brave New Climate have focussed on the hurdles facing large scale renewable power.  Here I have tried to distill these points into a checklist to bear in mind when considering these plans.  The list is followed by some brief exposition of each item. Some of these items refer to some Australian specifics, but similar questions will arise in other countries.

These items are not a set of pass/fail criteria, rather, they are prompts to ask “Did the plan address this point, and how?” The list is not exhaustive – many other questions could be raised, and hopefully will be in the comments.  I have not really considered nuclear power in this list because I am not aware of similar comprehensive attempts to plan carbon free nuclear economies (perhaps there should be) – there would be questions, but unlike renewable energy, we have existence proofs that it can be done.

So, how does the plan check out?

0. The checklist

□     What is the emissions reduction target?

□     What is the budget for the plan?

□     How is the plan to be financed?

□     What is the cost of power if the plan is implemented?

□     What is the CO₂ avoidance cost ($/tCO₂ avoided)

□     Can the plan scale to 100% emissions reduction?

□     What is the timeframe of the plan?

□     What current and future demand is assumed?

□     What efficiency improvements are assumed?

□     Does the plan include power for electric vehicles, desalination, and industrial use?

□     What are their worst case scenarios for solar and wind generation, and how have they been handled?

□     Is enough wind and solar generation planned to cover their minimum capacity factors and longest outages?

□     Do the wind and solar outputs account for dumped power due to production in excess of demand?

□     Is enough energy storage planned to provide continuous power?

□     Is enough generation capacity planned to charge storage in addition to supplying demand?

□     Are wind and solar assumed to contribute to emissions reduction?  If so, why?

□     What lifetime of wind and solar plant is assumed? Can these estimates be supported by data?

□     What maintenance and decommissioning costs are assumed?

□     Are all proposed generation and storage technologies mature?

□     Can the plan meet National Electricity Market reliability standards?

□     Does the plan increase the NEM mandated spinning reserve from the current 850 MW?

□     Does the plan increase the NEM reserve generation capacity from the current 20% value?

□     How much new hydroelectricity is assumed?

□     How much new pumped hydroelectricity (GW) does the plan call for?

□     How many hours storage does this provide?

□     What sites are proposed for the pumped storage?

□     What power source is proposed for pumping?

□     How much new transmission infrastructure is planned?

□     What power are the transmission lines rated for?

□     How much steel, concrete, land and water are required?

□     What are the proposed sites for the wind and solar installations?

□     Has the availability and cost of labour been addressed? Does it consider transport to remote locations and accommodation?

□     Have the ecological impacts of large scale wind and solar been assessed for the proposed sites?

□     How much natural gas is used?

□     Does the plan cost in large increases in the price of gas?

□     How long is natural gas assumed to last?

□     What will take the place of natural gas when it is no longer economically available?

□     Was nuclear power considered as an option?

1. Scope of Plan

1.1. What emissions reduction is targeted?  Is it sufficiently ambitious?

Climate change is a big issue, and we have to think big.  Unambitious targets will not solve our problem, and risk delaying effective action.  Targets of 40% or 60% cuts to CO₂ emissions are not enough.  The endgame is to completely decarbonize our energy system.  Even if the plan does not reach that goal at once, it should have the potential to scale to 100% emissions reductions.

The preindustrial atmospheric CO₂ concentration was 280 ppm.  It is currently about 390 ppm, and increasing at about 2 ppm per year.  We need to bring it back down to 350 ppm or less, in a timeframe of decades.  Failure will result in irreversible and extremely damaging consequences for human civilization and planetary ecology. The immediate goal, as proposed by James Hansen, should be to completely phase out coal power by 2030.  An effective plan must be able to shut down coal plants, one by one, until they are all gone.

Unsurprisingly, these topics have been well covered on Brave New Climate:

Target atmospheric CO₂ levels, not vague carbon emissions

We need a real global plan for carbon mitigation

Managing catastrophic risk – the six step plan

How to get rid of existing coal

1.2. What is the budget for the plan?

No plan can be credibly advanced without a credible budget.  Is this plan costed, not just for the direct generation plant, but also backup, storage, transmission, maintenance, decommissioning, and so on?  Is the rising cost of the fuel for backup (gas especially) into the future considered?  If not, pass.

1.3. How is the plan to be financed?

Having a budget is one thing. Knowing how the plan will be paid for is something else again. A plan that can’t be paid for can’t be built. There are many ways to do this – does the plan specify a financing model?

1.4. How cost effective is it ($/tCO₂ avoided)?

We don’t have unlimited cash to spend on emissions reduction.  We want bang for buck.  We want to be able to measure value for money.  And we want to shop around.  Can I get better value with a different plan?  So, what is the emissions avoidance cost, in dollars per tonne of CO₂ avoided?

Environment Victoria is campaigning to close down the Hazelwood coal plant.  Their plan is to eliminate 12 MtCO₂ per annum with wind and gas at a cost of $64/t CO₂ avoided.  Had they considered gas alone, they could have the same emissions reduction for $22/t CO₂ avoided.  If nuclear were available it could be even cheaper.   Choosing the more expensive option virtually guarantees their plan will fail.  This is just one coal plant. Do we want to make the same mistake with nation scale infrastructure, and fail also?

Peter Lang has calculated the emissions avoidance cost here for a number of generation options.

1.5. Can the plan scale to 100% of demand (or more)?

Adding small amounts of renewable energy to the grid is relatively easy (albeit costly).  But it gets harder as we add more.  Can the plan take us all the way to 100% decarbonization?  Or will we fall short, and be left with no other option than to bridge the gap with fossil fuels?

Each power source has its own limits.  Hydroelectricity is limited by availability of suitable sites and adequate rainfall.  Wind power penetration is limited by its effect on the stability and reliability of the grid.  Even coal is limited to less than 100% by its slow response time to rapidly changing demand.

1.6. What is the timeframe of the plan?

Does the plan have a schedule? We should expect to see milestones in such terms as “20% emissions reduction by 2020 through to 80% reductions by 2050″.

I do worry that such goals are a bit amorphous.  Our power supply does not come in continuous percentages, it comes in discrete chunks – the power plants.  So the best schedule would be a list of coal fired power plants, by name, with a date for closure.   Energy Victoria have exactly the right idea with their campaign to close Hazelwood by 2012.  Now can we set a termination date for the rest of these plants?

1.7. What energy sectors are in scope?

Do we just consider the energy sectors that are visible to us as consumers, like household electricity, and driving the car?  A plan that includes household efficiency, ‘green’ electricity, and reduced car usage might then look very appealing. But is it enough?  Can the plan provide

• Household electricity
• plus commercial and manufacturing uses of electricity
• plus desalination
• plus electrification of transport

and perhaps more, including energy intensive carbon drawdown?

2. Demand and Efficiency

2.1 What current demand is assumed?

The electrical energy demand for Australia in 2009-2010 is a nice round 1.0 exajoule, according to ABARE.  That’s 10¹⁸ J, or 280 TWh (1 terawatt.hour is 10¹² watt.hours).  It’s the equivalent of about thirty seven 1 GW power stations running for one year.  We have 49 GW installed generation capacity (2008).

Peak power demand in the National Electricity Market is of the order 33 GW (2007).

This demand is not met just by generating this very large amount of energy.  It is met by generating the total power demanded by all customers at all points in time and serving it to customers at the moment it is demanded.  These figures are for electricity as a product which can be sold, not just energy which can be generated.

2.2. What future demand is assumed?

Our current demand will not stand still.  The population will grow, and we will want more air conditioning and larger TVs!  New uses will be found for electricity, including electric vehicles and water desalination.

ABARE projections have Australia’s electricity production increasing to 366 TWh in 2030, without assuming significant adoption of electric vehicles.  What future demand does the plan assume?

2.3. What demand reductions due to efficiency are assumed?

Of course, we could use less energy by being more efficient.  However, plans that rely on a large efficiency component are due some close examination for a number of reasons.

The first is Jevon’s paradox, which observes that when some technology becomes more efficient, the technology is more widely used because it becomes cheaper, and net energy use increases.  Then there is the Khazoom-Brookes Postulate, which holds that energy efficiency allows increased economic growth, also leading to an increase in net energy use.

Efficiency only makes a big difference for uses that are already inefficient.  But very energy intensive activities tend to be quite efficient, as there is a strong economic incentive for them to be so.  Of our 280 TWh/yr of electrical energy, 43 TWh/yr is used in production of non-ferrous metals (29 TWh/yr just for aluminium).  These processes are already close to optimal.

So we are looking for efficiency improvements down in the tail of the Pareto distribution – amongst a large number of smaller consumption categories.  It is harder to achieve these efficiencies as improvements are spread over a diverse array of activities, each with its own special way of saving energy.

If we expect large efficiency gains from behavioural change, we will be disappointed.  Few people are motivated to make large lifestyle changes to support deep cuts in energy usage.  In the big picture, they are a hobbyist population that is of no consequence.  The greater mass will resist inconvenience, strongly, and will resist any political move to coerce such inconvenience.

3. Generation

3.1. Wind and solar

3.1.1. How much redundant capacity will be built?

There are traps lurking in the average capacity factors of wind and solar that can lead us to underestimate the number of power plants required.  Is the planned generation based on:

• The nameplate capacity?
• The annual average capacity factor?
• The capacity factor for seasons of lowest output (eg. the winter capacity factor for a solar plant)?
• Further derating the capacity factor to account for use of suboptimal sites, if very large scale generation is planned
• Further overbuild to cover extended periods of low generation that hide inside average capacity factors, such as a run of cloudy days or wind lulls?
• If we plan to store energy to cover these outages, we can’t use the same generators to service demand and charge up the storage – is additional generation capacity included for the energy we want to store?

TCASE10 discussed a number of issues related to capacity factors and outages.

3.1.2. What are their worst case scenarios for solar and wind generation, and how have they been handled?

The sun does not shine at a constant average rate, nor does the wind blow at a constant average speed.  Averages are not good enough for planning a power generation system.  What is the longest period of low wind and zero wind power that the plan assumes?  What is the longest run of cloudy days?

For instance, the Bonneville Power Authority in the US Pacific Northwest has 1.5 GW nameplate wind over four states, which in January 2009 ran for 11 continuous days at less than 50 MW (3% capacity).  Or you might look at all the wind in Ireland through 2006-07, where you can pick out a number of periods of about a week running at about 10%. These low generation periods need to be covered by alternative generation, use of stored power, or backup generation.

The worst case for generation drives many critical assumptions around scale, storage, cost, backup and emissions.  Does the plan explicitly state, and accommodate, the worst case?

3.1.3. Do the wind and solar outputs account for dumped power due to production in excess of demand?

With enough wind power in the system, sometimes output will exceed demand, in which case the energy is dumped, or sold at negative cost.  This “spilled wind” reduces the capacity factor, or impacts the economics of the generator.  It means that beyond point, perhaps 20% penetration if Denmark is typical, meeting demand by adding more wind to the grid is chasing diminishing returns.  A similar effect is expected for high penetrations of solar power, although not enough solar power has been built to test this.

Does the plan account for this effect, or assume it can simply add wind up to 100% penetration without penalty?

3.1.4. How much storage is planned?

How many hours of storage (for generation at full power) are planned?  Is it enough?

For instance, a solar system should be able to provide some power throughout the night.  You might guess this requires about 18 hours storage.  The Spanish solar station Andasol 1 has 7.5 hours storage, which apparently gives “almost 24-hour operation of the power plant during high sunshine periods.”  Or to put it another way, it can’t provide a full day’s power, even in high summer.  How much storage is required to see us through a cloudy day?  24 hours? 36?  How many continuous cloudy days might we expect?  Better plan storage for those days too.

Similarly for wind, we need to ensure the storage can cover multi-day lulls.  If it doesn’t, we’ll be burning some form of carbon instead.  And the cost of the fossil fuel plant must be paid for by the small amount of energy generated, so the cost per unit energy is very high.

3.1.5. Are wind and solar assumed to reduce emissions?

How much does wind power really reduce CO₂ emissions?  Does it even reduce it at all?

We currently back up intermittent wind with fossil fuel plants.  As these plants idle in standby, or follow the variable wind output, they use more fuel, like a car in city traffic, idling and starting and stopping.  Have these additional CO₂ emissions been accounted for?  Is there a net reduction in emissions?

In fact, introducing wind into the grid may even increase emissions.  A series of studies on wind integration for the Netherlands, for Colorado, and for Texas have all found increased overall emissions as more wind is added.

The same question has been considered here at Brave New Climate.  Even if wind power does reduce emissions it is not on a watt for watt basis, and the cost of avoiding emissions is very high.

(I suspect a similar situation applies to solar power but to a lesser degree, but am not aware of any studies on this.)

So, does the plan attribute any emissions savings to wind power?  If so, on what basis?

3.1.6. Maintenance, lifetime and decommissioning

Advocates of nuclear power have long been taunted by calls for decommissioning costs and full lifecycle analysis, and rightly so.  And it’s a question that should also be asked for other generators.  So, what does the plan assume for:

• Lifetime of wind and solar generators
• Maintenance costs
• Decommissioning costs

Decommissioning is expensive.  For instance, decommissioning for the Beech Ridge project (West Virginia) was estimated at ~US$100k per 1.5 MW turbine net of scrap value.  With 119 turbines producing ~186 MW that’s about $12m, or $60m/GW.

Offshore wind is more expensive.  One UK study estimates £34m/GW nameplate capacity, or about £100m/GW average output.

Several comments here by Bryen give a great rundown on a number of wind farm life cycle issues. To quote a few of his points:

Wind industry developers suggest a 20 to 25 year lifespan for an industrial wind turbine .. However, due to the majority of these installations being new developments, few turbines have been around to test these lifespan assumptions under real world conditions .. Gearboxes in wind turbines are often replaced within the first 5 years .. Jan Pohl of insurance firm Allianz in Munich, who faced about 1000 claims in 2006 stated : ‘an operator has to expect damage to his facility every four years, not including malfunctions and uninsured breakdowns.’

3.2. Hydroelectricity

The Snowy Mountains hydro scheme can generate 3.8 GW sustainably for 1184 hours per year.  It took 25 years to build, and we have neither the rainfall nor the sites for a large expansion of hydroelectricity.

Because of hydro’s rapid response to power fluctuations, introducing variable generators like wind into the grid will increase the demand for hydro.  Do we have enough hydro capacity to serve the proposed renewable generators?

3.3. Immature technologies

Geothermal power, wave power, tidal power, are all potential or actual sources of low carbon energy.  Perhaps these and other generators are included in “the energy mix”.  Are they commercial?  Or are they R&D projects?  Is the plan deploying proven technologies, or R&D projects?

4. Grid Storage and Backup

4.1. System Reliability

The National Electricity Market must meet reliability standards.  Unserved energy must not exceed 0.002 percent of total demand.  The NEM is also required to carry 850 MW of spinning reserve to ensure reliability.

Further, the grid carries about 20% capacity margin in reserve (Australia 2005, US 2004), which is 7-8 GW in Australia. Adding a large amount of intermittent generators to the grid would require an increase in the reserve power to ensure reliability.

Can the plan meet currently legislated levels of reliability?  What happens if it can’t?  How much should the reserve power be increased to ensure reliability?  Does the plan include this additional reserve power?

4.2. Storage with Pumped Hydroelectricity

Renewable energy requires energy storage, and the cheapest large scale storage is pumped hydro.  Questions to consider for pumped hydro are

• how much power (GW) is needed?
• how much energy (hours of storage at full power) is needed?
• how long does it take to pump up the storage?
• what is the power source used for pumping?
• where will we put it?

Australia has 2.5 GW of pumped hydro.  1.5 GW of that is the Tumut 3 system which can generate full power for 6 hours.  Then it requires 21 hours to pump it back up again.

The 0.5 GW Wivenhoe facility pumps from midnight to 6am.  It generates for about 7 hours per day, and is on standby for 12 hours. During standby it provides some power to stabilise the grid.  It can’t pump up during daytime standby or generation periods.

Australia’s pumped hydro capacity is a poor complement for wind or solar because pumping requires steady power – it can’t start, stop or ramp quickly.  This means you can’t generate power while charging.  So it generates power during the day, and is pumped up at night.  This is obviously a poor match for solar, and it’s also a poor match for wind. The power for pumping needs to be cheap.  Coal fired base load works, wind and solar would be uneconomic.  But the main limitation on expanding pumped hydro is the lack of suitable sites.

Peter Lang has analyzed a potential pumped hydro scheme using existing reservoirs in the Snowy Mountains scheme on Brave New Climate.  It could provide 8 GW of power for 5 hours a day. It would cost ~$12- to $15-billion.  There is much useful discussion in the comments to this post.

So, does the plan depend on pumped hydro to store energy generated by renewables?  How much storage does it require? And where will we put it?

5. Transmission Infrastructure

5.1.  How much new transmission infrastructure is assumed?

Long transmission lines are needed to collect power from generators far enough apart that local cloud or low wind is averaged out.  The length scale is the size of the continent.

Each individual site will need a transmission link to the trunk, and each individual turbine will need to be connected.  Additional switchgear and control systems will be needed.

So, does the plan have a comprehensive, costed, transmission infrastructure?

5.2. What is the capacity of the transmission lines?

The transmission lines must be sized to handle the nameplate capacity of any wind or solar plant, not the average capacity.  Wind and solar need about three times the transmission capacity of a conventional generator (nameplate/average capacity).

Large scale weather systems impose greater transmission capacity requirements on wind and solar than conventional power plants.  If the east coast is covered in cloud but West Australia is generating, the east-west transmission must be sized to carry the east coast load.  There’s a lot more power ‘sloshing’ across large distances.

So, are the transmission lines sized for the spatial load balancing and high peak loads of wind and solar, or does it just use capacities appropriate to our current generation system?

6. Resource Consumption, Land Use, and Ecological Impacts

6.1. Steel, Concrete, Land

TCASE4 considered steel, concrete and land usage for solar, wind, and nuclear power generation.  The resource consumption of the renewables are stupendous, one or two orders of magnitude greater than nuclear power.  Does the plan address the use of these resources?

6.2. Water for Concrete, Cooling and Washing

Renewable energy has large water requirements. Has water supply been considered?

Has the water supply needed to make the concrete during construction been factored in. Where will the water come from? What is the cost of supplying around 10 times as much water for the concrete for a solar thermal plant than for a nuclear plant of the same capacity?

As explained in TCASE6, all thermal power plants – solar thermal, coal fired, nuclear – have similar cooling water requirements, because they all produce power with steam turbines.  For closed loop cooling, solar thermal and nuclear use about 3000 L/MWh.  Open loop cooling withdraws much more water, about 100 000 L/MWh, which is returned to river, lake or ocean at a higher temperature.  The water lost to evaporation is about the same as used in closed loop cooling.

A particular issue arises for solar thermal if the plant is to be located in the desert – where does this water come from?  It is possible to use air cooling for thermal plants, but the cost is higher, and the thermal efficiency takes a hit, with less energy from a more expensive plant, so the cost effectiveness and investor return is reduced.

So, does the plan include a large amount of solar thermal power?  If so, do the plants use open loop, closed loop or air cooling?  Where does the water come from? Are costs and outputs appropriate to the cooling technology?

Finally, the mirrors in solar thermal plants require regular washing to remove dust, which blocks the sun. Does the plan describe the water supply for these plants, particularly if they are to be sited in the desert?

6.3. Gas

Large scale wind and solar requires lots of gas fired backup, and gas reserves are finite.

Professor Barry Brook has reviewed the availability of natural gas in Australia.  He estimates that our reserves, less exports, if used to serve our full energy requirements, would last perhaps 20 years.  How we actually choose to use it is an open question, but it is clear that gas as an energy source has a limited lifetime.  Brook says:

The UK is now paying dearly for their dash for gas, following the coal mine closures of the 1980s. Their once-abundant North Sea fields are rapidly depleting. Again, Australia should take note of this warning. We must not go down the natural gas-for-coal substitution route. It would be long-term economic suicide.

If we commit to renewables, we commit to expanded use of gas, at the same time as gas prices are expected to skyrocket.  What happens to the price of electricity?  Can we afford renewable power that commits us to dependence on a finite and increasingly expensive resource?  And how long do we have before the gas runs out?

6.4. What are the proposed sites for the wind and solar installations?

Renewable energy takes up an enormous area because the power is so dilute.  Meeting Austraila’s energy needs with 2.5 MW turbines would occupy about 15 000 km² (a naïve calculation based only on the average capacity factor, without overbuilding).  To give this some perspective, our best wind resource is on our 25 000 km coastline.  Covering Australia’s southern coastline a kilometre deep with windfarms would give us the required area.  If you don’t like this idea, where else should they go?

Similarly, meeting our needs with Andasol-class solar thermal would require about 2000 km².  Where will these plants go?

What ecosystems will they impact?  Who owns the land now?  On what terms will we negotiate with existing owners for access to their land, or acquisition of it?  What planning processes will be used?  How long will this take?

6.5. Labour

Does the plan consider the workforce that will be required?

Renewable energy is labour intensive in construction as well as maintenance.  And we don’t just need to find the labour, we need to transport the workers to remote areas and accommodate them.  In his Emissions Cuts Realities paper, Peter Lang writes:

To construct the solar thermal power stations in areas throughout central Australia [or remote wind power –jm] will require large mobile construction camps, fly-in fly-out work force, large concrete batch plants, large supply of water, energy and good roads to each power station. Air fields suitable for fly-in fly-out will be required at say one per 250 MW power station.

Does the plan consider the labour resource for remote development?  What cost of labour is assumed?  Is it competitive with the mining industry in similar situations?

6.6. What are the ecological impacts?

Building wind power amounts to light industrialization of the landscape.  The installation requires access roads for trucks, cranes and cement mixers, excavation of foundations and pouring concrete footings, construction of transmission lines and substations, and so on.  The packing density estimated by Professor Brook for a typical turbine would give an average spacing of about 500 m.  These activities are directly damaging to sensitive ecosystems, disrupting soils and causing erosion, and providing vectors for pest plants and animals

Solar mirror fields completely build over the area they occupy, which may mean local destruction of desert ecosystems.

Birds and bats are killed by blade strikes.  While there are many sources of bird mortality, wind turbines appear to be particularly hard on raptors (eagles, hawks, falcons, etc.).  Many other ecological effects have been reviewed in the report for the US National Academies, “Environmental Impacts of Wind-Energy Projects”.

These impacts may appear trivial, or sound like NIMBYism.  But for renewable energy deployments at very large scale, they may be devastating.  Have the direct environmental impacts of the plan been considered?

7. Comparison to the Nuclear Alternative

Constructing a renewable energy plan is like composing a sonnet or a fugue.  The constraints imposed by the form drive creativity and grand ambition.  A fine thing for poetry, but what if we just want to get the job done?

The constraint accepted by so many of these proposals is that we design the system without nuclear power.  What happens if you relax that constraint?  Was this even considered?

If the goal is to avoid disaster in the biosphere, or to do an end run around peak oil, does the fastest, most certain path to a fossil fuel free future include nuclear power, or exclude it?  Is our most effective course of action to pursue large scale renewables, or social and legislative change to enable rollout of nuclear power?

Were these questions even considered?

It is very difficult to predict the future of scientific developments, and few would even dare to make predictions extending beyond the next 50 years. However, based on everything we know now, one can make a strong case for the thesis that nuclear fission reactors will be providing a large fraction of our energy needs for the next million years. If that should come to pass, a history of energy production written at that remote date may well record that the worst reactor accident of all time occurred at Chernobyl, USSR, in April of 1986.

How could he have the audacity to make such a prognostication? Simple — because he, like most scientists, engineers and actuaries, understands the meaning of  probability and risk (as well as the fundamental physics of modern reactor design). In chapter 8, called “Understanding Risk“, he goes on to say:

One of the worst stumbling blocks in gaining widespread public acceptance of nuclear power is that the great majority of people do not understand and quantify the risks we face. Most of us think and act as though life is largely free of risk. We view taking risks as foolhardy, irrational, and assiduously to be avoided. Training children to avoid risk is an all-important duty of parenthood. Risks imposed on us by others are generally considered to be entirely unacceptable.

Unfortunately, life is not like that. Everything we do involves risk. There are dangers in every type of travel, but there are dangers in staying home — 25% of all fatal accidents occur there. There are dangers in eating — food is one of the most important causes of cancer and of several other diseases — but most people eat more than necessary. There are dangers in breathing — air pollution probably kills 100,000 Americans each year, inhaling radon and its decay products is estimated to kill 14,000 a year, and many diseases like influenza, measles, and whooping cough are contracted by inhaling germs. These dangers can often be avoided by simply breathing through filters, but no one does that. There are dangers in working — 12,000 Americans are killed each year in job-related accidents, and probably 10 times that number die from job-related illness — but most alternatives to working are even more dangerous. There are dangers in exercising and dangers in not getting enough exercise. Risk is an unavoidable part of our everyday lives.

That doesn’t mean that we should not try to minimize our risks, but it is important to recognize that minimizing anything must be a quantitative procedure. We cannot minimize our risks by simply avoiding those we happen to think about. For example, if one thinks about the risk of driving to a destination, one might decide to walk, which in most cases would be much more dangerous. The problem with such an approach is that the risks we think about are those most publicized by the media, whose coverage is a very poor guide to actual dangers. The logical procedure for minimizing risks is to quantify all risks and then choose those that are smaller in preference to those that are larger. The main object here is to provide a framework for that process and to apply it to the risks in generating electric power.

…

The failure of the American public to understand and quantify risk must rate as one of the most serious and tragic problems for our nation. This chapter represents my attempt to contribute to its resolution.

In this BNC post, Peter Lang provides a simple explanation of risk in relation to energy generation. In an Endnote, I quote a few passages from my recent book that also relate to this important — but often misunderstood — concept.

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What is risk? A simple explanation

Guest Post by Peter Lang. Peter is a retired geologist and engineer with 40 years experience on a wide range of energy projects throughout the world, including managing energy R&D and providing policy advice for government and opposition. His experience includes: coal, oil, gas, hydro, geothermal, nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and a wide range of energy end use management projects.

A recent comment on BNC stated:

I for one am glad nukes are being forced to be orders of magnitude safer than coal because the risks are orders of magnitude greater

In fact, the risks from nuclear are orders of magnitude lower than coal, not greater. Let me explain.

Risk is Consequence of an event multiplied by the Probability of that event occurring.

We need to define what we mean by the Consequence.

For electricity generation the consequence could be (for example):

1. Fatalities

2. Work-days-lost

3. Total health effects

4. Total damage costs (including health, environmental, etc.)

Fatalities can be subdivided into ‘immediate fatalities’ and ‘latent fatalities’. Fatalities can be subdivided into ‘workers’ and ‘public’.

We must define which measure of ‘Consequence’ we are using. Let’s keep it simple and use ‘immediate fatalities’ as our measure of ‘Consequence’.

The consequence of an accident might be 30 immediate fatalities (as happened at Chernobyl). The probability of occurrence might be 1 in 14,000 GW-years (123,000 TWh). The risk of such an accident is 1 fatality per 4,000 TWh (equivalent to 1 fatality in 20 years from severe nuclear accidents if all of Australia’s electricity was generated by nuclear power).

Now refer to Figure 1. To understand what this chart is telling us, consider the pink dot labelled “Chernobyl”. This is plotted at 28 Fatalities on the x-axis. Reading off the y-axis we see the frequency of nuclear accidents causing 30 or more immediate fatalities is 1.1 x 10^-4 GW-years (or 1 occurrence in 9,000 GW-years of electricity supplied). That is about 1 immediate fatality in 2,800 TWh (equivalent to about 1 immediate fatality in 14 years from severe nuclear accidents if all Australia’s electricity was generated by nuclear power).

Figure 1: Risks of severe accidents in the different energy chains in the EU. Original Source of this chart (link no longer available). Original Data is in Figures 7 and 8 is here.

Now look at the coal accidents (the brown line). For accidents with the same number of immediate fatalities as Chernobyl we see that the frequency is about 1.15 x 10^-3 GW-years. So, the frequency of severe accidents that causes 30 or more early fatalities is 15 times greater for coal generation than for nuclear generation.

Also on Figure 1, notice the pink line in the lower left corner of the chart. This is the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of nuclear generation. It indicates that nuclear is about 4 orders of magnitude (10,000 times) safer than coal generation.

This chart includes only the immediate fatalities caused by severe accidents. It does not include the latent fatalities. For coal generation most of the fatalities are latent fatalities and these occur in the general public, not in the workers. However, in nuclear and renewable energy generation most of the fatalities are amongst workers in the industry — workers anywhere in the chain from mining materials, processing, manufacturing, construction, transport decommissioning and disposal. The figures are from full life cycle assessment.

For nuclear and renewables the Fatalities per TWh of electricity supplied are roughly in proportion to the quantity of materials needed per TWh over the plant life. However, for fossil fuels, the fatalities are dominated by the fatalities to members of the public due to the toxic emissions. The fatalities to the workers are dominated by those involved in the fuel extraction.

Figure 2 compares the total health effects of the main types of electricity generation in the EU. It shows that, in the EU, nuclear is about 50 times safer than coal generated electricity. Nuclear is safer than all except hydro in the EU.

Figure 2: Mean values of health effects, presented as deaths/TWh for the respective forms of electricity generation throughout the EU (Source here).

Outside the OECD, fossil fuel and renewable energy generation is much more dangerous that in the EU so nuclear is even safer by comparison.

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Endnote (Barry Brook): Here are some extracts on this topic from recent book, Why vs Why: Nuclear Power:

Nuclear safety and serious accidents

Safety is the most common fear about nuclear power, yet the nuclear power industry has an excellent operational safety record.

A study of 4,290 energy-related accidents by the European Commission’s ExternE research project examined the number of deaths per terawatt hour of energy for each of various technologies. It found:

• oil kills 36 workers a terawatt hour
• coal kills 25
• gas kills 4
• hydro, wind, solar and, yes, nuclear, all kill less than 0.2

(These figures ignore deaths from pollution and global warming.)

…

The fearsome reactor meltdown or terrorist act: what is the worst case scenario?

There is no limit to what the imagination can come up with regarding industrial accidents.

Imagine if a fire broke out in a natural gas refinery on the outskirts of a city. High winds then carried the hot embers aloft, setting ablaze nearby suburbs and the surrounding forest. What if this triggered explosions in adjacent chemical plants? This chain of events might ultimately lead to a city-wide conflagration that killed hundreds of thousands of people. Such a scenario is exceedingly unlikely, but not impossible. In the end, it is the probability that matters.

There is, for instance, some risk that a terrorist could hijack an aircraft, hit a reactor with pinpoint accuracy, breach containment, and cause the release of nuclear material. However, it is an incredibly low risk that all of these things will occur together. For instance, it has been estimated that only about one in every 1,000 direct aircraft strikes might crack a steel-reinforced concrete containment dome.

…

If we want to increase global security, then it is counterproductive to hope nuclear power will simply go away. We should instead discuss how to use this low-carbon energy source safely and cleanly, with minimum risk and maximum advantage. The risks of not employing nuclear power vastly outweigh the dangers of continuing to use fossil fuels or running out of energy.

We hope to add to this list, and refine the answers (these are very much first drafts, and some certainly need a little filling out). Eventually, I hope that this becomes a static top banner page on BNC, and, I hope, a pamphlet for you to distribute among friends and colleagues. So, feedback is very welcome – let’s work together on this.

Q1. How urgent is it to address climate change?

Q2. Why do we need nuclear power? Won’t renewables provide our needs?

Q3. We need to act fast, aren’t renewables the fastest response?

Q4. Aren’t renewables the most affordable option?

Q5. What about storing excess energy for later use?

Q6. Isn’t it more important for us to scale down our energy requirements through energy efficiency and conservation?

Q7. Aren’t renewables our safest option?

Q8. Does nuclear emit more CO₂ than renewables

Q9. What about meltdowns? Is nuclear energy safe?

Q10. What about radiation?

Q11. What about the waste?

Q12. Wouldn’t a nuclear power staion be a terrorist target?

Q13. What about nuclear weapons proliferation?

Q14. Nuclear power is unnatural, isn’t it?

Q15. Is there enough uranium?

Q16. Is nuclear energy expensive?

Q17. Is nuclear energy fast enough?

Q18. Why isn’t every country following the French model if it’s the best?

Q19. Isn’t the nuclear lobby in bed with the coal lobby?

Q20. But… isn’t nuclear power evil?

FAQ

Q1. How urgent is it to address climate change?

Increasingly urgent. The longer we delay on the move away from fossil fuel energy sources, the more we will ‘lock in’ the build-up of long-lived greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide.

To have a 50:50 chance of avoiding 2°C or more global warming, carbon emissions must be slashed by around 80% by 2050 and essentially eliminated in the few decades after that. It will take time to make this massive, worldwide transition to new energy sources. We have no time to lose!

Q2.Why do we need nuclear power? Won’t renewables provide our needs?

No. Renewables are very expensive and cannot meet our needs all the time (see below).

Q3. We need to act fast, aren’t renewables the fastest response?

Unfortunately, non-hydro renewables are proving to be slow and ineffective.

For the last 20 odd years, Denmark has been aggressively pursuing wind power, yet it still still only supplies between 5% and 20% of their electricity needs. In twenty years the Danes have been unable to replace a single coal fired power station with renewables.

At 650 g CO₂ per kilowatt hour, Denmark’s emissions are more than 7 times greater than nuclear-powered France. And remember, no country has done better with wind then Denmark.

Conversely, in just ten years, France almost completely replaced their old coal-fired power stations with 34 nuclear power plants. Nuclear power currently supplies 77% of electricity to the French grid. At just at just 90g CO₂ per kilowatt hour of electricity, France now has the lowest emissions from electricity generation of any non-hydro/geothermal, developed nation in the OECD.

Ten years! Nuclear power is the fastest response we have.

For more details, read Danish fairy tales – what can we learn? (by Tom Blees)

Q4. Aren’t renewables the most affordable option?

No. Effectively replacing just one coal power station involves a massive overbuild at huge costs.

Australia’s largest wind farm is the 192 MWe Waubra plant at $450 million. To match the nameplate capacity of Hazelwood (1675 MWe) we need 8 of these wind farms (or solar equivalent) spread across state. That’s $3.6 billion. But because weather can vary across the state, this variability means wind and solar combined produce at best only about a quarter of their capacity. So we quadruple our first calculation and blanket the state in 24 Waubras at $14.4 billion. But, wind can also drop off over huge areas. To account for this we need to spread another 24 Waubras interstate. $28.8 billion and we’ve lost our energy independence right there. Theory is, when our wind and solar are out, NSW should be operating and vice versa. Assuming the whole of NSW is experiencing ideal conditions and doesn’t need the power themselves (big assumptions), they should sell it to us. Then there’s transmission lines, more $, and transmission loss, more MW… and so it goes on. Or, we could replace it with one nuclear power plant at a quarter or less of the cost. Old power station out, new power station in, MWe for MWe.

Replacing Hazelwood coal-fired power station – Critique of Environment Victoria report

The 100% renewable option is neither fast nor affordable.

[R]enewable sources tend to be alternative rather than additive. Therefore it is not a matter of having each renewable source carrying a fraction of the load all the time. If we build one unit of wind power and one unit of PV power we would not necessarily have two more units of renewable energy capacity; sometimes we would have no more, e.g., on calm nights. This means we might have to build two or even four separate systems (wind, PV, solar thermal and coal [or]nuclear) each capable of meeting much or all of the demand on its own, with the equivalent of one to three sitting idle much or all of the time.

Ted Trainer: Renewable energy cannot sustain an energy intensive society

A video on the high cost of Danish wind:

Does wind power reduce carbon emissions? (by Peter Lang)

Wind and carbon emissions – Peter Lang responds (by Peter Lang)

Solar power realities – supply-demand, storage and costs (by Peter Lang)

Solar realities and transmission costs – addendum (by Peter Lang)

Q5. What about storing excess energy for later use?

In a continent a dry as Australia our hydro capacity is extremely limited and could not by itself fulfill the storage requirements of a 100% renewable grid. Pumped hydro in Australia is also prohibitively expensive, geographically limited and, to pump water, requires the kind of guaranteed steady power supply variable wind/solar cannot supply. Pumped-hydro energy storage – cost estimates for a feasible system (by Peter Lang)

Concerning solar thermal:

Plant capable of delivering 1000 MW in winter would need 100+ million square metres of collection area. At the estimated SEGS cost of $800/m (Trainer 2008) the plant would cost $80 billion.

…

The climate data seems to show that despite their storage capacity solar thermal systems would suffer a significant intermittency problem and in winter would either need storage capacity for four or more cloudy day sequences once or twice each winter month, or would need back up from some other sources. This means they could not be expected to buffer the intermittency of other components in a fully renewable system.

Ted Trainer: Renewable energy cannot sustain an energy intensive society

Q6. Isn’t it more important for us to scale down our energy requirements through energy efficiency and conservation?

Population increase, a switch to electric vehicles, climate change adaptations (eg desalination) and the continuing electrification of the developing world will all conspire to make conservation little more than a smoke screen – empty action that allows even weak adherents to feel a dangerously misplaced confidence while the planet continues to die. They cannot be relied upon as anything more than peripheral emissions reduction strategies.

A great video on India’s growing demand

Put all energy cards on the table to fix climate change fully

Q7. Aren’t renewables our safest option?

Our foremost reason for pursuing renewable energy is to avoid dangerous climate change. Therefore the 100% renewable option can only be considered our safest option if it adequately addresses climate change. Unlike nuclear power, renewables have so far proven unable to prevent new fossil fuel stations being built, and unable to replace existing coal and gas . We are deeply concerned that placing our sole faith in technologies, yet to prove their efficacy in replacing fossil fuels, is a climate disaster waiting to happen. Effective action is our safest option.

Further reading:

Critique of ‘A path to sustainable energy by 2030′

Germany – crunched by the numbers (by Tom Blees)

Unnatural Gas (by Tom Blees)

Q8. Does nuclear emit more CO₂ than renewables?

No.

When generating electricity, nuclear power emits no CO₂.

When construction, mining and decommissioning of the various technologies are accounted for, nuclear emits far less CO₂ than any other electricity generation technology, or mix of technologies, that can meet our demand for electricity.

If we ignore the emissions from the back-up generators, wind power emits roughly the same as nuclear generators. When we include them, wind power emits about the same as efficient gas generation.

TCASE 4: Energy system build rates and material inputs

Emission cuts realities for electricity generation – costs and CO₂ emissions (by Peter Lang)

Q9. What about meltdowns? Is nuclear energy safe?

Yes. Nuclear is about the safest of all the electricity generation technologies.

Compare Chernobyl with Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. Chernobyl didn’t have a containment dome, Three Mile Island did. Not a single person died or fell ill as a result of the Three Mile Island meltdown. Containment domes work.

Risk assessment studies show that nuclear power is the safest of all the electricity generation technologies. Nuclear is 10 to 100 times safer than coal electricity generation. Coal plant safety varies but nuclear power is at least 10 times safer than the safest coal power plant. This has been demonstrated by 55 years of nuclear electricity generation. Nuclear power is the only universally deployable, zero emissions technology that has proven able to replace a fossil fuel power station. This alone makes it a safer bet than intermittent renewables such as wind and solar.

Current generation III nuclear power stations are even safer than the already incredibly safe current designs. They have passive safety systems, controlled not by human operators but by the laws of physics, unless the laws of physics – which have been running the universe since the beginning of time – ‘decide’ to change, then these designs are fail safe. They cannot melt down. If something goes wrong and there is not a single human operator in the plant they simply shut themselves down. Not a single human operator need be present in the plant for this to occur.

Q10. What about radiation?

Radiation is all around us. People, animals, plants, water, rocks and the sun all emit radiation. The average radiation dose we receive each year is 360 millirems. But depending on where you live in the world, what your life style is like, what your favourite foods are etc you may be exposed to a natural and completely harmless background radiation dose of anything from, about 200 millirems per year, to more than 5000 millirems/yr. For example:

Poland is low at – 240 millirem/yr

Grand Central station, NY – 540 millirem/yr (It’s built from granite.)

Kerala, India – 900 millirem/yr

Pripyat, Chernobyl (1992) – 2500 millirem/yr (non-natural levels)

Certain beaches in Brazil – 3000 millirem/yr.

Tamil Nadu, India at – 5,300 millirem/yr

A nuclear power station’s radiation is indistinguishable from natural background radiation levels. At about 0.005% of our average radiation dose it’s equivalent to the radiation dose we’d receive from eating one banana per year and around 100 times below that emitted by our current coal plants.

The developed nations with the highest reliance on nuclear power have life expectancy, under 5 year old mortality, and infant mortality rates equal to any other developed nation. There is little evidence to suggest nuclear power stations pose increased health risks. Numerous studies have been undertaken to determine the effects of living near nuclear power plants and the overriding evidence demonstrates no rise in cancer rates, or other problems, for communities who live close to nuclear power plants, compared to those who do not.

Ask yourself this: If we accept the science on climate change, why shouldn’t we accept the science on nuclear power? (See also Q12,17 & 18).

How dangerous is radiation?

Radiation – facts, fallacies and phobias

Q11. What about the waste?

Nuclear power produces a tiny amount of waste. To put the volume of waste into perspective, this is all that remains from a now decommissioned nuclear power station which generated power for 31 years.

This is a minuscule amount compared to the waste from fossil fuel power stations, which release the equivalent of 5000 Gulf of Mexico oil spills into the atmosphere every single day.

All technologies create waste – even wind and solar require the disposal or recycling of long lived toxic waste such as cadmium and arsenic. Many of these waste products have no half life, they are toxic forever, yet, instead of concluding we must abandon renewable technologies, we find ways to manage their waste. We can, and do, use the same approach for nuclear waste. Indeed new Generation IV nuclear power plants (eg IFR) have solved the nuclear waste issue. In reality, nuclear waste is much better thought of as ‘once-used-nuclear-fuel’, of which only about 1% to 10% of the energy has been used. The brilliant thing about Generation IV nuclear power plants is that they use this ‘waste’ as fuel, using over 99% of the remaining energy. In fact, Generation IV nuclear power plants are the ONLY way we can get rid of the long-lived nuclear waste we have already generated, by burning it as fuel. If ones concern is nuclear waste, the solution is Gen IV nuclear power.

The final waste product from an IFR Gen IV nuclear power plant (ie: with once-used-fuel recycling) has a half-life of just 30 years. A half life is the amount of time it takes for radioactive isotopes to degrade into non-radioactive isotopes. A half life of 30 years for Gen IV waste means in 30 years it’s radiation levels will drop to 50% of original levels, in 60 years this 50% will have halved again, a drop to 25% of original levels, in 90 years only 12.5% of original levels will remain, and so on until, in about 300 years, this tiny amount of waste will be less radioactive than the granite walls of Grand Central Station in New York City.

Lastly — and this is ironic — we are currently living with 5-50% more nuclear waste being pumped into our atmosphere every year in the fly ash from our coal stations than an IFR would produce capture and store away over the same time frame. By going nuclear we would in fact be reducing our nuclear waste.

Q12.Wouldn’t a nuclear power station be a terrorist target?

No…

…not if they actually wanted to do some damage.

Q13. What about nuclear weapons proliferation?

Nuclear power is not a precursor to nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons were developed before nuclear power, evidently nations do not need nuclear power in order to develop nuclear weapons.

None of the weapons that currently exist will disappear with a dismantling of our nuclear power fleet.

There are many nations (Japan, for example) who have nuclear power, yet do not have nuclear weapons.

Nuclear power can replace coal in all nations who currently have nuclear reactors, nuclear power or nuclear weapons without increasing any imagined proliferation risk, and that would take care of more than 90% of our stationary energy emissions worldwide.

Banning nuclear power because of nuclear weapons proliferation concerns is akin to banning medical research because of biological weapons proliferation concerns. In other words, absurd! The connections are too tenuous and the positives too great.

Q14. Nuclear power is unnatural, isn’t it?

No, it isn’t. Atoms don’t have prejudices, and energy is not selfish. The universe is naturally awash with radiation, and nuclear fission is not black magic. Nuclear reactors have even occurred naturally in Earth’s history. Ever heard of the Oklo reactor? Look back over a billion years, and find out more…

Q15. Is there enough uranium?

Yes. There is enough uranium to provide all the world’s energy indefinitely.

Australia holds a quarter of the world’s known reserves, if any nation can rely on nuclear power, we can.

Using advanced reactor technology an individuals entire energy need for a whole year (electricity, synthetic jet fuel, electric vehicles etc.) can be supplied from the uranium and thorium that could be extracted from half a cubic metre of ordinary dirt. Over an individuals entire lifetime the amount of extracted nuclear fuel involved would be no bigger than a golf ball. Indeed, we’ve already mined enough uranium to power the whole world using next-generation nuclear power for 700 years!

Q16. Is nuclear energy expensive?

It’s much cheaper than 100% renewable energy — basically wind and solar and the little hydro we can muster.

Once up and running, nuclear power produces some of the cheapest electricity in the world.

It can be made more expensive (but still cheaper than 100% renewables) wherever there is an unsupportive public. Public demonstrations, legal stalling, superfluous or conflicting regulation changes mid-build, all cause delays and cost overruns. The simple answer is to:

1. Support nuclear power as our surest carbon mitigation strategy.

2. Get the appropriate regulations in place before building begins and stick by them.

Nuclear power can be the least cost electricity where there is a ‘level playing field’ for all types of electricity generation.

Recent nuclear power cost estimates – separating fact from myth

Emission cuts realities for electricity generation – costs and CO₂ emissions (by Peter Lang)

The 21st century nuclear renaissance is starting – good news for the climate

Q17. Is nuclear energy fast enough?

It’s the fastest option we have. With a supportive population, and a little inspiration from France, we could replace our coal base load with nuclear power in 15 years. At its peak, France was building 3,500 MWe of nuclear power, or around four to six nuclear power stations, per year. Despite valient attempts in countries like Germany and Denmark, no nation has ever come close to installing this much wind or solar in such a short time frame.

Q18. Isn’t the nuclear lobby in bed with the coal lobby?

No. Because they know nuclear power is the only zero emissions electricity generation system capable of displacing coal, the coal lobby is fighting hard to keep nuclear power out of Australia. This is a real advertisement produced by the coal industry in Australia.

Q19. Why isn’t every country following the French model if it’s the best?

In the developed world? Because they are needlessly afraid of modern nuclear power for any number of obsolete or unsubstantiated reasons. (see Q20) Still, 19 of the world’s top 20 economies either use nuclear power, or are building it for the first time. The only one missing from that list is… Australia.

The developing world is attempting to lift itself out of poverty and inequality — aiming to enjoy the standard of living of those in the West. Their priorities are development first, climate change second. They will build what’s cheapest. At the moment that’s coal, but they are successfully reducing the up front cost of nuclear power and as they do so nuclear builds are expanding. At the moment nuclear power is expensive to build (compared to coal), but cheap to run. Hence their perseverance on reducing capital costs.

Q20. But… isn’t nuclear power evil?

For many greens, opposition to nuclear power is automatic. Nuclear power stands for war, sickness, invisible radiation, toxic waste, an apocalyptic symbol of technology gone awry.

The idea of nuclear energy as a kind of modern day evil is an indulgence we can no longer afford. It is not some mysterious malignancy. It is a mature, safe, unremarkable technology that provides carbon free electricity for many communities. The real consequences of climate change beginning around us are set to become far worse than the imagined perils of nuclear power.

It is time to set aside the mythology and theatre of anti nuclear sentiment. Nuclear power is still a core environmental issue today, but this time around, we support it as strongly as it was once opposed.

But before that, here are some general site statistics that regular readers might find interesting:

‘Birthday‘:  7 August 2008 (with Welcome to a Brave New Climate)

Total number of posts: 265 (in 15 categories)

Total number of comments: 17,200 (with another 92,200 spam messages being filtered out!), or 65 average per post (this has obviously increased with time, as the community has been built up)

Total hits: 655,500, with the busiest day receiving 2,509 (Wed 2 Dec 2009) — these now seems stable, at about 1,200 per day, with fluctuations in the range of 700 – 900 on weekends and 1,400 – 1,600 on good days, and over 2,000 on exceptional days. I guess the blog has reached its carrying capacity (see chart below), with some regulars, many wayfarers, and other medium-term visitors who stay a while and then move on. I wonder if other blogs have the same experience?

Most commented and visited post: Ian Plimer – Heaven and Earth

Blog subscribers (WordPress email — see top of left side bar): 144

Twitter feed: 555 followers, TFF ratio = 14.6

Most regular referring website: Climate Debate Daily (13,580 referrals); Most regularly referred website:  Deltoid (1,470 onward clicks)

Most popular Google search terms:  bravenewclimate,  Ian Plimer, integral fast reactor, barry brook, climate change skeptics, recycled

Most regular commenters: Barry Brook (1,465), Peter Lang (1,147), DV82XL (783), Finrod (650), John Newlands (645), eclipsenow (579), John Morgan (447), Geoff Russell (361), David Benson (323), Neil Howes (290), Ewen Laver (269), G.R.L. Cowan (268), TerjeP (229), Douglas Wise (228), Greg Meyerson (225), Fran Barlow (223), Charles Barton (196).

This list was done via individual searches (of registering email addresses — which I keep private, of course), so if you think you’ve been overlooked, let me know and I’ll tell you your magic number!

Okay, on to the top 10s (hits and # comments, in brackets):

Top 10 climate sceptics posts

1. Ian Plimer – Heaven and Earth (45,780; 1,028)

2. Spot the recycled denial III – Prof Ian Plimer (7,509; 40)

3. Sceptics (6,709; 15)

4. Dr David Evans: born-again ‘alarmist’? (6,324; 105)

5. Climate Denial Crock (5,072; 157)

6. What Bob Carter and Andrew Bolt fail to grasp (5,006; 185)

7. Dr Jennifer Marohasy ignores the climate science (2,813; 60)

8. Two denialist talking points quashed (2,732; 19)

9. Spot the recycled denial II – 60 Minutes ‘Crunch Time’ (2,433; 65)

10. The great climate debate 2009 – Brook vs Plimer (2,292; 49)

Top 10 climate information posts

1. Do most scientists really believe in global warming? (4828; 35)

2. Is there a link between Adelaide’s heatwave and global warming? (4,316; 95)

3. What if the sun got stuck? (3,964; 239)

4. Top 10 ways to reduce your CO2 emissions footprint (3,952; 16)

5. El Niño and sunspots return, sea ice doesn’t (3,817; 70)

6. How hot should it have really been over the last 30 years? (2,934; 50)

7. More ice, flat temperatures – what does it all mean? (2,619; 79)

8. Heatwave update and open letter to the PM (2,545; 85)

9. Will global warming cause a mass extinction event? (2,515; 48)

10. Two years, three record heat waves in southeastern Australia (1,932; 76)

Top 10 nuclear power posts

1. Sustainable Nuclear (7,575; 88)

2. Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) nuclear power Q&A (4849; 116)

3. Prescription for the Planet – Part II – newclear energy and boron-powered vehicles (3,324; 28)

4. Radiation – facts, fallacies and phobias (3,075; 248)

5. The Integral Fast Reactor – Summary for policy makers (2,947; 100)

6. Hypocrisies of the antis (2,849; 153)

7. Response to an Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) critique (2,742; 133)

8. Recent nuclear power cost estimates – separating fact from myth (2,735; 104)

9. Nuclear century outlook – crystal ball gazing by the WNA (2,708; 458)

10. A LFTR deployment plan for Australia (2,225; 62)

Top 10 renewable energy posts

1. Solar power realities – supply-demand, storage, and costs (6,538; 501)

2. Critique of ‘A path to sustainable energy by 2030′ (4,665; 189)

3. Emission cuts realities for electricity (4,563; 329)

4. Wind and carbon emissions – Peter Lang responds (3,336; 233)

5. Renewable Limits (3,043; 32)

6. Does wind power reduce carbon emissions? (3,018; 245)

7. Solar realities and transmission costs – addendum (2,975; 319)

8. TCASE 4: Energy system build rates and material inputs (2,622; 163)

9. Climbing mount improbable (2,347; 152)

10. Pumped-hydro energy storage – cost estimates for a feasible system (2,140; 119